US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1357

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P, NEA/NGA, EUR/SE, PMAT, AND L; OSD FOR ISA, ISP 
AND LEGAL; JCS FOR J3, J5 AND LEGAL; EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5, 
POLAD AND LEGAL; CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD; 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: FEB 26 SESSION: US/TU TEAMS AGREE ON TEXT FOR OPS 
MOU 
 
REF: A) STATE 50934 B) ANKARA 1246 C) ANKARA 1270 
     D)ANKARA 1345 
 
 
(u) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch. 
Reasons:  1.5 (B and D) 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S) The US and TU negotiating teams reached agreement on 
all of the remaining outstanding issues in the operations 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Feb 26.  After seven hours 
of talks during the morning 2/26, the two sides agreed to 
language on all issues but one:  fuel services-related costs. 
 The Turks agreed to the USG position on taxation (no taxes) 
and agreed to operate under command and control arrangements 
worked out in advance between US and Turkish forces if 
Turkish forces engage in activities south of the Green Line 
in response to a request from the US.  At approximately 1530 
that same day, the MFA informed the Embassy that the GOT side 
had accepted the US team's counter-proposed language on fuel 
services-related costs that Ambassador Pearson had presented 
to U/S Ziyal at 1430 that same day (ref c).  The US continues 
to hold off in responding to the TU acceptance of this 
language until the remaining issues in the other two MOUs are 
worked out, and until the situation becomes more clear 
following Parliament's March 1 rejection of a motion that 
would have allowed the US to deploy troops for operations 
against Iraq (ref d).  The US/TU teams have nearly completed 
scrubbing the more than 60-page text, and it has been 
e-mailed to appropriate Washington agencies, CENTCOM and 
EUCOM.   Para 10 contains the agreed upon text for the 
section of the MOU (Annex C - Operations - para 7(b)) that 
pertains to activities in northern Iraq.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
2/26 SESSION: BREAKTHROUGH ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
2. (S) During seven hours of talks 2/26, the US and TU 
negotiating teams reached agreement on all but one (fuel 
services-related costs) of the outstanding issues in the 
operations MOU identified in ref b.  Following is an 
issue-by-issue summary of the agreements reached by the 
parties: 
 
 
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TAXES 
----- 
 
 
3. (S) The Turks agreed to the USG position on taxes. 
Despite numerous unsuccessful attempts to insert the "and as 
applied" language in Article IV(h) of the cover MOU, the US 
side agreed to the tax relief language that is based on that 
agreed to in the Site Prep MOU.  The Turks agreed to the USG 
position that we not pay taxes on official expenditures. 
Below is the agreed upon text for the section of the MOU 
pertaining to taxes (cover MOU, Article IV, (h): 
 
 
"For the sole purposes of the present MOU, defense 
expenditures by or on behalf of the U.S. for the services 
rendered and commodities provided to the forces of the 
Sending Party in Turkey as covered by Turkish Tax Law No. 
6426 dated 1954, as amended in 1992, shall be exempted from 
taxes, duties, fees and charges as stipulated therein. 
Regarding personal expenditures of the members of the Sending 
Party forces provisionally deployed in Turkey for the 
purposes of this MOU, application of other taxes, duties, and 
fees in force shall not be affected, and such expenditures 
shall be subject to the taxes, duties and fees relating to 
purchases and services chargeable under Turkish laws and 
fiscal regulations." 
 
 
----------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
----------------------- 
 
 
4. (S) While the US team conceded on this point and agreed to 
delete the language in the scope on this subject, Ambassador 
Lino laid down the marker that she was accepting deletion of 
this phrase (and deflecting a GOT threat to revive and 
present, at the last minute, a draft humanitarian assistance 
annex) with the mutual understanding that combat troops have 
an inherent duty to provide for assistance to civilian 
populations in combat zones, insofar as it is possible. 
Bolukbasi replied by stating that the subject of humanitarian 
assistance had been discussed on a military-to-military basis 
and whatever arrangements would be made would fall under the 
aegis of Turkish legislation and regulation on the subject 
(i.e., taxation).  Lino countered that she understood an 
implementing arrangement would be devised to regulate the 
understandings between our militaries on this question. 
 
 
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NBC EQUIPMENT 
------------- 
 
 
5. (S) The US delegation pressed hard to include "as 
available" in the text and sought clarification that "in 
Turkish territory" did not exclude northern Iraq (ref a). 
The Turkish side stressed the importance they attached to 
receiving NBC assets to protect the Turkish population 
against a WMD attack.  The Turks wanted to try to work in 
language in the MOU that would have committed us ("to the 
maximum extent possible" was their wording) to provide NBC 
equipment and assets to the Turkish population to protect 
them against a possible attack.  The team stressed that the 
US was committed to doing everything possible to defend 
Turkey against a WMD attack and to helping the Turkish 
population in the event of an attack, but noted that US only 
had a limited supply of NBC equipment and the equipment that 
would be brought into Turkey would be tied to the US forces. 
In the end, the Turkish side said it understood and agreed to 
accept the US language.  Following is the agreed upon text 
for para 2(b) of the Operations Annex: 
 
 
"The Sending Party may deploy Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) assets (detection, bio-chemical), protection 
(personal, collective) and decontamination into Turkey to 
mitigate NBC risk in case of an Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) attack in Turkish territory. The Sending 
Party will also provide NBC support, to the maximum extent 
feasible, for Turkish personnel exposed to NBC contamination. 
Any personnel exposed to NBC contamination should be 
decontaminated at the location of the incident or at a 
facility with decontamination capability." 
 
