US embassy cable - 03SANAA442

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TERRORISM FINANCE: REQUEST FOR POST VIEWS ON DESIGNATION OF AL-AQSA FOUNDATION

Identifier: 03SANAA442
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA442 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-03-06 12:17:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: KVPR CVIS ETTC EFIN PTER PREL YM TERFIN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 000442 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR AMBASSADORS/DCMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2012 
TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, ETTC, EFIN, PTER, PREL, YM, TERFIN 
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: REQUEST FOR POST VIEWS ON 
DESIGNATION OF AL-AQSA FOUNDATION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 54754 
 
Classified By: AMB: EJHULL BASED ON REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Reftel's proposed designation, under E.O. 13224, 
of the Al-Aqsa Foundation branch in Yemen involves important 
U.S. interests in the global war on terrorism and potentially 
as well US-Yemeni cooperation in that war.  From vantage of 
Embassy Sanaa, our highest priorities at the moment are: (a) 
building a strong bilateral USG-ROYG counter-terrorism 
structure to deal with remaining Al-Qa'ida HVTs in Yemen 
(ORCA has a specific proposal now pending with the PSO); (b) 
following up on the arrest of Al-Moayad and turning off 
illicit Al-Aqsa Foundation activities; and (c) maintaining a 
stable working relationship with the Yemeni government 
through the Iraq conflict.    Following up on the arrest of 
Al-Moayad and turning off Al-Aqsa Foundation illicit 
activities in support of terrorism must be and can be done in 
a way that is compatible with our other immediate priorities. 
 
2. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa believes that if there were an 
immediate designation of Al-Aqsa Foundation in Yemen, the 
Yemeni government (and public) would have a strongly negative 
reaction.  A public uproar would immediately ensue, 
highlighted by pro-Palestinian demonstrations orchestrated by 
the opposition Islaah party, senior leaders of which, 
including Al-Moayad, founded the local Al-Aqsa Foundation in 
the early 1990's.  Islaah would attempt to make political hay 
alleging American anti-Islamic and anti-Palestinian policies, 
and the government and the president's GPC party would be 
thrown on the defensive over the "holy issue of Jerusalem" 
during the last month of campaigning before Yemen's 
parliamentary elections April 27. None of that would be in 
U.S. interests. 
 
3. (S/NF) Our understanding is that the ROYG has kept an 
arm's length from Al-Aqsa Foundation activities.  It is a 
legally registered NGO put up and maintained by Islaah. 
Designation of the Al-Aqsa Foundation may, eventually, and on 
a broader basis, be a sound step to take in our efforts 
against global terrorism.  Immediate designation, in Yemen 
alone, would not be. 
 
4. (S/NF) The now public affidavit in support of the arrest 
of Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad provides considerable 
wealth of detail to corroborate his material support and 
resources to foreign terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda and 
Hamas.  We need to prepare the ground so that the reaction by 
key ROYG officials to this information is one of 
understanding, recognition, and appreciation.  For this 
purpose, Ambassador will shortly draw to the Foreign 
Minister's attention key facts about Sheikh Al-Moayad's 
activities inimical to U.S. and Yemeni government interests, 
drawn from the publicly released affidavit.  Embassy Sanaa 
will not repeat not alert ROYG officials regarding possible 
USG steps to designate Al Aqsa Foundation.  However, it is 
essential that we initiate discreet private contacts with 
senior Yemeni officials about the public evidence against 
Al-Moayad so that they do not misunderstand USG actions 
against Al-Moayad and draw conclusions inimical to our 
interests.  It would be counter-productive for our efforts in 
this regard to also have to be fighting a public battle with 
the ROYG on Al-Aqsa designation. 
 
5. (S/NF) (S/NF) Rather than immediate designation of the 
Al-Aqsa Foundation branch in Yemen, Embassy Sanaa proposes 
that relevant USG agencies -- diplomatic, law enforcement, 
and intelligence -- assemble more information in order to 
target more broadly Al-Aqsa Foundation offices not just in 
Yemen, but elsewhere in the Middle East, Europe, and wherever 
they are located. 
HULL 

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