US embassy cable - 93HAVANA6938

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 006938 
 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS:        PTER, CU 
SUBJECT:     CUBA: 1993 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:         STATE 317207 
 
1.   (C)  SUMMARY.  THE SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN CUBA 
FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE HAS 
IMPOSED LIMITS ON CUBAN CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT 
TERRORISM ON ANYTHING LIKE PAST LEVELS.  POST IS NOT 
AWARE OF NEW EVIDENCE IN 1993 OF CUBAN MATERIAL SUPPORT 
FOR ARMED INSURGENCIES.  NEVERTHELESS, CUBA MAINTAINS 
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MOST "TERRORIST STATES" AND 
CONTINUES TO SERVE AS A REFUGE FOR KNOWN TERRORISTS. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.   (U)  MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS.  IN AN EFFORT 
TO APPEAL TO FELLOW LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, THE 
CUBAN REGIME HAS PUBLICLY TRIED TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM 
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE.  ENDING 
SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS IN COLOMBIA WAS SAID TO HAVE 
BEEN A PRE-CONDITION FOR FIDEL CASTRO'S VISIT TO 
CARTAGENA AUGUST 9-11, AND WAS PART OF THE JUSTIFICATION 
THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT GAVE FOR RESTORING DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS WITH HAVANA IN LATE OCTOBER.  AS FOR 
GUATEMALA, THE OTHER COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED BY FORMERLY 
CUBAN-BACKED REBELS, THE OFFICIAL CUBAN PRESS MADE 
GUARDEDLY CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS TOWARD THE PEACE 
PROCESS THERE DURING THE VISIT OF NOBEL LAUREATE 
RIGOBERTA MENCHU TO HAVANA IN EARLY AUGUST. 
 
3.   (U)  RELATIONS WITH TERRORIST STATES.  CUBA HAS 
FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH 
KOREA, AND SYRIA.  ALL THESE COUNTRIES HAVE EMBASSIES IN 
HAVANA, AS DOES CUBA IN EACH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE 
CAPITALS.  RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND NORTH KOREA ARE 
PARTICULARLY CLOSE AND HIGH PROFILE.  THE PLO IS ALSO 
REPRESENTED HERE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. 
 
4.   (U)  PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM.  THE 
REGIME-CONTROLLED CUBAN PRESS IS CAREFUL TO ESCHEW 
EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS.  NEVERTHELESS THERE 
PERSISTS A SLANT SYMPATHETIC TO "NATIONAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS" AND SELF-STYLED MARXIST MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE 
SHINING PATH.  IN ADDITION THE STRIDENT ANTI-U.S. LINE 
WHICH PERVADES CUBAN NEWS AND COMMENTARY SPILLS OVER 
INTO ATTACKS ON U.S. COUNTERTERROR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS 
THE SANCTIONS ON LIBYA, WHICH THE CUBANS HOLD UP AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF THE WEST'S "DOUBLE STANDARD.  AFTER YEARS OF 
ONE-SIDED COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN ISSUES, THE CUBAN 
PRESS TREATED THE SEPTEMBER PEACE ACCORD RELATIVELY 
OBJECTIVELY. 
 
5.   (U)  HARBORING/TRAINING FOREIGN TERRORISTS.  POST 
IS NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN 1993. 
BASQUE TERRORISTS WHO SOUGHT REFUGE HERE SOME YEARS AGO 
REMAIN, BUT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED THE SPANISH 
EMBASSY THAT NO FURTHER ASYLEES WOULD BE ACCEPTED. 
SEVERAL THOUSAND FOREIGN STUDENTS FROM FORMER MARXIST 
REGIMES LIKE SOUTH YEMEN OR NATIONAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE POLISARIO OR THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S 
LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTINUE TO ATTEND SPECIAL SCHOOLS 
ON THE ISLE OF YOUTH.  HOWEVER THE MILITARY OR 
PARA-MILITARY COMPONENT OF THESE PROGRAMS APPEARS TO 
HAVE BEEN REDUCED OR LARGELY ELIMINATED, AND THE NUMBERS 
OF STUDENTS HAVE DECLINED, WITH FEW IF ANY NEW ARRIVALS. 
 
6.   (U)  THERE HAVE BEEN NO PROSECUTIONS OR 
EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORISTS MADE PUBLIC IN CUBA IN 1993. 
 
 
SULLIVAN