 
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FUEL-SERVICES RELATED COSTS 
--------------------------- 
 
 
6. (S) The Turks held firm in insisting that the US pay a 
price the same as the actual cost (unspecified and "top 
secret") paid by Turkish forces.  The US remained equally 
 
SIPDIS 
firm on its position that we were prepared to pay the same 
price for similar fuel-related services minus any taxes.  The 
two sides adjourned at 1300 without having resolved the 
issue.  In a follow-on meeting with U/S Ziyal, Ambassador 
Pearson suggested that they agree to a concept that would 
ensure that the US paid a fair and reasonable base price 
(minus taxes) for fuel-related services, and provided Ziyal 
compromise language that met both parties needs (ref c). 
Ziyal said he would have to ask the Prime Minister, given the 
large sum of money involved.  Just after the Ambassador 
arrived back at the Embassy, the MFA called to say that the 
GOT side had accepted our language but asked for US 
confirmation that we could seal the deal on this basis.   As 
of the writing of this cable (3/3), the US continues to hold 
off in responding to the TU acceptance of this language until 
the remaining issues in the other two MOUs are worked out, 
and until the situation becomes more clear following 
Parliament's March 1 rejection of a motion that would have 
allowed the US to deploy troops for operations against Iraq 
(ref d). 
 
 
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ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
--------------------------- 
 
 
7. (S) Principles:  The US team continued to argue that we 
needed language before the beginning of para 7(b) in the 
operations annex (the part that discussed activities in 
northern Iraq) that maintained reference to northern Iraq and 
allowed us to maintain flexibility in light of the situation 
on the ground (ref a).  The Turks agreed to accept some 
language to this effect, but insisted that it be placed as 
the second sentence at the beginning of the annex (vice 
before para seven, subsection b - the US preference).  Given 
the flexibility of the US position on location, the US team 
agreed, but insisted that the words "in Turkey" also be 
included to note that the activities discussed in the annex 
were to take place in both Turkey and in northern Iraq. 
Following is the agreed upon text that appears at the 
beginning of Annex C of the MOU: 
 
 
"This Annex covers the Receiving Party and the Sending Party 
relations in Turkey and in the Northern Front and sets forth 
principles for activities in Turkey and in northern Iraq in 
the event of operations under this MOU." 
 
 
8. (S) Tick 3:  Ambassador Lino deployed the compromise 
language provided in ref a.  After reviewing the text, 
Ambassador Bolukbasi erupted, accusing the US of trying to 
limit Turkey's ability to fight terrorism.  He added that 
fighting terrorists -- particularly PKK/KADEK -- was one of 
Turkey's national priorities, and questioned what he 
perceived to be an attempt by the US to limited Turkey's 
ability in this area.  Lino noted that our intention was not 
to limit Turkey's ability to combat terrorism, but rather to 
clarify the language that the two sides had agreed upon ad 
ref the previous night.  Bolukbasi said that if that was the 
US position, there was no need to continue discussions and 
started to leave.  Lino responded that it would be more 
useful for the parties to continue in order to reach an 
agreement as soon as possible.  Bolukbasi declined and said 
he had to consult with his authorities on this matter of 
national importance.  After approximately 45 minutes, during 
a private meeting with Bolukbasi which she requested, Lino 
reiterated that the USG appreciated the importance that 
Turkey attaches to combating terrorism.  She told Bolukbasi 
that in light of the importance of the issue, the USG could 
agree to text that the parties had agreed to ad ref the other 
evening, with a minor change.  Bolukbasi concurred. 
 
 
9. (s) Tick 4:  This was by far the most sensitive issue in 
the negotiations on activities in northern Iraq and the most 
difficult to resolve.  During the 2/26 morning session, the 
Turkish side rejected both of the alternatives presented by 
the US (ref a) as being too restrictive.  The Turkish side 
then presented the US side with two sets of proposed language 
-- neither of which were acceptable to the US.  After 
considerable back and forth in which both sides agreed in 
principle that the aim was to devise language that met both 
of our needs while respecting each others' red-lines, the 
Turkish side left the room and came back nearly 30 minutes 
later with language that came closer to meeting USG needs. 
After some editing and refining and a small group meeting, 
the US side said it could agree to the text ad ref, but said 
it would have to clear it with senior US military authorities 
before it could be inserted into in the MOU.  After clearing 
the language with CENTCOM DCOM Gen Abazaid and JCS DJS LTG 
Casey, the US team notified the Turkish team that the text 
was acceptable. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
AGREED UPON TEXT FOR ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
10. (S) Below is the agreed upon text for para 7(b) of the 
Annex C (Operations): 
 
 
Activities in Northern Iraq: 
 
 
(1) The Parties will be responsible for providing logistic 
support along national lines. 
 
