US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1253

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MEDIA REACTION ON THE ARAB SUMMIT AND THE PRESIDENT'S 02/26 SPEECH

Identifier: 03AMMAN1253
Wikileaks: View 03AMMAN1253 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2003-03-03 12:15:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: KMDR JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 001253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, R/MR, 
I/GNEA, B/BXN, B/BRN, NEA/PPD, NEA/IPA FOR ALTERMAN 
USAID/ANE/MEA 
LONDON FOR GOLDRICH 
PARIS FOR O'FRIEL 
USCINCCENT//CCPA, USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL 
STATE PASS TO AID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: KMDR JO 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON THE ARAB SUMMIT AND THE 
PRESIDENT'S 02/26 SPEECH 
 
 
                        Summary 
 
-- Lead coverage in all papers March 2-3 is dedicated 
to the Arab summit meeting in Sharm el-Shaikh.  All 
papers March 2 carry banner headlines highlighting the 
summit meeting's final communiqu declaring 
"rejection" of military action against Iraq.  All 
papers also highlight details of King Abdullah's 
speech to the summit meeting.  Majority of editorial 
commentary March 2 reiterates the King's remarks 
stressing the need to "use all means to spare this 
region a war".  Other commentaries focus on the 
success of the summit in achieving a "unified" Arab 
stand against a war on Iraq. 
 
        Editorial Commentary on The Arab Summit 
 
-- "Serious talks at the Sharm el-Shaikh summit" 
 
Columnist Tarek Masarweh writes on the back page of 
semi-official, influential Arabic daily Al-Rai 
(03/03):  "The categorical Arab agreement against the 
war says something more serious than that.  It is 
saying that the American and British presence on Arab 
territories is, from a practical viewpoint, an 
occupation.  Since Kuwait, Saudi, Qatar and Bahrain 
reject the war that the United States and Britain mean 
to wage against Iraq, then the military build-up on 
their territories.is an abuse of security treaties, 
which were approved for the purpose of protecting 
(these countries)  against outside aggression, and not 
for the purpose of becoming bases and launch-pads for 
aggression against neighboring countries." 
 
-- "The summit's decisions, who will buy them?" 
 
Columnist Sultan Hattab writes on the op-ed page of 
semi-official, influential Arabic daily Al-Rai 
(03/03):  "The United States does not want advice on 
what it needs to do from the Arab summit.  It rather 
wants the Arab summit to help carry out American 
schemes.  Since this did not happen, it is expected 
that the United States will either respond to the 
summit's decisions or completely ignore them, and turn 
its attention to its bilateral contacts and 
relationships with Arab countries and to what has 
already been achieved in those areas and not stated in 
the summit's communiqu..  The war is coming and the 
Arab summit's decisions are powerless and lack action. 
They have come too late." 
 
-- "The summit of fears and contradictions and 
agreement" 
 
Chief Editor Taher Udwan writes on the back page of 
independent, mass-appeal Arabic daily Al-Arab Al-Yawm 
(03/03):  "The only value of the Sharm el-Shaikh 
communiqu is that it has shown all the Arabs 
rejecting the war.  Despite the fact that American 
armies will in reality launch operations from Arab 
territories, the consensus agreement gives the 
impression that the United States is abusing its 
security agreements with the Arab countries to serve 
its own wars and interests that contradict the 
interests and desires of the Arabs.  Arab leaders had 
their backs against a wall and they would not have 
been able to survive the failure of the summit 
meeting.  They had no choice but to agree to the final 
communiqu.  This shows that the Arab countries feel 
that the war on Iraq carries so much danger for 
themselves that they have to put aside their conflicts 
and disagreements.  Everyone in Sharm el-Shaikh was 
realistic, particularly after President Bush's most 
recent speech where he said that Iraq would be the 
beginning of change in the Middle East.  This means 
s 
that America's intervention in the future of Arab 
regimes will not be limited to Iraq and Palestine but 
will affect other Arab countries..  The summit can be 
described as a summit of pressures, worry, fear, 
conflicts and contradictions, but it did breakthrough 
towards a unified stand of rejecting the war.  This, 
in itself, is important because it denies Washington 
legitimacy for its war." 
 
 
  Editorial Commentary on President Bush 02/26 Speech 
 
-- "Nothing but a promise" 
 
Columnist Dr. Musa Keilani writes on the op-ed page of 
centrist, influential among the elite English daily 
Jordan Times (03/02):  "U.S. President George W. 
Bush's promise to turn his attention to Palestine 
after Iraq . reminds us of a similar pledge by his 
father in 1990 ad of what actually happened since 
then.  Indeed, Bush the father fulfilled half of that 
pledge by arranging the 1991 Middle East peace 
conference in Madrid where what was then described as 
historic peace talks began between the Arabs and 
Israel.  What do we have in our sights today to expect 
a situation different under Bush the son?  We have yet 
to see a commitment on the part of Bush Jr. to ending 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and we see it as 
unlikely that Washington has new ideas to advance this 
quest.  Bush's promise is not worth much unless 
accompanied by a clear outline of the process that 
would lead to the realization of the quartet's 
`roadmap for peace'.  We do appreciate that the 
ultimate point in that `roadmap' is a Palestinian 
state.  But we have no idea what it would take for the 
Palestinians to get there.  More importantly, we have 
no assurance that pressure would be applied on Israeli 
to accept reason, logic, international legitimacy and 
a desire for peace based on the genuine rights of the 
Palestinians..  Until and unless we see concrete signs 
of a paradigm shift in the U.S. approach and 
Washington's acceptance of the truth that it is its 
blind backing for Israel that has distorted any 
sincere and honest search for peace, we are afraid 
that Bush's promise is nothing but just that - a 
promise." 
 
-- "Bush and the `post-war speech'" 
 
Daily columnist Urayb Rintawi writes on the op-ed page 
of center-left, influential Arabic daily Al-Dustour 
(03/02):  "The `post-war speech' delivered by the U.S. 
President at the American Enterprise Institute 
sketched the outlines of U.S. strategy in the Middle 
East and highlighted the principles of `post-Saddam 
Hussein Iraq'..  A federal, democratic, modern Iraq, 
serving to bring security and stability to the region, 
providing the example for political reform for the 
entire Middle East; an Iraq that will  be able to 
export oil to world markets and add a modern ruling 
regime to the Middle East.  An Iraq of this kind 
cannot be under occupation and military rule, unless 
we are talking about a short transitional period.  An 
Iraq that lives under American generals or even 
civilian rulers could become an agent for the 
Americans, and then with time turn into the core of 
instability in the region and a source for a new wave 
of terrorism.  Our problem with the `American vision' 
of Iraq lies in three aspects:  The first is that the 
advancement of Iraqi democracy will not replace the 
need for advancement on the Palestinian political 
track.  The second is that U.S. policy in general has 
always been characterized by pragmatism and a short 
attention span.  It is not unlikely that Washington 
would renege on all its pledges and promises at the 
first signs of a crisis or resistance.  The third 
aspect is that U.S. foreign policy is greatly 
influenced by domestic calculations and considerations 
that are determined by opportunist pressure groups 
that have their own interests to serve." 
GNEHM 

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