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| Identifier: | 03ISTANBUL232 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ISTANBUL232 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Istanbul |
| Created: | 2003-02-25 11:32:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ASEC PGOV PHUM TU Istanbul |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000232 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2013 TAGS: ASEC, PGOV, PHUM, TU, Istanbul SUBJECT: ISTANBUL ANTI-WAR PROTESTS: WHAT KEEPS THEM SMALL? REF: ISTANBUL 225 Classified By: CG David Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: In a country that recent polls show is approximately 94 percent against a war in Iraq, one would expect its largest city to have seen its share of large anti-war demonstrations. Despite a populace that holds views more squarely anti-war than London, Paris or New York, to date protest organizers have not been able to attract more than 5,000-8,000 of Istanbul's 12 million residents. The reasons for this lie in Turkey's fragmented civil society; police and security attitudes; and harsh winter weather. END SUMMARY. ------------------ WHOSE RALLY IS IT? ------------------ 2. (C) The average Istanbul resident is strongly anti-war. But, before attending a rally against the war, most likely he or she will ask who is organizing it, and who is likely to attend. The possibility of a rally being &hijacked8 by, or accused of collaboration with, more radical groups is a powerful disincentive to participation. In a February 15 protest in Kadikoy, an initially peaceful protest became a small-scale riot, involving Molotov cocktail throwing and the arrest of approximately 60 alleged members of the outlawed Kurdish PKK/KADEK organization. Turkish citizens' desire to avoid trouble and distance themselves from accusations of sympathy with some radical groups provide a strong reason to stay home. 3. (C) Across the spectrum, political parties and NGOs have held anti-war functions, but often seek to use the theme to further their own ends. If someone isn't a die-hard Saadet Partisi supporter, for example, he probably doesn't want to attend their rally, regardless of how he feels about the anti-war theme. Perhaps recognizing how difficult it has been to bring out the crowds, the organizers of a February 22 anti-war meeting billed their gathering as an academic conference rather than a rally. Poloff noted that the rally-style speeches and rhetoric fell somewhat flat on a sedate audience of approximately 150 journalists, academics, and students. --------------------- THE HEAVY HAND OF LAW --------------------- 4. (C) More senior police commanders remember well the nearly all-engulfing riots that paralyzed Istanbul in the late 1970s. As a result, police are rarely out-manned at political rallies. In the case of openly announced demonstrations, the police often arrive several hours in advance, parking buses full of police throughout the area. When a rally's organizers do not notify the police (tantamount to requesting permission), reaction from the authorities can be more severe. In recent protests near Galatasaray Lisesi (about a half mile from the Consulate General) on February 19, police buses were backed up for several blocks. Two weeks prior, a protest planned for the Abide-i Hurriyet Park in Sisli had hundreds of police filling the location more than 3 hours in advance, with fewer protesters than police showing up, partially due to rain. 5. (C) Our contacts also note that, at a typical rally, many plain-clothes policemen permeate the crowd, and also videotape the event. The fact that taped speeches by pro-Islamist politicians have been leaked by the security establishment to the press in the past, often to discredit the politicians' claims of moderation, seems to support this thesis. When coupled with a general lack of civic activism in Turkish society, efforts to avoid conflict with the police (and possible subsequent detention) provide a second powerful reason not to take to the streets. 6. (C) One final factor reducing the size of possible protests is the fact that Turkey's AK Parti government has echoed the public's general anti-war sentiment in its statements and policies. If parliament (as is expected) passes a resolution later this week allowing U.S. troops to transit Turkish territory, anti-war activists may take to the streets to protest their government's &disconnect8 with the public. ------------- RAIN AND SNOW ------------- 7. (U) Another important consideration is that the weather has been almost unceasingly bad for the last three weeks. Considerable rain and snow have kept Turks at home across the board, with enclosed shopping malls the only significant crowded locations. Protests are unlikely to draw any large numbers, no matter how heated the opposition, until the weather improves. ------- COMMENT ------- 8. (C) With a government echoing many of the public's anti-war arguments, even as it negotiates with the U.S. over troop transit, rally participation may have seemed unnecessary. With the submission of a request to parliament for authorization of U.S. troop transit, that dynamic could change. END COMMENT. ARNETT
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