US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU408

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOISTS STEP UP PRE-TALK DEMANDS, 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 0312 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) The declaration of a ceasefire between the Government 
of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents on January 29 has led to 
little discernible progress toward actual peace negotiations 
thus far.  Neither side has committed to a code of conduct 
governing the truce, the GON has not yet named its 
negotiating team, and neither a date nor a venue for talks 
has been agreed upon.  The Maoists are exploiting the 
apparent lack of movement to complain about the GON's failure 
to meet their ever-burgeoning list of demands, while 
continuing to send out feelers to the mainstream political 
parties and, more recently, selected embassies.  The Palace's 
continued delay in enlisting the support of the political 
parties has left the GON ill equipped to counter the Maoists' 
two-pronged charm offensive, relying instead on the able--but 
by no means infallible--Narayan Singh Pun, Minister for 
Physical Works, as its public face on the peace process. End 
summary. 
 
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MAOIST LIST OF DEMANDS, ANTI-GON COMPLAINTS LENGTHENS 
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2.  (SBU)  As the ceasefire between the Government of Nepal 
(GON) and the Maoists enters its fifth week, there have been 
no indications that the two sides are substantially closer to 
agreeing to a timetable or agenda for negotiations than when 
the truce was first announced.  Neither side has yet 
committed to a code of conduct governing offensive and 
defensive actions during the ceasefire, despite the plethora 
of draft codes being churned out by assorted human rights 
groups, including the National Human Rights Commission, on 
almost a daily basis.  Other than Narayan Singh Pun, Minister 
of Physical Planning, the GON has not yet appointed any other 
negotiators to its team, although it has announced the 
formation of a blue-ribbon panel, including a former Army 
Chief and former Chief of Police, to advise the team once 
talks begin. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The Maoists, meanwhile, appear to be intensifying 
their anti-GON propaganda, using the mainstream media to 
publicize an ever-growing list of new pre-conditions 
(including the repeal of anti-terrorism legislation passed in 
the previous Parliament; the release of all Maoist detainees; 
and the recall of the Royal Nepal Army to barracks) that they 
then castigate the GON for having failed to meet.  The 
insurgents have begun flagging such "failures" in their 
public statements as possible reasons the ceasefire may 
eventually  break down.  For example, in an interview 
published February 28 in a leading vernacular daily, Maoist 
negotiator Krishna Mahara blamed the post-ceasefire arrests 
of several Maoist cadre for making the Maoists "less assured" 
about the future of peace talks.  One day later, the 
Kathmandu Post, the largest-circulation English daily, 
reported Mahara and fellow Maoist spokesman Dinanath Sharma 
as citing the GON's "unnecessary delay" in naming members of 
its negotiating team as evidence that it is "neglecting the 
truce."  Ratcheting up the volume one notch higher, Maoist 
negotiator Mahara was quoted in the mainstream press yet 
again on March 5 as warning that the insurgents might pull 
out of peace talks completely unless the GON orders the Army 
confined to barracks. 
 
4.  (C)  The GON, however, is unlikely to issue such a 
redeployment order.  In the absence of a code of conduct, 
many commanders have ordered their troops to apprehend 
Maoists observed openly carrying arms.  Brig. Gen. Gaurav 
Rana, commander of the 5th Brigade in the far-western region, 
told us he has given his soldiers standing orders to make 
such arrests.  Soldiers under his command arrested 14 armed 
Maoists at a public meeting in Kanchanpur District and 
clashed with armed Maoists in Bajhang District, killing two, 
at the end of February.  Since then, he noted, sightings of 
armed Maoists in his AOR have declined markedly. 
 
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MAOISTS MEETINGS 
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5.  (SBU)  The Maoists are also continuing efforts to reach 
out to the mainstream political parties, both in Kathmandu 
and in remote rural districts (Reftel).  The parties 
obviously are flattered by the attention and seeming respect 
accorded them--especially when they feel themselves ignored 
and slighted by the Palace.  Party leaders  rush to report 
the meetings, complete with Maoist party line, to the local 
media, thereby ensuring the insurgents free, sometimes 
sympathetic front-page coverage.  For example, mainstream 
dailies on March 4 carried a Nepali Congress Central 
Committee member's account of one such meeting, including 
verbatim Maoist complaints of the GON "not fulfilling its 
part for peaceful dialogue," coupled with the disingenuous 
claim that the Maoists are committed to safeguarding 
democracy. 
 
