US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA537

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TEACHERS STRIKE DEEPENS, TESTING GOG

Identifier: 03GUATEMALA537
Wikileaks: View 03GUATEMALA537 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Guatemala
Created: 2003-02-27 18:56:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: ELAB PGOV KDEM ASEC CASC GT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271856Z Feb 03
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 000537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/IL WHA/PPC AND WHA/CEN 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FOR ILAB: ROBERT WHOLEY 
USTR FOR BUD CLATANOFF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, KDEM, ASEC, CASC, GT 
SUBJECT: TEACHERS STRIKE DEEPENS, TESTING GOG 
 
REF: A. GUATEMALA 507 
 
     B. GUATEMALA 473 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  February 26, Day 38 of the national 
teachers strike affecting 80,000 public schoolteachers and 
over 2 million students, saw blockades of major airports, 
ports, border crossings, and oil refineries, and the 
indefinite suspension of Congress due to the protests.  After 
receiving a conciliatory message from President Portillo 
later that day, however, strikers abandoned protests blocking 
Guatemala's two international airports on February 27. 
Wrangling between strikers and the GOG now appears back to 
the bargaining table, mediated by Archbishop Quezada Toruno. 
The Archbishop told the Ambassador early on February 26 that 
the GOG's ability to increase the budget is constrained. 
Strike leaders told LabAtt they are committed to non-violence 
and do not seek to destabilize the GOG by collaborating with 
opposition groups including the organized private sector. 
Nevertheless, the teacher strike occurs at a moment of 
vulnerability for the GOG and governing FRG, and could spur 
additional protests if it continues.  End Summary. 
 
Teachers Give Their Side of Conflict 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) On February 26 LabAtt met with a group of strike 
leaders including Nery Barrios, Secretary General of the 
Unity of Social and Popular Action (UASP) labor federation, 
and Teachers Association leaders Roberto Madrid, Romualdo 
Maldonado, Joviel Acevedo, and Julio Solano.  LabAtt stated 
USG concerns over the blockage by protesters of airports, 
ports and border crossings, which we do not view as 
legitimate means to impel dialogue in a democracy.  Strike 
leaders responded that throughout a long and frustrating 
process that originated over a year ago, they have strictly 
maintained a policy of non-violence and has striven mightily 
to prevent their members from responding in kind to 
intimidation, threats and provocations from anti-strike 
agents.  Acevedo said he had received threats explicitly 
sourced to the Presidential Guard (EMP), and that his home 
has been invaded and family members threatened.  Solano said 
he had also suffered similar threats.  Strike leaders agreed 
to keep this meeting with LabAtt confidential, and did not 
ask for any public Embassy role in their conflict.  Madrid 
suggested, however, that the Consultative Group might 
helpfully address the issue of educational reform directly in 
its May meeting resolutions. 
 
3.  (SBU) Strike leaders said that strikers had received and 
rejected many offers by opposition political parties and 
other groups including university students, campesinos and 
the private sector to join the teachers' protests.  The 
teachers said they rejected these offers, most recently from 
the president of the main employer association (CACIF) 
because the do not want to lose control, be used for partisan 
political ends, or for the situation to threaten the 
democratic stability of the country.  LabAtt praised this 
stance.  Madrid summarized the origins and motivation of the 
teachers' demands, which the GOG and media have distorted by 
portraying the conflict as essentially about salaries/budgets 
instead of the educational reforms blocked by the FRG in 
Congress in August 2002, which provoked the current 
escalation of direct action by teachers.  However, key 
demands that must be addressed for the teachers to return to 
class include an agreement on the budget increase for the 
education ministry, and a GOG commitment to desist from 
reprisals against strikers.  (Note: A labor court judge 
declared the strike illegal on February 20 and gave strikers 
five days to report to work, which was promptly appealed by 
strikers.  If upheld, strikers who refuse to return to work 
could be legally dismissed.  End Note.) 
 
CACIF Denies Meddling 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Upon hearing of teachers' allegations of CACIF 
offers to support teachers with a "general strike," 
EconCouns, on Ambassdor's instructions, expressed concern to 
Roberto Castaneda, current Chamber of Agriculture President 
and CACIF Vice President,  who will be named CACIF's new 
President starting March 3.  Castaneda agreed that, if true, 
Nuetze was "out of line," and he reconfirmed what CACIF 
leaders told the Ambassador on February 25:  they are 
concerned over apparent escalation of agitation against the 
government and have the perception that situation could 
spiral out of control.  Calm and leadership, not inciting 
passions, was what the country needed, they told the 
Ambassador.  Castaneda promised to look into this and get 
back to us. 
 
