US embassy cable - 03ABUJA401

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL -- J. MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DID VP ATIKU OUTFOX BABANGIDA AND 
OBASANJO DURING THE PDP CONVENTION? 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 216 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: During a late January conversation with 
Ambassador Jeter and PolCouns, Lagos-based businessman Leno 
Adesanya contended that VP Atiku finessed both President 
Obasanjo and former Head of State Ibrahim Babangida during 
the PDP convention in early January. Prior to the convention, 
Atiku had decided to stick by Obasanjo, according to 
Adesanya.  However, Atiku feigned indecision in order to kill 
two birds with one stone. First, his faked ambivalence 
compelled Obasanjo to concede control of the domestic agenda 
to Atiku should they win the 2003 election.  Second, Atiku 
wanted to deceive Babangida into believing that he had fallen 
into Babangida's snare. Adesanya, who has one foot in Atiku's 
camp and the other in Babangida's, said that Babangida's 
objective was to coax Atiku to team with Ekwueme against the 
President. With Obasanjo out of the race, Babangida would 
have taken the ANPP nomination.   When Babangida's plan went 
awry, the ANPP nomination fell to Muhammedu Buhari. According 
to Adesanya, Babangida, Ekwueme and NSA Aliyu Mohammed, a 
staunch Babangida ally, were the big losers coming out of the 
conventions. End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) During a late night conversation that extended well 
into the early morning, Lagos businessman Leno Adesanyo 
provided Ambassador Jeter and PolCouns an account of the PDP 
convention from an Atiku insider's perspective.  The account 
is decidedly biased toward Atiku, but much of it rings true 
because of Adesanyo's access and credibility, we are 
reporting in detail what he had to say: 
 
 
------------------ 
ATIKU, THE REALIST 
------------------ 
 
 
3.  (C) Going into the PDP convention, Atiku recognized his 
limitations.  While seeing himself as a much better 
politician than the President, he knew Obasanjo would attempt 
to destroy him politically if he challenged the President's 
renomination.  Thus, although the past year had been one of 
considerable friction and mistrust between the two leaders, 
Atiku recognized that his fortunes were wedded to those of 
his boss.  Equally important, Atiku also realized that 
Obasanjo was stuck with him; Obasanjo could not secure the 
party renomination without his endorsement.  However, Atiku 
was unsure if Obasanjo grasped this reality; if not, the 
President might mistakenly precipitate their mutual downfall 
by taking the advice of former Works Minister Anenih and 
Babangida fifth columnist, NSA Aliyu Mohammed, to dump him. 
Thus, Atiku needed to demonstrate clearly to the President 
that he was indispensable to Obasanjo's return to office. 
 
 
4. (C) Atiku also knew former Head of State Babangida had 
been playing Atiku and Obasanjo against one another. 
Babangida's plan was to coax Atiku to team with Alex Ekwueme 
in order to defeat Obasanjo's renomination.  With Obasanjo 
out of the running, Babangida would have seized the ANPP 
nomination, then watched as the ensuing enmity between 
Obasanjo and the Ekwueme/Atiku ticket moved the PDP to 
destroy itself. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Don't Change Horses In Mid-Stream 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
5.  (C) To secure his future with Obasanjo while also 
deceiving Babangida, Atiku felt he needed to wait until the 
last minute before publicly affirming his support for 
Obasanjo.  The PDP governors' eleventh-hour rebellion against 
Obasanjo gave Atiku the vehicle to perfect his strategy. A 
few days prior to the convention, Obasanjo met the governors, 
agreeing to support their renominations.  The quid pro quo 
was obvious.  However, seeking to undermine this pact, NSA 
Aliyu Mohammed visited Delta State governor James Ibori and 
some others, frightening them that Obasanjo had compiled 
embarrassing dossiers and planned to use the information to 
disqualify the governors once he secured the PDP Presidential 
nomination.  The NSA's intrigue galvanized the governors and 
temporarily injected suspense into the PDP convention.  But, 
instead of redounding to Babangida's benefit as Aliyu 
expected, the governor's brouhaha with Obasanjo helped Atiku 
to perfect his own plan. 
 
