US embassy cable - 03HARARE356

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/S AND AF/EX 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER 
 
E. O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR, ECON, ZI 
SUBJECT: CFU Update on Negotiations with GOZ 
 
Ref: a) Harare 239; b) Cape Town 76 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET POSTING. 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary.  Laboff met with Commercial Farmers Union 
(CFU) president Colin Cloete to discuss the ongoing 
negotiations between the farmers' group and the GOZ. 
Despite official claims that the two groups are in accord, 
the CFU reports that the two sides remain fundamentally 
divided on many issues.  The GOZ wants its ownership of the 
seized 11 million hectares acknowledged as a fait accompli; 
the farmers want their title deeds honored.  The GOZ wants 
farmers to "release" their farming equipment for the use of 
the newly-settled farmers, (ref a); the farmers want to 
retain their equipment (much of which is still mortgaged, 
all of which was individually purchased) for their own use 
when they return to their own property.  Despite the clear 
standoff between the two parties at the national level, 
farmers are being approached on the ground and offered 
various deals by the local authorities to get them to 
produce food.  Still, many farmers -- burnt by previous bad- 
faith deals -- remain wary, and others are simply 
uninterested in returning to farming without a fundamental 
shift in Zimbabwe policies.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  At a recent meeting, Cloete reported that GOZ 
attempts to paint a rosy picture of accord between itself 
and the CFU on the land resettlement program are completely 
without basis.  Still, despite the absolutist language in 
the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) published by the 
GOZ-controlled newspaper, ref a, Cloete believes that the 
GOZ is desperately aware of its precarious position in 
relation to food security.  In any event, the two sides 
remain miles apart on almost all issues. 
 
3. (SBU)  In the MOU, the GOZ stated as its opening position 
that the 11 million hectares seized (approximately 97% of 
the land previously owned by white commercial farmers) was 
"STATE LAND" which would never revert to private ownership. 
However, after a subsequent meeting on returning skilled 
farmers to production between the CFU and the Minister of 
Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement Joseph Made, the GOZ 
seemed to back off from its initial position.  At the outset 
of that meeting, Made stated that ownership of the land by 
the GOZ and its occupancy by resettled farmers were "non- 
negotiable."  In response, Cloete and his deputies replied, 
"Then there is nothing to negotiate," closed their 
notebooks, and walked out of the meeting. 
 
4. (SBU) Cloete later received a call from the minister who 
asked if the CFU members would consider a 35-year lease on 
their own lands; receiving a negative response, Made asked 
if a 99-year lease would be acceptable.  Cloete responded 
that the sanctity of title deeds, and thus acknowledged 
ownership of the land, was non-negotiable from the farmers' 
perspective, and that leases (without full compensation for 
seized property) would never satisfy dispossessed farmers or 
entice them to return to production.  According to Cloete, 
after these opening positions were stated, no further 
meetings have taken place.  The MOU has not been signed, and 
the highly publicized "cooperation" between the GOZ and the 
CFU -- cited by Nigerian president Obasanjo, as well as 
Foreign Minister Zuma of South Africa (ref b), as a sound 
basis for lifting sanctions against Zimbabwe -- remains 
strictly cosmetic. 
 
5. (SBU)  Cloete also reports that the GOZ seems as 
distanced as ever from the situation on the ground.  For 
instance, the Lands Committee in the Wedze area, a rich 
farming region southeast of Harare, recently approached 
between 15 and 18 commercial farmers in that area and 
appealed to them to return to production for "the good of 
the nation."  Of that number, only 3 are actually producing. 
Similar appeals have in the past two years resulted in 
farmers planting crops on the basis of an oral assurance 
that they would be allowed to reap, only to be dispossessed 
by war vets and settlers shortly before harvest time.  Based 
on previous experience, farmers remain wary about planting 
without a nationwide return to rule of law, or at least 
without local written guarantees that they will be allowed 
to harvest their crops.  Asked about the coordination 
between Minister Made and the local Lands Committee in such 
an appeal, Cloete responded that he greatly doubted if the 
Minister was aware that the local authorities were 
attempting to cut deals with the farmers. 
 
6. (SBU)  In fact, Cloete was convinced that Minister of 
Information Jonathan Moyo -- and not the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Resettlement Joseph Made -- was actually in 
control of the negotiations between Made and the CFU. 
Cloete based his belief on the personal interactions between 
the two ministers at his latest series of meetings, as well 
as a clear sense of Made's subservience to Moyo's 
declarations at those meetings. 
 
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What Next? 
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7. (SBU)  When asked what he saw as the best way forward for 
the commercial farmers, Cloete was unwilling to speculate on 
political solutions.  Rather, he seemed to believe that 
actually getting the farmers to return to production -- even 
in the absence of political accommodations -- was vital. 
Referring to the situation in Wedze, Cloete stated that he 
would like to see six or seven farmers return, grow crops, 
and help address the food security situation.  If they were 
successful, then perhaps another six or seven would return; 
later another six or seven, and so on. 
 
8. (SBU)  However, Cloete acknowledged that this would only 
help if the GOZ refrained from its continued attempts to 
seize and establish its own ownership of the property in 
question.  He saw several pre-requisites to the return of 
farmers in a productive capacity.  The first is a guarantee 
of personal security for farmers on their property.  The 
second is a return to law and order on the ground, 
demonstrated by police support in confrontational situations 
rather than a routine and dismissive response that "we can't 
help, this is political," and clearly differentiated from an 
ephemeral return to the "rule of law."  The third is a 
respect for title deeds; the fourth, availability of 
financing for the upcoming crop.  The last prerequisite is 
the availability of a motivated labor force.  As reported 
septel, many farmers -- even those who nurtured good 
relationships with their labor force -- are wary of placing 
their trust in workers who have demanded the payment of 
financially crippling severance packages and, in some cases, 
participated in looting their employers' property. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (SBU)  Cloete remains unsure as to how best proceed with 
negotiations with the GOZ.  He realizes that negotiation is 
risky, but he knows that without negotiation the farmers 
have no hope of returning to the land in time to make a 
difference for Zimbabwe's food crisis.  Cloete believes that 
some commercial farmers must be in place and producing by 
the 2003/2004 growing season, or Zimbabwe may slide into an 
abyss which will not be remedied for generations.  Cloete 
realizes that the CFU has been thrown a lifeline by the 
GOZ's need to have others -- the EU, the Commonwealth, the 
USG -- see some effort at breaking the current impasse, but 
he seems uncertain on how best to capitalize on the 
increased international attention to the destruction of 
commercial farming in his homeland. End comment.