US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO381

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03-06-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PHUM, PINR, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Adviser to president indicates that PA party 
and radical JVP are inching closer to pact 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 280; (B) Colombo 175 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met March 5 with Ronnie 
De Mel, a close adviser to the president and a senior 
MP.  In a change of tune from a previous meeting, De Mel 
indicated that a formal linkup between the PA and the 
radical JVP party was a real possibility and could come 
soon.  If it happened, elections were also a 
possibility.  The Ambassador urged great caution in 
working with the JVP given its anti-peace process, anti- 
economic reform views.  De Mel's comments heighten our 
concern that the domestic political situation may be in 
for some flux, with negative implications for the peace 
process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
============================== 
PA-JVP Linkup:  Inching Closer 
============================== 
 
2.  (C) On March 5, Ambassador Wills met with Ronnie De 
Mel, a  close adviser to President Kumaratunga and a 
senior MP in her People's Alliance (PA) party. 
(Note:  For additional bio-data on De Mel, a long-time 
Sri Lankan politician with a colorful past, see Ref B.) 
When queried, De Mel -- in a decided change of tune from 
a previous meeting -- indicated that a formal alliance 
between the PA and the Sinhalese extremist Janantha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party was a real, near-term 
possibility.  (Note:  In a late January conversation, De 
Mel had downplayed the possibility of such a linkup -- 
see Ref B.)  De Mel confirmed that representatives from 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the key constituent 
element in the PA, were meeting virtually every week 
with the JVP in an attempt to hammer out a memorandum of 
understanding. 
 
3.  (C) While noting that he was not personally involved 
in the talks, he said he understood that progress was 
being made in putting together an agreement.  That said, 
he had heard that major sticking points remained, and 
involved peace process and economic reform issues. 
These were problematic, complex issues, and it was not 
at all clear whether the two sides could reach agreement 
on how to handle them.  If differences were bridged, 
however, it was possible that an agreement could be 
concluded within weeks, but probably not before May.  On 
this point, De Mel added that the president had given 
him the green light to go on vacation for the next eight 
weeks, telling him that she doubted any urgent matters 
(i.e., announcement of a PA/JVP pact) would arise in 
that timeframe. 
 
4.  (C) As for his own views, De Mel indicated that he 
could accept a PA/JVP linkup under the right 
circumstances, e.g., provided the JVP agreed to support 
the peace process and economic reforms.  Asked whether 
any PA MP's might cross-over to the United National 
Party (UNP) government if a pact with the JVP was 
reached, De Mel shrugged his shoulders, commenting that 
it all depended on whether the outlines of an agreement 
were acceptable to party members.  (Note:  In Ref B 
conversation, De Mel had claimed that up to 25 PA MP's 
might be prepared to work with the UNP under the right 
circumstances.)   He added that he personally preferred 
the idea of the PA's joining in an alliance with the 
UNP.  The latter idea, however, did not seem likely to 
go anywhere:  President Kumaratunga and UNP leader Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe could not get along with each 
other in any way, shape, or form.  The Ambassador 
remarked that we had noticed that unfortunate fact. 
 
============================= 
Ambassador's Words of Caution 
============================= 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that Sri Lanka was a 
democracy and as such the U.S. took no view on its 
internal matters.  That said, he urged the PA to 
exercise great caution in working with the JVP given its 
stridently anti-peace process, anti-economic reform 
views.  A PA-JVP alliance could have a profoundly 
negative impact on the peace process.  The Tamil Tigers, 
for example, could end the talks, pointing to the PA/JVP 
alliance as the reason.  In this sense, a PA/JVP 
alliance could be a gift to the LTTE, which could 
plausibly argue that the Sinhalese could not be trusted. 
International sympathy for the LTTE, in other words, 
could accrue in the event of a PA/JVP pact. 
 
6.  (C) Underlining that she had the final say regarding 
the nature of any agreement with the JVP, De Mel replied 
that he was certain that President Kumaratunga would not 
agree to anything that undermined the peace process. 
She had always been in favor of peace and remained 
committed to ethnic reconciliation.  The Ambassador 
agreed that that was the case, but JVP extremism had to 
be dealt with very, very carefully.  De Mel replied that 
the SLFP had had success in the past in "taming" and 
subsuming left-wing parties.  Many in the party felt 
that the JVP could be handled and controlled in a 
similar manner.  In any case, it was doubtful that the 
JVP would push for cabinet positions if there were an 
election in which a PA/JVP combination won.  (Note:  As 
a matter of background, the PA and JVP briefly entered 
into a governing pact in late 2001.  The JVP turned down 
ministerial positions in that short-lived government.) 
 
========== 
Elections? 
========== 
 
7.  (C) Queried about the possibility of new 
parliamentary elections if there were a PA/JVP linkup, 
De Mel responded that it was a possibility, although no 
decisions had been reached.  He noted that there were 
some in the PA who felt that the party could defeat the 
UNP government with the addition of JVP support.  De Mel 
said he tended to agree with this view, noting that the 
PA's and JVP's combined vote had slightly surpassed that 
of the UNP in the December 2001 election.  (Note:  On 
the numbers, De Mel is correct:  the UNP and allies 
received 48.1 percent vs. the PA's 39.2 percent and the 
JVP's 9.5 percent, which equaled a total of 48.7 
percent.  FYI:  After their short-lived government 
collapsed in late 2001, the PA and JVP ran different 
slates of candidates in the December 2001 election, 
dividing their combined vote in constituencies.  End 
Note.)  The PA's alliance with the radical JVP might 
cost it some support among the middle class, but 
probably not too much.  In any case, he continued, the 
UNP government was rapidly losing popularity.  People -- 
especially in rural areas -- were angry at cost of 
living hikes and were eager to take it out on the 
government.  Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was a clever 
politician, who knew how to use the press, but he was 
indecisive and people were seeing through him. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
8.  (C) De Mel -- who chooses his words carefully and is 
in a position to know -- was clearly signaling that work 
on a PA/JVP pact was proceeding quickly and that 
something potentially could be announced soon.  This was 
a far cry from his previous comments to the Ambassador, 
which indicated that things were moving much more 
slowly.  (Note:  FYI.  We doubt De Mel's calculus that 
such a linkup would easily defeat the UNP if an election 
took place soon.  While the government might be losing 
some popularity due to economic problems, we think it 
remains relatively strong.) 
 
9.  (C) His comments heighten our concern that the 
domestic political situation could be in for some flux. 
We cannot see how a PA/JVP linkup, if it comes to pass, 
could be good news for the peace process.  Not too far 
underneath the surface of its leftist rhetoric, the JVP 
is a Sinhalese extremist party and Tamils know that. 
One can only guess at the reaction of the Tigers, but, 
given their volatility, they could -- in a worst case 
scenario -- use such a pact as a pretext to end the 
peace process.  At this point, we do not think it is 
time to hit the panic button, but the U.S. needs to 
monitor the situation carefully, while cautioning actors 
on the need to proceed with Sri Lanka's larger national 
interests in mind.  We might consider enlisting others 
in the international community (UK, India) to make a 
similar case if present trends continue.  END COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS