US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA619

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CCA,WHA/CEN, 
INR, S/CT, AND DS/ICI/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETTC, PINR, ASEC, EAID, HO, CU 
SUBJECT: GOH OPEN TO CUBA RESOLUTION IN GENEVA; REITERATES 
CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN MEDDLING IN INTERNAL HONDURAN POLITICS 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 03206 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.5 (B), and (D). 
 
1. (C)SUMMARY: WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Dan Fisk 
discussed Cuba in meetings with President Maduro, Foreign 
Minister Perez-Cadalso and Minister of Defense Fred Breve 
during his February 6-7 visit to Honduras.  Foreign Minister 
Guillermo Perez-Cadalso indicated that Honduras might be 
willing to vote for/co-sponsor a Cuba human rights resolution 
at the UN Commission on Human Rights, further noting that 
Honduras may obtain a seat on the commission.  Defense 
Minister Frederico Breve in another meeting once again raised 
concerns about Cuban meddling in internal Honduran politics. 
In the meeting with President Maduro, Fisk noted that 
President Maduro had raised concerns about Cuban meddling in 
Honduran affairs with former WHA A/S Reich in mid-2002.  Fisk 
also  reiterated the United States' disappointment with the 
way the restoration of full diplomatic relations between 
Honduras and Cuba had been handled in the last days of the 
previous Flores government.  While the U.S. preference would 
be to have President Maduro reconsider the status of GOH-Cuba 
relations, Fisk asked that, should Honduras name an 
Ambassador to Havana, at a minimum it should appoint a 
forceful advocate for human rights and civil society.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) The issue of Cuba was raised in DAS Fisk's February 
6-7 meetings  with President Maduro, Foreign Minister 
Perez-Cadalso, and Minister of Defense Fred Breve. In his 
meeting with the Foreign Minister, Fisk  noted that the U.S. 
remained  disappointed in the Honduran decision to normalize 
fully relations with Cuba and stated that the U.S. preference 
would be to have the decision reconsidered, appreciating the 
difficulty of such a move.  He also noted, from his 
discussions with the GOH Ambassador to the U.S., that 
Washington was aware that there was some continuing 
discussion within the GOH  over the naming of a Honduran 
ambassador to Cuba.  Fisk encouraged the GOH not to move 
ahead at this time, adding  that if the GOH felt compelled to 
do so, the U.S. hoped it would appoint a strong advocate for 
human rights and civil society  as the first Honduran 
ambassador to Cuba.  Fisk  emphasized the U.S. assessment 
that there has been no noticeable improvement in the human 
rights situation in Cuba and urged the GOH to engage Cuba on 
this issue, especially since President Maduro had raised it 
directly with then-A/S Reich last year. 
 
3. (C) Fisk reiterated these same points in his meeting with 
President Maduro as well and added that the U.S. would 
appreciate being given some forewarning if the GOH decided to 
move forward with naming an ambassador to Cuba.  Maduro once 
again claimed to have been completely uninformed of the 
decision by the outgoing government to normalize relations 
with Cuba.  He added a new wrinkle this time, telling Fisk 
that he had opposed the decision and had so communicated that 
view to the outgoing Honduran government. 
 
4. (C) DAS Fisk asked FM Perez-Cadalso for Honduras' support 
on the annual Cuba human rights resolution at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.  Perez-Cadalso replied that 
Honduras shared U.S. concerns about the human rights 
situation in Cuba and would be inclined to co-sponsor a 
resolution again this year.  More significantly, 
Perez-Cadalso informed Fisk that Honduras was working to 
obtain GRULAC support for one of the Latin American seats on 
the UNCHR.  While Perez-Cadalso did not offer an 
unconditional Honduran vote in favor of a Cuba CHR 
resolution,  he reaffirmed strongly that insistence on 
greater respect for human rights in Cuba was a fundamental 
tenet of Honduran foreign policy toward the island.  He added 
that given this context, the GOH would likely co-sponsor a 
resolution this year and would consider voting for a 
resolution as well. 
 
5. (C) Fisk mentioned that President Maduro's call to then 
WHA Assistant Secretary Otto Reich about Cuban meddling in 
internal affairs was not the only concern we had heard in the 
region about Cuban interference in internal affairs. He added 
that in his meeting earlier in the day MOD Breve had also 
raised the issue.  (In addition, President Maduro also 
touched on this problem in his meeting with DAS Fisk the next 
day.)   Fisk advised the FM that if Cuba meddles in Honduras, 
the GOH could send a strong message back by appointing an 
ambassador who would engage on democracy and human rights 
issues there.  He told the FM that the GOH would need a tough 
person in Havana to deal with the Cubans, someone who could 
send a message.  The FM accepted this point.  However, he 
noted that with more than 600 Hondurans now studying medicine 
in Cuba, it was very important to have a Honduran diplomatic 
presence there. 
 
6. (C) During his meeting with DAS Fisk, MOD Breve asked 
about the resurgence of leftist group activities throughout 
Latin American and opined that he felt there was an evident 
effort to coordinate activities, themes, and tactics across 
the region, particularly in Central America.  Breve said the 
GOH was concerned about the sources of funding for some labor 
unions and NGOs in Honduras and noted that there appeared to 
be a link to Cuban intelligence.  Fisk expressed agreement 
that this resurgence was worrisome and commented that Cuba 
was neither the sole source of support nor the threat it had 
once been.  He also cautioned Breve that in democratic 
societies political opposition exists and that civil dissent 
was a legitimate form of political expression.  Fisk conceded 
the need to be wary of efforts to manipulate that opposition, 
but pointed out that recognizing Cuba had not helped Honduras. 
 
7. (C) Breve then bemoaned the Liberal Party ties to Cuba and 
charged that the two sides were working together to promote 
the leftist agenda in Honduras.  He also opined that it was 
now obvious that the Liberals had normalized relations with 
Cuba in order to obtain resources to fund their political 
opposition to the Nationalist government. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT:  Given FM Perez-Cadalso's comments, we 
believe that Honduras could be a possible co-sponsor of a 
Cuba resolution.  Maduro's and Breve's comments on Cuban 
meddling follow a consistent pattern of concern that we are 
hearing.  However, as with so much in Honduras, there seems 
to be little or no effort to take action against the Cubans 
or to actually substantiate the alleged connections. 
Interestingly, FM Perez-Cadalso is the first GOH official 
(and we would have thought least likely on the national 
security team) to suggest a willingness to take action by 
reviewing the status of Cuban doctors in Honduras.  He added 
that he would try to remove them if they were involved in 
inappropriate political activities.  (There was a noticeable 
physical reaction against this comment by Vice Foreign 
Minister Anibal Quinonez, a career foreign service officer, 
who was in the meeting.)  Finally, Maduro's comment that he 
opposed normalization of relations with Cuba prior to the 
previous government's decision should be added to the annals 
of revisionist history.  At best, his transition advisors 
preserved his plausible deniability; at worst he acquiesced 
in the decision. 
Palmer