6.  (C)  Along with the charm offensive targeting political 
parties, the Maoists are sending out feelers to certain 
diplomatic missions in Kathmandu.  The Danish DCM told our 
DCM that his mission, along with such others as the Swiss and 
Norwegians, had recently received a back-channel request for 
a meeting with unidentified Maoist representatives.  The 
Danish DCM said that no such meeting had yet been agreed to 
or scheduled, although he indicated the request was under 
active review.  He undertook to advise us of any further 
developments. 
 
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PALACE PUTS STOCK IN PUN 
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7.  (C)  The Maoist pitch to the parties may be receiving a 
comparatively sympathetic reception in part because the 
Palace persists in neglecting them.  Pashupati Rana, General 
Secretary of the National Democratic Party (which is 
 
SIPDIS 
generally perceived as closest to the Palace), told the DCM 
that he believes King Gyanendra is unrealistically confident 
that the current discussions will lead, eventually, to a 
stable peace.  Rana said that the King, who has had little 
previous experience with this kind of political dialogue, may 
be over-estimating prospects for peace and may thus 
(mistakenly) be in no hurry to cultivate the parties.  In 
Rana's view, the King may be putting too much faith in the 
abilities of Minister Pun, whose political acumen for this 
particular task Rana doubts.  (Rana himself has not met with 
the King since the declaration of the ceasefire.)  A 
prominent banker who had known the King well during his days 
as Nepal's leading businessman noted a naivete about certain 
topics--unexpected in someone with a reputation as a savvy 
entrepreneur--that he suspects may be coloring the monarch's 
interpretation of Maoist motives and his expectations for 
successful dialogue. 
 
8.  (C)  Former colleagues of Pun from the Nepali Congress 
Party like Ram Sharan Mahat, a former finance and foreign 
minister, and C.P. Bastola, a former foreign minister and 
negotiator in the last round of talks, echo some of Rana's 
reservations about whether Pun has the political canniness to 
deal with the cagey and manipulative Maoists.  (Note:  Mahat 
and Bastola may have their own partisan reasons to criticize 
Pun, who left the Nepali Congress to form his own party, as 
well.  End note.)  Critics of the GON's reliance on Pun as 
sole point-man note that the GON ceded much to gain the 
ceasefire, including the withdrawal of its designation of the 
Maoists as terrorists, without obtaining commensurate 
concessions from the Maoists.  Even the Maoists' purported 
commitment to drop their objection to the constitutional 
monarchy appears to be more illusory than actual.  According 
to the Indian Ambassador, Pun has admitted that he has been 
unsuccessful in obtaining the written renunciation of such 
anti-monarchical aims from Maoist leader Prachanda that Pun 
had claimed to have in hand before announcement of the 
ceasefire.  Since Pun had indicated that the King made Maoist 
acceptance of the constitutional monarchy a pre-condition to 
talks, the admission that the GON has no such commitment has 
deepened the Indian Ambassador's already pessimistic view of 
prospects for productive dialogue. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C)  Many observers remain suspicious about the Maoists' 
true intentions in agreeing to the ceasefire, fearing they 
may use the moratorium to resupply, regroup, and recruit, 
rather than to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement.  The 
Maoists' front-page grousing about the GON's failure to 
fulfill an ever-shifting list of unrealistic demands mirrors 
their behavior during the previous abortive round of talks in 
late 2001, and could indicate that they are laying the 
groundwork for an evenual walk-out.  Before such an event 
takes place, however, we expect the Maoists will send ample 
warning--most likely through surrogate mouthpieces in 
far-left political and human rights organizations--claiming 
the futility of further dialogue for spurious reasons.  Pun 
seems a relatively good choice as lead GON interlocutor with 
the Maoists for a number of reasons.  He appears genuinely 
committed to working for the national good and lacks the 
narrow partisanship that poisons so much of Nepal's domestic 
political discourse.  As a former Army officer, he is more 
likely to be trusted as an honest broker by the security 
forces and the Palace.  At the same time, as a Magar tribal 
from the remote northwestern district of Myagdi, he shares 
the same ethnicity and a similar background as many Maoist 
foot-soldiers.  That said, his lack of experience as a 
negotiator raises legitimate questions regarding his ability 
to see through Maoist chicanery.  We continue to be concerned 
by the Palace's delay in more effectively enlisting the 
parties' support.  However well-intentioned Pun may be, his 
efforts are unlikely to succeed as long as the parties feel 
they are being purposely excluded--a point the Maoists, in 
their continuing outreach to mainstream political 
leaders--seem to appreciate fully. 
MALINOWSKI