 
6. (C) According to Adesanya, Atiku met the governors the 
first day of the convention; they urged him to leave Obasanjo 
and seek the nomination himself.  Atiku demurred; he also 
deflected the suggestion that he join Ekwueme.  Finally, 
Atiku arranged a meeting between Obasanjo and the now irate 
governors.  The governors railed that Obasanjo was 
hypocritically pursuing them for corruption, while turning a 
blind eye to corrupt politicians within his own 
Administration. Atiku supported the governor's position, 
telling Obasanjo that significant corruption was not the 
exclusive ambit of the governors and that serious 
transgressions occurred in the executive branch: he said it 
would be unjust to focus exclusively on gubernatorial 
excesses.  Assuming the role of mediator, Atiku then asked 
both sides to affirm their mutual support and cease the 
antagonism being fueled by elements that wanted to destroy 
the PDP.  The governors agreed to bury the hatchet, if 
Obasanjo would shelve the dossiers.  Having demonstrated his 
influence with the governors, Atiku continued to play coy 
with Obasanjo. 
 
 
7. (C) In the end, Atiku extracted an extraordinary 
concession from the President. Obasanjo agreed to relinquish 
the entire domestic agenda to Atiku, including the 
appointment of key economic policy-makers. Since Obasanjo 
focused on the world arena during his first term and aspired 
for recognition as an international statesman, Atiku said 
that is where he would like Obasanjo's attentions to remain. 
Obasanjo would serve the role of a "super Foreign Minister" 
and ceremonial Head of State.  As Adesanya understood the 
agreement, Atiku would be allowed to direct domestic economic 
policy while Obasanjo busied himself with debt relief, NEPAD, 
conflict resolution and other measures to shore up Nigeria's 
image abroad. 
 
 
------------------- 
Outfoxing Babangida 
------------------- 
 
 
8.  (C) As he exploited Obasanjo's political vulnerabilities, 
Atiku simultaneously outfoxed the "Maradonna" and master of 
political intrigue, Babangida.  Leading up to the convention, 
Atiku had maintained contact with Babangida, the central 
topic being their displeasure with Obasanjo.  Atiku wanted 
Babangida to think he had swallowed the bait and would leave 
Obasanjo if another suitor offered the right political 
inducement.  Wary of the Babangida camp's ability to disrupt 
the convention, Atiku continued to signal willingness to 
abandon Obassanjo if the price were right. This protracted 
indecisive was, in fact a conscious ploy to prevent Babangida 
from implementing a possible back-up plan to wreck the 
Obasanjo/Atiku alliance.  Atiku kept negotiating with 
Obasanjo's challenger, Alex Ekweume. Atiku knew Ekweume had 
Babangida's backing, as well as support from former Head of 
State Abdulsalam and NSA Mohammed. 
 
 
9. (C) In this context, Atiku's BBC interview the evening of 
January 4, where he equivocated on his own Presidential 
ambitions, was pure bluff.  During the broadcast, Atiku said 
he was considering all options before him.  This remarkable 
statement from an incumbent Vice President fooled many into 
believing Atiku was leaning toward abandoning the President 
and seeking the Presidency himself.  Adesanya recalled 
talking to Atiku immediately after the interview; the VP 
called the statement a ploy to keep Babangida off-balance 
until the last possible moment. 
 
 
10.  (C) The ploy worked, Adesanya contended.  A few hours 
after the BBC broadcast, Atiku was with Obasanjo lobbying 
governors and state delegations to suggest this ticket.  By 
midnight, the Obasanjo/Atiku ticket was secure.  With only a 
few hours before the convention vote, it was too late for 
Babangida and company to implement any "Plan B" they might 
have had to thwart the Obasanjo renomination. 
 
 
11.  (C) Obasanjo's renomination killed Babangida's ultimate 
objective, the ANPP nomination, Adesanya maintained. 
Babangida wanted to run, but only if Obasanjo had been 
sidelined.  This reticence was not due to deference or 
loyalty to the President, but out of respect for the power of 
incumbency and its influence on the outcome of the election. 
Babangida did not want to fight Obasanjo but did not mind 
fighting an Ekweume/Atiku ticket that had drawn the wrath of 
a sitting President.  However, Babangida's manipulation of 
the ANPP as his maid in waiting came to naught.  He had 
helped place his former second in command, Augustus Aikhomu, 
into the important post of Chairman of the ANPP Board of 
Trustees.  Also, many ANPP governors and other party 
stalwarts prayed Babangida would join the party at the last 
minute.  The party scheduled its convention after the PDP's 
just to keep the door open for IBB. 
 
