US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1485

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, MARR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: CODEL WEXLER PRESSES RULING AK PARTY LEADER 
ERDOGAN FOR ACCELERATED RE-VOTE ON U.S. TROOP DEPLOYMENT 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: AK Party leader Erdogan initially told Codel 
Wexler March 8 he may need several weeks (until end March) to 
create the right conditions for parliamentary passage of a 
resolution permitting deployment of U.S. troops through 
Turkey.  When Codel and Ambassador pushed back that Turkey 
must take the decision the week of March 10, Erdogan 
countered that he will need "ten days" (until March 17 or 
18).  Ambassador asked to meet with Erdogan quickly to clear 
up directly all of Erdogan's misunderstandings.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) In an extended meeting with ruling AK Party chairman 
Erdogan evening March 8, Codel Wexler (Turkey Caucus 
co-chairmen Wexler (D-FL) and Winfield (R-KY) and Caucus 
member Rogers (R-MI)): 
 
 
--underscored that they had come to Turkey to express their 
concern at the potential damage to a six-decade friendship 
and alliance from the Turkish parliament's March 2 vote 
against U.S. troop deployment; 
 
 
--pointed out that the American people would be mindful of 
the reason for higher losses of U.S. troops if Turkey were 
not a part of the coalition; 
 
 
--emphasized that it would be inconceivable for the House of 
Representatives to turn down the mooted economic assistance 
package for Turkey if Turkey were in the coalition before an 
operation began; 
 
 
--noted that time is very short and pressed for a 
parliamentary re-vote the week of March 10. 
 
 
3. (C) Acknowledging he is focused on his campaign for 
election to parliament March 9 and subsequent assumption of 
the prime ministership sometime in late March, Erdogan said 
he does not want to risk a second, and fatal negative vote by 
rushing the re-submission of the deployment resolution.  He 
will need sufficient time to create the right atmosphere and 
then to plan next steps.  Some members of the current AK 
government cabinet voted against the resolution, a situation 
he does not want to re-occur.  One cannot trust the current 
government, which in any event will only be interim once P.M. 
Gul resigns after the election, to pass the resolution. 
Therefore it may be necessary to await formation of the new 
government.  Timing depends not only on unavoidable 
constitutional procedures but also on the willingness of 
President Sezer quickly to give Erdogan the mandate to form a 
new government.  The re-vote would thus come in about three 
weeks, i.e., at the end of March. 
 
 
4. (C) Erdogan amplified his views with assertions that his 
task is compounded by problems in U.S.-Turkish communications 
and on political, military, and economic questions. 
 
 
5. (C) U.S.-Turkish communications: At the moment when he and 
the GOT leadership were exposing themselves to great 
political risk by pushing the resolution in the face of 
opposition from political parties, NGOs, and the public, 
"ugly anti-Erdogan, anti-AK, and anti-Turkish cartoons" 
appeared in the U.S. press, Erdogan stated.  These cartoons 
became convenient material for the opposition CHP to use to 
humiliate AK M.P.s and change votes.  The USG has the power 
and influence to inform the U.S. media in the way it wants to 
(a remark which provoked disbelieving laughter from the 
Codel). 
 
 
6. (C) Political dimension: AK M.P.s were taken aback by the 
news which swept the assembly chamber before the vote that no 
Turkmen rep had been included in the six-man opposition 
leadership council announced by the opposition conference in 
Salahadeen, Erdogan said.  It is unacceptable for Turks to 
see the Turkmen not given equal status with the Arabs and 
Kurds as principal ethnic groups in Iraq.  In addition, AK 
M.P.s were embittered by the news of the burning of a Turkish 
flag by Kurdish demonstrators in N. Iraq.  They were angered 
by provocative statements by KDP leader Barzani, who has 
benefited from Turkish protection, and has traveled on a 
Turkish diplomatic passport, for more than a decade.  Rumors 
are now rampant that the U.S. is behind such anti-Turkish 
displays by the Kurds.  The U.S. must above all prevent 
Barzani from making such statements.  Then there was the 
March 8 statement by UK P.M. Blair that the coalition will 
block the occupation of N. Iraq by Turkish troops.  You want 
Turkey in the coalition but then use a stick to threaten us. 
We have a very weighty State tradition and we regret these 
kinds of statements.  We are watching carefully.  We will 
wait until the situation settles down to bring the resolution 
to the floor again, he asserted. 
 
 
7. (C) Military dimension: The citizens of Turkey had been 
under the impression that the 42,000 U.S. logistics troops 
would be based in N. Iraq.  When the news suddenly broke that 
they would be based in S.E. Turkey, there was a negative 
public reaction, and the opposition CHP and media immediately 
allied against such a deployment.  The negative campaign was 
compounded by U.S. demands to use airfields far from the 
front.  The negotiations thus did not create confidence, 
Erdogan averred. 
 
 
8. (C) Economic dimension: The U.S. side pushed the most 
important issues to a later date and refused to de-link the 
aid package from IMF conditionality.  How could the U.S. 
insist on maintaining such linkage on the eve of a war with 
all the risks that entails, Erdogan asked.  Then the U.S. 
objected to paying $100,000 (sic) in taxes.  The package's 
credit line will depend on Congressional approval.  But 
Congress won't approve the package -- if at all -- until two 
months after the operation begins, an operation that will 
last only a week.  Turkey will face immediate needs but will 
have to await the by-no-means certain outcome of Congress's 
deliberations.  What if Turkey takes advantage of the offer 
of an $8.5 billion bridge loan but then Congress fails to 
pass the package?  How will Turkey repay this loan? 
 
 
9. (C) Codel and Ambassador Pearson rejoined that: 
 
 
--The bridge loan will be available the day the operation 
starts. 
 
 
--Speaker of the House Hastert gave Fonmin Yakis and State 
Minister for the Economy Babacan a commitment -- 
unprecedented in the Ambassador's memory -- that if President 
Bush wants the package, it will pass the House. 
 
 
--The USG has persuasive answers for all the questions 
Erdogan raised, and it is clear the two sides need to sit 
down so that the U.S. can clear up any misunderstandings on 
the Turkish side.  Ambassador told Erdogan he would meet him 
at any time the weekend of March 8-9 if necessary to clear up 
all the remaining misunderstandings. 
 
 
10. (C) In a subsequent pull-aside between Erdogan and the 
Ambassador and Codel, Ambassador said that, according to the 
extended timetable Erdogan laid out, the coalition may be in 
Baghdad before the Turkish parliament reconsiders the 
deployment resolution.  Time is of the essence.  Turkey needs 
to take the decision soonest.  Erdogan replied that he will 
need "ten days" (until March 17 or 18). 
PEARSON