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| Identifier: | 03ABUJA385 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ABUJA385 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2003-02-21 15:19:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EPET ENRG PREL NI OPEC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000385 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W AND EB NSC FOR JFRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2013 TAGS: EPET, ENRG, PREL, NI, OPEC SUBJECT: NIGERIA PROPOSES NEW OPEC QUOTA SCHEME Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Special Assistant on Petroleum Issues Kupolokun told the Ambassador on February 14 that Nigeria had made a thinly-veiled threat to withdraw from OPEC while proposing to other members a new quota allocation scheme based on production capacity and socioeconomic indicators rather than reserves. Kupolokun enlisted U.S. support for the Nigerian position, but the Ambassador indicated we were unlikely to put diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia or other Gulf countries at this time. He did suggest, however, that Kupolokun visit Washington soon to discuss energy issues. Paragraph 9 is an Action Request. End Summary. 2. (C) In a February 14 meeting with the Ambassador at the ChevronTexaco Managing Director's Abuja residence, Special Assistant to the President on Petroleum Issues Funsho Kupolokun said Nigeria had proposed to OPEC members the preceding week in Vienna a new quota allocation scheme based on production capacity and socioeconomic indicators rather than reserves. Also present at the meeting with Kupolokun was ChevronTexaco Managing Director Jay Pryor. Lagos CG Hinson-Jones and Econoff (notetaker) were also there. The Nigerian proposal argued that adherence to the current system would cripple the Nigerian oil sector and, because that one sector is so dominant, have a devastating impact on the Nigerian economy at-large. 3. (C) Kupolokun predicted that Nigerian production capacity will grow quickly over the next few years as deepwater fields go into production. He said that in 2003 Nigerian production capacity will be about 3.1 million barrels per day (mbd), while the OPEC quota will be only 2 mbd. Kupolokun forecasted that by 2006 Nigerian production capacity will rise to 4.7 mbd, with a quota of only 2.3 million if the current system remains intact. 4. (C) Kupolokun said several factors contributed to the increase in Nigerian production capacity, key among them the recent infusion of capital into the sector by the government to meet joint venture cash-call arrears that had gone unpaid for much of the 1990's. Pryor added that most of that investment has gone into deepwater fields that yield light crude that is easier to refine into gasoline than onshore Bonny crude. U.S. demand for this non-Arab source of crude that can be cheaply refined into gasoline has also pushed investment in Nigerian deepwater fields, according to Pryor. 5. (C) Kupolokun acknowledged that maintaining spare capacity is key to OPEC's ability to keep world oil prices stable, but said that Nigeria's burden in doing so is too high. He said that by 2006 if the OPEC quota system is not changed, Nigerian spare capacity as a percentage of total capacity will be more than 100 percent, while spare capacity for Arab OPEC members will be around 25 to 50 percent. Pryor added that to be economically viable, deepwater fields must run at close to full capacity, unlike the large onshore fields being pumped by most other OPEC members. 6. (C) Kupolokun also made the case that from a socioeconomic perspective, Nigeria would find it difficult to keep a lid on production. He compared Nigeria to other OPEC countries on a series of socioeconomic indicators, summing up the situation as follows: "If it is good, like income, we are last, if it is bad, like infant mortality, we are first." He said the GON is finding it harder and harder to explain to its people why it is forsaking additional oil revenues for the benefit of rich Arab nations. 7. (C) Commenting that these two points comprised a thinly-veiled threat to withdraw from OPEC, Kupolokun went on to outline the Nigerian proposal that the OPEC quota allocation system be modified to include production capacity as well as account for economic development indicators such as GDP per capita and external debt. To ensure that no member would face a drop in quota, the Nigerian proposal would allow some proportion of the new quota to be based on the old system, with the balance based on production capacity and those key indicators. Kupolokun reports that Nigeria's proposal split OPEC members between Gulf and non-Gulf countries, with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar staunchly opposed and Algeria and Libya enthusiastically supportive. Kupolokun indicated that a final decision on the Nigerian proposal, as well as a similar proposal made by an independent consultant, would be made at the mid-March OPEC Council of Ministers Meeting. 8. (C) Kupolokun asked the Ambassador whether the United States might be able to provide diplomatic support for Nigeria's efforts to win over other OPEC members on their quota allocation proposal. The Ambassador expressed sympathy for the Nigerian position, but noted that given the current state of the world, the United States was unlikely to press Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states on an issue as contentious as this. He did, however suggest that Kupolokun visit the United States soon to have a full discussion on energy issues with Washington-based officials interested and dealing with energy security issues. Kupolokun indicated interest in the idea but said he would consult with his colleagues before making a commitment. In a recent chance meeting, Kupolokun told the Ambassador the GON is very interested in the idea of visiting Washington, but would not want to do so before the April National Elections. Kupolokun promised to formalize the request in writing. 9. (C) Action Request: Post requests Washington input on the feasibility of a Washington visit by Kupolokun following the April Nigerian National Elections. End Action Request. 10. (C) Comment: The proposal to increase Nigeria's quota is strongly backed by ChevronTexaco here in Nigeria. It will almost certainly be supported by other oil companies operating in Nigeria, including Exxon-Mobil. Although the humanitarian benefits to Nigerians of a quota increase were stressed in the meeting, the other major factor is more money for the oil companies and the GON. End Comment. JETER
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