 
12. (C) However, when Obasanjo emerged from the PDP confab, 
Babangida left his faithful waiting at the altar.  With 
Babangida out of the picture, the internal dynamics of the 
ANPP led to the nomination of former Head of State Buhari, 
the only ANPP candidate with national stature. 
---------- 
Thumbs Up! 
---------- 
 
 
13.  (C) Predictably, Adesanya saw Atiku as the biggest 
winner in this rendition of events. First, Atiku secured his 
slot on the Obasanjo ticket against the urging and treachery 
of some Obasanjo insiders; additionally, with Obasanjo 
surrendering the domestic agenda, Atiku will become the de 
facto head of government in 2003.  Moreover, Atiku's most 
powerful rival for the 2007 presidency, Ibrahim Babangida, 
has been weakened considerably. Adesanya asserted that Atiku 
was not overly concerned that Obasanjo would renege on his 
promises or try to dump or discredit him.  Last year's 
impeachment crisis and the recently concluded PDP convention 
had demonstrated Atiku's weight with both PDP National 
Assembly members and PDP governors.  If Obasanjo moved 
against Atiku, Atiku's allies would neutralize the President. 
 Atiku held the impeachment card and that threat alone would 
discourage Obasanjo from seeking revenge or going back on his 
promises.  Adesanya also saw Obasanjo as a victor, albeit of 
a lesser magnitude.  The renomination exacted a high price; 
Obasanjo had to concede considerable power to Atiku and had 
to plead with delegates for their support.  Although on the 
road to likely re-election, Obasanjo has had to endure 
several humiliating steps to get there.  Domestically, he has 
been diminished. 
 
 
------------ 
Thumbs Down! 
------------ 
 
 
14.  (C) Babangida was the biggest loser.  The patina of 
invulnerability had been tarnished. In this instance, 
Babangida's purported greatest skill -- keeping all his 
options open and his opponents guessing -- proved to be a 
liability.  Instead of appearing masterful, he came across as 
unreliable and indecisive.  Babangida's vaunted secrecy also 
failed him.  His courtiers, anxious to be seen by others as 
close Babangida confidants, behaved like hyperactive sieves, 
leaking details of his conversations to whomever would 
listen.  Babangida's plans to trick Atiku were repeated to 
the Vice President; they also featured prominently in the 
press.   Developing an effective counter-deception, Atiku 
foiled the ambush, leaving Babangida waiting on the wrong 
road for someone who would never show. (Comment: Adesanya is 
not alone in this depiction.  Many Babangida supporters are 
shaking their heads.  Babangida's swagger has been reduced to 
political timidity.  In reality, although Babangida has been 
diminished, he is not a spent force and may still be able to 
wield influence, albeit his options are considerably less. 
End Comment) 
 
 
15. (C) Another clear loser was the National Security 
Advisor.  In fomenting the governors' opposition to the 
President, Mohammed entertained the prospect that Babangida 
dangled before him: the vice-presidential slot under Ekweume 
-- the same slot being offered Atiku.  However, Adesanya 
dismissed Mohammed as a credible national candidate.  Aliyu 
is considered to be a purveyor of intrigues and coups, not a 
politician.  He has no charisma, no constituency and little 
cash.  After his manipulation of the governors, Aliyu was of 
little value and became invisible. His feeble performance 
during the convention confirmed his weaknesses and the 
quixotic nature of his political aspirations, Adesanya 
declared.  Adesanya revealed that Mohammed had attempted to 
resign, but Atiku counseled Obasanjo to ignore his request. 
Atiku advised it would be better to keep Mohammed on the 
payroll and on a tight leash in order to contain his 
infidelity and any future intrigues.  If Mohammed were out of 
office he would feel threatened; the NSA could use his 
immense knowledge of the inner secrets of the Administration 
to cause considerable embarrassment, if not, damage. 
 
 
16.  (C) PDP challenger Alex Ekweume also came up short in 
Adesanya's estimation.  Adesanya speculated that Ekweume's 
strident criticism of the convention had as much to do with 
the 1999 convention as last month's event.  In '99, Ekweume 
accepted defeat gracefully; this time, his supporters 
pressured him to make a stink.  They hoped the PDP would 
offer some party positions to their faction in exchange for 
his silence. 
 
