US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1496

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001496 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NICOSIA FOR DRENZ/A/S DEWEY 
DEPT FOR PRM 
DEPT PASS AID FOR DHCA/OFDA - WGARVELINK 
EUCOM FOR J3, J5, SOJ7 AND POLAD 
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2013 
TAGS: EAID, IZ, PREF, PREL, MOPS, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S DEWEY AND 
HUMANITARIAN DELEGATION 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 1335 
 
 
(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch for 
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
 
1. (C) The Turkish Parliament,s March 1 vote rejecting 
deployment of U.S. troops, along with a worsening in 
Turkish-Kurdish tensions, has shaken the GOT and has 
increased the uncertainty surrounding Turkey,s ultimate 
choices on Iraq.  Whether or not there will be a Northern 
Option, your visit on humanitarian assistance planning 
provides the USG with a good opportunity to craft a 
cooperative approach to assistance and to maintain our 
dialogue with Turkey.  Key issues for your discussions 
include:  explaining our humanitarian strategy in Iraq as it 
affects Turkey; encouraging cooperation with NGOs and 
international organizations; establishing a framework for 
coordination with the GOT and others in this area.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
Aftermath of the March 1 Parliamentary Vote 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Parliament March 1 rejected the AK (Justice and 
Development) Party Government's petition to permit deployment 
of U.S. troops to Turkey.  A number of factors contributed to 
the outcome, particularly: 1) strong anti-war sentiment in 
the public, media, in Parliament on both sides of the aisle, 
and other organs of the Turkish state; 2) the secular Turkish 
State's fears about USG intentions in Iraq; 3) a desire by 
the traditional State to undercut the Islamist-oriented AK; 
and 4) AK's own internal political dynamics, rivalries, and 
ineptitude.  The AK Government is now badly shaken.  AK 
leader R. Tayyip Erdogan and P.M. Abdullah Gul were weakened, 
and U.S.-Turkish relations have come under strain despite 
affirmations on both sides.  Erdogan and Gul have hinted that 
the defeated proposal could resurface in another form.  Many 
observers believe it is not likely to emerge until after 
Erdogan, who was elected to Parliament in a special March 9 
election, becomes the Prime Minister. 
 
 
3. (SBU) Turkish relations with the Kurdish entities in 
northern Iraq have been particularly strained in recent days. 
 The population and leadership of northern Iraq is solidly 
opposed to Turkish intervention on humanitarian or other 
grounds.  On March 3, tens of thousands (some reports place 
the figure at 300,000 or more) demonstrators in Irbil marched 
in protest and several burned Turkish flags.  The Iraqi 
opposition in its conference final statement February 28 
rejected the prospect of Turkish military intervention.  The 
Iraqi Kurds have not given their agreement to have Turkish 
camps set up in the areas the KDP and PUK control, to have 
the Turkish Red Crescent operate there, nor to have 
additional Turkish troops stationed there.  The Turks are 
reacting harshly to these statements and to the 
demonstrations.  In a recent media interview, U/S Grossman 
cautioned against unilateral Turkish intervention in Iraq. 
 
 
GOT Contingency Planning 
------------------------ 
 
 
4. (C) Turkey has done contingency planning for a 
humanitarian crisis both on an internal, interagency basis 
and with international organizations.  It has designated 
airports (Gaziantep, Van and Erzurum) for humanitarian use. 
MFA told us on March 6 that it may open the port of Mersin, 
which is currently reserved for military use, to humanitarian 
needs.  The GOT plans to establish 18 &humanitarian aid 
collection zones8, to be run by the Turkish Red Crescent 
(TRC), in northern Iraq and Turkey which could handle up to 
276,000 refugees/displaced persons, but the GOT has said it 
will try to serve populations in need on the Iraqi side of 
their common border.  Turkey plans to repatriate displaced 
persons as soon as the security situation would permit this. 
Turkey has not attempted to coordinate its aid plan with the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), on whose territory the GOT intends to 
provide relief.  As we understand, the Department has taken a 
decision not to press Turkey to admit asylum seekers, and 
Embassy recommends that we not/not press the Turks to do so 
during your visit. 
 
 
5. (SBU) TRC has pre-positioned some resources, but there are 
gaps (principally tents) in its ability to respond in the 
event the full 276,000 persons need relief, in part because 
TRC is not supposed to dedicate more than 60 percent of its 
capacity to 
any single crisis. 
 
