US embassy cable - 03HANOI584

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DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON IRAQ

Identifier: 03HANOI584
Wikileaks: View 03HANOI584 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2003-03-11 08:57:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PREL MARR PTER VM IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS HANOI 000584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PTER, VM, IZ 
SUBJECT:  DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON IRAQ 
 
REF:  A.  HANOI 0567    B. FBIS SEP20030311000012 
-     C.  STATE 63629 
 
1.  (U)  In a meeting on March 10 devoted primarily to 
bilateral ties (ref a), senior Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung described Vietnam's "consistent" policy regarding 
Iraq:  The GVN opposed terrorism, opposed using the excuse 
of terrorism to invade another country, and opposed weapons 
of mass destruction.  He urged the international community - 
- working through the UN -- to use "peaceful means" to get 
Iraq to disarm.  (Ref b provides MFA spokeswoman's most 
recent iteration of the GVN position on March 7.)  He 
specifically noted that Vietnam would oppose a war against 
Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution.  He 
emphasized that Vietnam, as a victim of war, opposed war due 
to the suffering, losses, and deaths of innocent civilians. 
He noted that a resort to non-peaceful means would be 
"counter to civilization" in the 21st century. 
 
2.  (U)  DPM Dung added that Vietnam's "good relations" with 
Iraq were as two sovereign, independent states that do not 
interfere in each other's internal affairs and sought 
mutually beneficial economic ties.  He emphasized that Iraq 
had helped Vietnam during the US embargo on Vietnam by 
enabling it to purchase oil.  He noted that Vietnam owed 
Iraq USD 500 million for those purchases.  (Note:  It was 
not clear whether that was the original or remaining debt.) 
He said that Vietnam sold about USD 500 million worth of 
rice, milk, and other commodities to Iraq each year under 
the UN's Food for Oil Program. 
 
3.  (U)  Ambassador stressed that the U.S. did not seek war, 
which could have horrible and unpredictable consequences. 
He noted, however, as Secretary Powell had recently stated, 
that the time comes when a clear and credible threat of war 
is the only way to get a response.  He emphasized that 
Saddam Hussein's very small responses so far had come only 
because of these threats.  He urged Vietnam to use its good 
relations with Iraq to appeal to its leaders to do what they 
should have been doing regarding disarmament over the past 
twelve years.  He noted that UN inspectors had confirmed the 
existence of WMD programs in the 1990s, but we had yet to 
see sufficient explanations of where these weapons are now. 
He warned that failure to enforce UNSC resolutions could 
have serious consequences for the credibility of the 
institution, citing the example of the League of Nation's 
impotence when Italy invaded Abyssinia.  He stressed that 
"time was running out" for the Iraqi leadership to cooperate 
fully as required under UNSCR 1441 and earlier resolutions. 
DPM Dung reiterated his appeal for "peaceful methods" only. 
 
4.  (U)  Comment:  Vietnam has already made up its mind on 
Iraq and likely will continue to stick to what it sees as 
the moral high ground of opposing war in general.  We 
suspect even the passage of an additional UNSCR authorizing 
military action would not convince the GVN to add its public 
support to such efforts.  There is, sadly, little likelihood 
that the GVN would ever use whatever channels of 
communication exist between its leaders and Saddam Hussein 
to urge Iraq to do the right thing, and quickly.  End 
comment. 
 
5.  (U)  In light of the above, Embassy will not deliver ref 
c demarche request. 
PORTER 

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