 
17.  (C) Paradoxically, Adesanya rated Buhari as a loser 
despite winning the ANPP nomination.  With Babangida 
sidelined, the ANPP governors pushed the nomination to 
Buhari. Although they knew he had little chance in the 
general election, he is popular in the North.  The ANPP 
governors, all from northern states, figured Buhari's 
popularity in their region would have a bandwagon effect and 
help their reelection.  In short, Buhari was but the 
sacrificial lamb for their gubernatorial ambitions. 
 
 
--------- 
What Next 
--------- 
 
 
18.  (C) Adesanya said that Obasanjo/Atiku were confidently 
looking forward to the general election.  However, the PDP 
could still have problems in the South-South unless Obasanjo 
made peace with the coastal states on the volatile issue of 
offshore oil revenues.  Also, they needed to make amends with 
Ekweume and other Igbos to keep the Southeast as a PDP 
stronghold and prevent it from splitting its vote among the 
several Igbo candidates in the minor parties.  Adesanya felt 
Babangida would further withdraw from open political 
engagement and not chance additional setbacks.  However, 
Babangida is faced with the prospect of either his stiffest 
political competitor, Atiku, returning for another four 
years, or of Buhari, his arch-enemy, ascending to the 
Presidency.  (Adesanya scoffed at suggestions that Babangida 
and Buhari had reconciled.  On his return to Minna from 
Sokoto where he met Buhari, Babangida shrugged of his session 
with Buhari as a non-event.) 
 
 
19.  (C) Uncomfortable with this "lose-lose" situation, 
Babangida could pursue a third option.  Although not likely, 
Babangida might encourage an alliance of the minor parties 
against Obasanjo, particularly if a figure like Ekweume could 
be coaxed to publicly spearhead this effort. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
20.  (C) As we have stated previously (Reftel), we will never 
learn the whole truth regarding the PDP and ANPP conventions. 
By giving us the view from Atiku's vantage point, however, 
Adesanya has provided more pieces of the complex puzzle. 
Adesanya's account is believable but it is also biased.  An 
associate of Atiku and Babangida, Adesanya is an astute 
businessman who persistently gauges where his bread will 
receive the most butter. Thus, he inclines more heavily 
toward Atiku these days.  In his rendition, Adesanya 
conveniently glossed over the fact that Atiku wanted the 
Presidency and had unsuccessfully searched for a mechanism to 
oust Obasanjo without incurring his wrath. Only when that 
search proved fruitless, did Atiku cast his lot with 
Obasanjo.  Additionally, Adesanya assigned no role to Atiku 
in the governor's rebellion.  We find this implausible. 
 
 
21. (C) Atiku likely encouraged NSA Mohammed to go behind 
Obasanjo's back to the governors.  This would be consistent 
with the objective of deceiving Babangida.  Atiku probably 
continued to harbor a splinter of hope that the governor's 
rebellion would send Obasanjo packing.  Atiku's counsel to 
Obasanjo to retain Mohammed despite the latter's trespasses 
is more understandable in this light.  Mohammed might tell 
Obasanjo about Atiku's role.  Moreover, as long as Mohammed 
is around, Obasanjo's suspicions would focus more on the NSA 
than on the Vice President. 
 
 
22.  (C) Adesanya's rating of relative winners and losers 
seems on point.  However, Obasanjo adherence to his promise 
to give the domestic portfolio to Atiku may not be as 
ironclad as Adesanya thinks.  While somewhat chastened, 
Obasanjo still has his bark and plenty of bite.  We would not 
be surprised to see him "forget" some of his convention 
concessions if he wins the general election.  Obasanjo also 
may someday "punish" Atiku for his humiliation. 
 
 
23.  (C) Last, we agree with Adesanya that January was unkind 
to Babangida.  Late last year, the media depicted him as a 
mastermind who influenced five of the then six parties.  At 
least three parties were pining for him to announce his 
candidacy under their banner. Now, he faces either Atiku or 
Buhari, two enemies, as the second or the first most powerful 
person in the country, respectively.  Atiku is no boy scout; 
his role in eroding the Babangida myth was clearly in his own 
self-interest.  However, Atiku has helped stabilize politics 
at the national level by not breaking up the PDP ticket. 
Moreover, by cutting Babangida down to size, this could 
encourage politicians in the opposition that their path to 
success lie more in working together than in making the trek 
to Minna to seek Babangida'a favor. 
JETER