US embassy cable - 03SANAA380

S E C R E T SANAA 000380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, YM, UN 
SUBJECT: IRAQ:  EVOLVING YEMENI ATTITUDES TOWARD A POSSIBLE 
WAR 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Acting Chief Catherine J. Westley for Reason 1. 
5 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  ROYG policy and Yemeni street opinion 
publicly oppose a war in Iraq, but the underlying reality is 
more nuanced.  The public line articulated by Saleh and 
senior officials strongly denounces war and advocates 
concerted Arab action to prevent it, but includes no/no 
expression of support or sympathy for Saddam Hussein.  Most 
Yemenis remain more concerned with day-to-day matters, 
including the poor economy and the upcoming parliamentary 
elections, and numerous contacts have expressed support for 
removing the Baathi regime if/if this is accomplished with 
minimal impact on civilians.  UNSC-related diplomacy which 
has received dramatic coverage in the West has received 
minimal public and media attention in Yemen.  Nevertheless, 
popular reaction could be vehement and emotional if war 
seemed to drag on, or if Iraqi civilians were killed in a 
high-profile incident.  Contacts almost universally express 
hope that the war will be finished quickly.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)   Media statements from ROYG leaders continue to 
oppose war in Iraq.  President Saleh has used domestic media 
to maintain a high public profile out of the Non-Aligned 
Movement Summit in Malaysia, saying that the NAM meeting and 
the upcoming Arab Summit "should not be merely a verbal 
phenomenon that repeats words of condemnation and 
denunciation."  An editorial this week in the official daily 
al-Thawra said, "Iraq will be the first field of 
confrontation and it is the real test for the capability of 
the Arabs and Muslims to defend themselves."  At the same 
time, opposition to war is couched in terms of support for 
the Iraqi people and not Saddam or the Baathi regime. 
Numerous influential Yemeni contacts told the Ambassador this 
week that the removal of Saddam will be good for the region. 
Several predicted that only significant civilian casualties 
would elicit a vehement popular reaction in Yemen. 
 
3.  (S)  Powerful military commander of the northern region 
Ali Muhsen Saleh al-Ahmar recently told the DATT that the 
Arab people would prefer no war, but the main concern was 
about how the "American occupation" would be viewed.  He also 
said that there could be flashpoints of reaction here in 
Yemen, but expressed confidence that the ROYG could handle 
it. 
 
4,  (C)  An official in the President's office told 
Pol/Econoff that he wished the war would be over with 
quickly, and that if must happen it should happen now without 
further delays.  This sentiment was echoed to Acting Pol/Econ 
Chief by a leading NGO human rights activist who said "get it 
over with already."  Several journalist contacts expressed 
suspicion about American motives in going to war and echoed a 
familiar line in regional media: that the timing of the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative announcement in December 
created questions in Arab minds about what America is "really 
trying to do" in this region. 
 
5.  (U)  At the same time, opposition media hype has been 
fairly low-key in recent days.  For example, out of three 
weekly opposition newspapers, only one contained an article 
on Iraq, noting matter-of-factly that a small anti-war 
demonstration was held in Taiz. UNSC diplomacy and the 
prospect of a new UNSCR has received understated media 
attention in Yemen (far less than the President's daily 
statements on Iraq), and even contacts firmly opposed to war 
do not see efforts by France et al. in the Council as likely 
to forestall conflict. 
 
6.  (C)  Yemeni public reaction is opposed to a possible war; 
 however, the vehemence of opposition is not as acute as 
concern for internal Yemeni matters and the Palestinian 
issue.  With parliamentary elections coming in two months' 
time and a worsening economy, many Yemenis are more concerned 
with how to feed their families. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment:  President Saleh and other government 
leaders are playing up their opposition rhetoric, partially 
as a means to keep the "street" in line.  However, the 
underlying reality in Yemen is a studied balance of support 
for the Iraqi people and conspicuous non-support for Saddam. 
Those Embassy contacts who urge a quick end to a war they see 
as inevitable appear to be fatigued by the limbo imposed by 
the last several months' wait, and perhaps concerned about 
what a prolonged war would mean for internal Yemeni issues 
like the parliamentary elections.  End Comment. 
 
HULL