Archbishop Sees Difficult Negotiations Ahead 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Archbishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruno told Ambassador 
in a courtesy call on February 26 that it would be very 
difficult to resolve the conflict, which he was called upon 
to mediate by both sides.  Three early rounds of meetings 
during the week of February 14 were getting nowhere, so on 
February 24, Quezada told both sides that without a shift in 
positions, he saw no reason to continue.  When the GOG, 
represented at the dialogue table by the Ministers of 
Education, Labor, and Finance, expressed willingness to 
consider an increase to the education ministry's budget, 
Quezada asked strike leaders to reconsider their demand for 
2.8 billion queztals and submit a more realistic proposal. 
He had not received a response when Ambassador and LabAtt 
called on him, but confided that he believed the most the GOG 
could offer would be an increase of 1 billion, without having 
to raise the consumption tax, which would be politically 
impossible.  That would permit a salary raise of 2-300 
quetzals per month ($25-38) and money left over to improve 
schools.  Quezada Toruno noted that the Education Ministry 
budget currently comprises 11% of the budget, the highest 
amount after payment of government debt.  Minister of Finance 
Eduardo Weymann publicly defended the level of that budget, 
saying it was now 40% higher than in 1999. 
 
6.  (SBU) On other issues, Quezada thanked the Ambassador 
(three times) for his early visits to human rights defenders, 
including the Archbishop's Office on Human Rights (ODHAG), 
for the important signal that sent of U.S. interest. 
Quezada's most difficult decision, he said, since taking 
office in June 2001, was to continue the Church's status as a 
plaintiff in the Gerardi case.  The Ambassador praised that 
decision as the right one, and asked whether Quezada believed 
the justice system had revealed the truth of the Gerardi 
killing.  Quezada said no, but expressed confidence in the 
Supreme Court ruling that the appeals (but not the original 
verdict) be re-done.  Asked by the Ambassador for his view on 
the complicity of Mario Orantes, the priest sentenced to 20 
years for his role in the crime, Quezada said he believed, 
with the vast majority of the clergy, that Orantes knows more 
than he is saying. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The teachers' strike occurs at a moment of weakness 
for the GOG and the governing FRG: 
 
-- GOG intervention to save another failed bank (supposedly 
to protect cronies) and continued efforts to pay off the 
ex-PACs (former civil defense patrols whose votes the FRG 
wants) contrast with its inability to meet teachers' demands. 
 
-- The GOG seeks to stay in the good graces of the IMF, in 
large part so it can attract more foreign bond buyers 
(proceeds will go to projects that help the FRG's 2003 
campaign), so its budget options are limited. 
 
-- Just as the GOG's cave-in to ex-PACs in 2002 probably 
encouraged the teachers to strike, a perceived capitulation 
to the teachers would make it difficult to fend off a 
transport strike (due to shrinking profits on bus fares due 
to fuel price increases). 
 
-- Portillo has hitherto absented himself from the strike 
issue, fueling unfounded speculation and uncertainty. 
 
-- With the election campaign to begin formally in May, there 
is no incentive in other parties to oppose the strike. 
 
8.  (SBU) While strike leaders now tell us that the GOG's new 
flexibility had brought dialogue "back from the brink," deep 
divisions over money and many other issues remain on the 
bargaining table, including the issue of lost wages for 
strikers during this month out of class.  Portillo's overdue 
intervention to mollify protesters is typical of his crisis 
management, and follows a similar move with campesino groups 
earlier this week.  Unfortunately, Portillo's history of 
dealing with protests by announcing half-measures and 
unfulfilled commitments have deepened skepticism and 
prolonged protests to the point where they reach the crisis 
point, as in this instance.  This strike, which enjoyed broad 
popular support, could prove the most politically costly to 
Portillo and the FRG, alienating left-leaning teachers who 
help shape public opinion in the provinces. 
 
9.  (SBU) While a major inconvenience to travelers and 
serious drain on commercial activity, this conflict has not 
to date directly threatened U.S. citizens nor has it risen to 
a level of a threat to Guatemalan democracy.  We will 
continue to monitor protests with a view to U.S. citizen 
security and other U.S. interests. 
HAMILTON 

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