 
(2) All units will remain under their national command, and 
all their plans, activities and objectives will be 
coordinated and de-conflicted. 
 
 
(3) Receiving Party SOF will not be involved with any armed 
engagement against Iraqi forces or any Iraqi opposition group 
except in situations requiring combating terrorists, 
including PKK/KADEK, or the exercise of the right of 
self-defense or in circumstances enshrined in paragraph (4) 
below. 
 
 
(4) Armed conflict between Iraqi  opposition groups or 
attempts by them to cross the Green Line (de facto line as 
depicted in Appendix-4) shall be closely monitored by Sending 
Party forces and the Parties will exchange necessary 
information on opposition group activity across the Green 
Line in a timely manner. Close coordination shall be 
maintained for any follow up action when required in such 
emergency situations involving hostile activities contrary to 
the principles in this section of the MOU that should be 
repelled in accordance with mutual commitments enshrined in 
paragraph (5) below. In such cases where either Party 
believes a violation of these principles is occurring or is 
about to occur, that Party shall promptly notify the other 
Party. In cases where the Sending Party concludes that it may 
not be able to prevent such hostile activities in a timely 
manner, it may approach the Receiving Party authorities for 
assistance as required under these circumstances. Receiving 
Party authorities shall evaluate the situation and any 
follow-up action that may be required under the circumstances 
shall be considered and decided jointly by the Sending Party 
and the Receiving Party, including the necessary arrangements 
that shall establish tactical and operational requirements in 
the area for the security of the respective units. Execution 
of any follow-up action will be based upon the agreed 
arrangements. 
 
 
(5) Operations to ensure security and safety of all Iraqi 
opposition groups would be a Sending Party responsibility, 
but the Sending Party shall coordinate this mission with the 
Receiving Party, as it does in other areas. None of the 
groups shall be allowed to use force or engage in hostile 
activities against each other. When JSOTF-N needs to make 
coordination or contact with the Turkoman, they will approach 
Receiving Party SOF to make that coordination and contact. 
 
 
(6) Representatives of the Receiving Party will be allowed to 
be present at planning meetings of the Sending Party with the 
PUK and KDP groups concerning training, organization and 
provision of weapons and equipment by the Sending Party. 
Support to these groups (training, organization and 
distribution of weapons and equipment) will be coordinated in 
a timely manner with the Receiving Party authorities. 
 
 
(7) Provision of weapons and equipment shall be commensurate 
with the needs of self-defense and execution of the missions 
to be assigned to these groups. No heavy weapons shall be 
provided and all weapons distributed for these purposes shall 
be registered  with a view to ensure their return at the end 
of the operations. Receiving Party LNOs may observe the 
entire process from registration to distribution and be 
provided copies of the registration forms. 
 
 
(8) The PUK and KDP settled north of the Green Line will be 
trained and organized with a purpose of defeating Iraqi 
forces when serving with Sending Party SOF.  All such 
training and organizing by the Sending Party SOF with PUK, 
KDP and other groups may be observed upon request by assigned 
Receiving Party SOF LNOs. Receiving Party SOF LNOs will 
request to observe training to the respective Sending Party 
Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) commanding officer. All 
military operations south of the Green Line by Sending Party 
trained and organized Kurdish elements will be under Sending 
Party command and control. The Sending Party undertakes to 
provide timely information in advance to the Receiving Party 
in this respect for the purpose of coordination with the 
Receiving Party SOF. 
 
 
(9) The officers assigned to the JCC (Diyarbakr) and, if 
requested, Silopi, shall carry their own pistols. 
Accommodations and messing for these officers shall be met by 
their respective commands. 
 
 
(10) During an emergency (casualty evacuation, medical 
evacuation, or WMD attack), either Party,s communications 
systems can be used to assist in resolving the emergency and 
saving lives. 
 
 
(11) Receiving Party and Sending Party SOF units in northern 
Iraq deployed to the same areas will have separate HQ 
locations, but may provide 2-5 liaison officers at the 
battalion and company level. 
 
 
(12) The Sending Party will provide timely information on 
Turkish citizens in the custody of Sending Party forces in 
northern Iraq. The Sending Party will make those Turkish 
citizens available to Turkish authorities and, when requested 
by the latter, necessary arrangements will be made 
expeditiously for their joint interrogation and debriefing. 
 
 
11. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Lino and 
EUCOM J5 Maj. Gen Kohler. 
PEARSON