 
NGOs 
---- 
 
 
6. (SBU) The GOT has been wary of NGOs, and few have been 
able to officially register.  Since 1996, the Turkish-Iraqi 
border has been closed to NGOs with very few exceptions.  MFA 
told the Humanitarian Planning Team (HPT) that NGOs seeking 
to provide assistance to displaced persons in Turkey or in 
the border zone on Iraqi territory would have to register 
with the GOT, sign an MOU defining the scope of their 
activities, and coordinate with the TRC and/or UN agencies. 
MFA told us the GOT would be more flexible with respect to 
NGOs seeking to transit Turkey to deliver relief beyond the 
border zone in Iraq.  The GOT is willing in principle to 
approve applications on an ad hoc basis for NGOs focused on 
humanitarian relief, rather than human rights or political 
activism.  The International Rescue Committee has sent a 
representative to Turkey to make application, and other NGOs 
are expected to follow soon. 
 
 
Coordinating Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) The GOT plans to establish crisis/coordination centers 
in the Prime Ministry, MFA, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep and Van, 
among others, in the event of a conflict in Iraq.  MFA has 
also identified 42 diplomats to staff these centers. 
However, the GOT has been reluctant to activate any of them 
far in advance of a crisis.  In January, the HPT raised the 
importance of coordination between civilian and military 
planners in both our governments, as well as between them and 
international organizations and NGOs, pointing to the 
positive example of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) 
in Kuwait.  Embassy has urged the Turks to act on this 
recommendation. 
 
 
8. (C) Meanwhile, EUCOM/Military Coordination Liaison Command 
(MCLC) are developing plans for a Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Center (HACC) or Humanitarian Operations Center 
(HOC) in Diyarbakir.  However, some USG agencies have raised 
concerns that this configuration may not be as open to 
international humanitarian organizations and NGOs as other 
possible structures.  MCLC Commanding General Peter Osman 
will be in Ankara during your visit, providing an opportunity 
to consult internally on this issue.  Maj. General Osman 
would like to participate in your meetings with the GOT. 
 
 
9. (C) MFA has asked for a specific proposal, and has said it 
would like to establish guidelines or even an MOU on the 
coordination mechanism.  The GOT will expect to discuss this 
further with you during your meetings on March 12. 
 
 
Program and Recommendations 
--------------------------- 
 
 
10. (SBU) Embassy is arranging the following appointments for 
March 12:  mini-country team; an interagency meeting 
including MFA, Prime Ministry, Turkish General Staff (TGS), 
and Interior Ministry representatives, led by MFA 
Undersecretary for Multilateral Political Affairs; lunch with 
UN agencies; separate meeting with TGS; meeting with Turkish 
Red Crescent President; reception hosted by the Ambassador. 
As noted above, MCLC Commanding General Osman would like to 
join the delegation for meetings with the GOT. 
11. (C) Embassy recommends focusing on the following issues 
during your meetings with GOT officials: 
-- Overview of U.S. Strategy:  Emphasize our intention to 
minimize displacement and damage to humanitarian 
infrastructure in the event of a conflict, and that this will 
in turn work in Turkey,s interest by keeping the number of 
potential asylum seekers as low as possible. 
 
 
-- Role of International Organizations/NGOs:  Note that USG 
assistance will be channeled mainly through UN agencies and 
other humanitarian organizations.  Applaud Turkish 
cooperation with UN agencies and positive signals on NGO 
access to Iraq.  Encourage the GOT to give expeditious and 
favorable consideration to NGO applications, to the World 
Food Program,s registration in Turkey, and to the MOU 
governing UN activities when presented by the UN.  Note that 
we and other organizations will naturally seek to procure 
relief supplies locally once it is clear that aid can transit 
through Turkey. 
 
 
-- Coordination:  Encourage the GOT to activate a crisis 
center and establish a coordinating mechanism for 
humanitarian assistance as soon as possible.  We should seek, 
if at all possible, to present as much detail on our thinking 
for this mechanism (HACC, HOC or other).  This will help 
deflect the Turkish inclination to define it by means of an 
MOU or other written guidelines. 
 
 
-- Turkish Role in Northern Iraq:  The GOT foresees a large 
role for its Society in Northern Iraq, but the ICRC will have 
the mandate for coordinating relief in conflict zones and the 
KDP and PUK have their own contingency plans.  Urge the Turks 
to coordinate humanitarian assistance. 
PEARSON