US embassy cable - 03ABUJA386

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:1.6.X6 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, NI 
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA: VP ON CURRENT POLITICS 
 
 
REF:  ABUJA 0015 
      ABUJA 0016 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Nigeria's Vice President claims his earlier 
flirtation with running for President was a ruse to distract 
IBB.  According to Atiku, the ambitious former military ruler 
is now effectively sidelined for 2003.  Buhari's base in the 
North is narrower than most observers believe, Atiku says, 
asserting that he and President Obasanjo will win handily. 
Clearly pleased with his pivotal role in securing Obasanjo's 
renomination, Atiku looks forward to 2007.  Obasanjo still 
faces a credibility gap.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (SBU) Vice President Atiku Abubakar February 7 invited DCM 
for communal lunch after Juma'at prayers and then for a brief 
private meeting afterward.  Atiku was in excellent spirits and 
remarked that his health had improved. 
 
 
3.  (C) Agreeing that his own actions had been critical to the 
success of the Obasanjo/Atiku ticket at the early January PDP 
convention (refs), Atiku reviewed events from his perspective. 
He had gone to sleep on Friday night, January 3, when Obasanjo 
returned from an unsuccessful visit to the Bauchi delegation 
and awakened his number two.  The angry delegates had "sent 
the President packing," and Obasanjo needed Atiku's support to 
salvage the ticket.  Violating security regulations in the 
interest of showing unity, they drove from rebel delegation to 
rebel delegation together in one car. 
 
 
4.  (C) "I had to pity the man," Atiku said.  Over and over, 
delegates said they would vote for Obasanjo because Atiku 
requested them to and despite their anger over Obasanjo's 
failure to keep his promises.  The Governors also had to be 
"brought along," Atiku continued.  They wanted firm assurances 
(from Atiku) that Obasanjo would "behave differently next time 
[in the 2003-2007 term]" than he had heretofore. 
 
 
5.  (C) Atiku felt IBB was significantly diminished in the 
wake of the PDP convention (reftels).  "At the last minute," 
IBB had called Governor Kure to tell him the Niger delegation 
should not vote for Obasanjo and Atiku.  Kure declined to 
follow his patron's guidance, saying Niger had committed 
itself and would not renege.  IBB's initiatives during this 
electoral cycle were focused on sowing confusion and holding 
Atiku down, so that the road would be clear for an IBB win in 
2007, Atiku opined; the former military ruler fears Atiku will 
be "too powerful" by 2007 if he holds onto the Vice Presidency 
for another four years.  IBB's failure to have a significant 
impact on the PDP's candidate selection process this year will 
further weaken him in the run-up to 2007, Atiku added. 
 
 
6.  (C) Atiku asserted that he had been "leading them along" 
for seven months, planning all along to stick with Obasanjo 
but allowing Obasanjo's adversaries to think they might be 
divided.  By the time they discovered that Obasanjo and Atiku 
were staying together, it was too late for Babangida, Aliyu 
Mohammed and others to implement a back-up plan. 
 
 
7.  (C) Atiku said many PDP stalwarts, especially Governors, 
pushed him to announce a bid for the Presidential nomination 
during the first 36 hours of the convention.  He had told them 
he could not abandon Obasanjo because doing so would split the 
country.  "In the end, I am a patriot, and I cannot do that." 
 
 
8.  (C) While agreeing with DCM's assessment that the ultimate 
result of the convention and his role in achieving it had 
boosted his profile in a political arena where appearances 
play a key role, Atiku contended that this did not help him. 
"I want to be underestimated; that is how I get things done." 
 
 
9.  (C) Atiku assessed ANPP Presidential candidate Muhammadu 
Buhari's chances as slim.  The retired general and former Head 
of State has no base outside the Northwest and, therefore, 
cannot win.  Atiku said he was "blackmailing" politicians and 
businessmen from that zone with this "fact," pushing them to 
return to the PDP so that the Northwest might contribute to 
Obasanjo's victory rather than having to live with the 
inevitable despite their best efforts to prevent it. 
 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  If Atiku truly was "leading them along" for 
seven months, then he is an actor of extraordinary skill and 
breadth who played deftly nuanced performances before Obasanjo 
allies, Obasanjo adversaries and foreign observers alike.  We 
agree, however, that he benefited from being underestimated, 
particularly vis-a-vis Babangida.  As concerns that former 
Head of State, Atiku's assessment of Babangida's diminution 
accords generally with our own.  The "Maradonna" of Nigerian 
politics appears increasingly desperate to remain relevant - 
or at least to make the general public think he is.  Having 
failed to control the PDP convention from his Minna mansion, 
he recently told the media that he had been "born again" and 
now supported the idea of a sovereign national conference: 
Anything to keep the ball in play.  As for Buhari, his base of 
strength may be just as narrow as Atiku describes.  His hopes 
for victory rest, therefore, almost entirely on being able to 
exploit fully Obasanjo's loss of political credibility and 
popularity.  Thus far, however, his close advisors (all true 
believers) seem to think that voters will flock to Buhari 
simply because he is not Obasanjo (and from the North) and 
apparently do not perceive a need to present a positive 
agenda.  So far, Buhari's Presidential campaign has been 
dormant. 
JETER