US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1132

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, PINS, TU, Iraq 
SUBJECT: TURKEY ON IRAQ: STUMBLING UNWILLINGLY TOWARD THE 
COALITION OF THE WILLING 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 
(b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Virtually all interlocutors from across the 
spectrum assume eventual GOT agreement to deployment of U.S. 
forces through Turkey.  However, there is no clear GOT 
decision on the horizon; for their part, key elements of the 
Kemalist State are compounding the delay by using the Iraq 
question for domestic purposes -- to weaken the ruling AK 
party.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) In Feb. 17-20 conversations, long-standing political 
contacts in ruling AK and other parties, journalists, 
businessmen, and think-tank contacts with close ties to the 
Turkish General Staff have elucidated for us why the Turks 
have dragged their feet.  Virtually all contacts assume 
Turkey will join the coalition, but all underscore the 
reluctance of the AK government/AK parliamentary group and 
State bureaucracy, and most acknowledge the reluctance of the 
General Staff, to join quickly.  Our contacts' comments come 
in the midst of (1) general public indifference to the 
economic and financial cost of failing to garner U.S. 
economic assistance in return for U.S. deployment and (2) 
sneaking admiration among many in and outside government for 
the way the French have sought to stymie us. 
 
 
AK Party 
 
 
3. (C) Vice chairman for press Mercan, usually a belligerent 
interlocutor, was uncharacteristically subdued in readily 
admitting to us the necessity of coming to agreement on the 
economic package and on deployment.  He remains concerned, 
however, that opposition within the party is too big to 
overcome. 
 
 
4. (C) Parliamentary foreign policy deputy chairman Sirin has 
lobbied publicly and privately for a larger economic package, 
not in the form of loans but of a rescheduling of $50 billion 
of Turkey's sovereign debt.  However, acknowledging the 
overriding importance of coming to agreement on U.S. 
deployment, he declared off-handedly that we should not worry 
because the AK government will -- at some point -- pass the 
necessary deployment decision through parliament.  Becoming 
more acerbic, Sirin attributed the delay to party leader 
Erdogan's "outsized" sense of self importance and 
preoccupation with doing nothing that might ruin his chances 
of being elected to parliament in the re-run of the general 
election in Siirt province March 9.  Sirin half-jokingly 
asked whether we would consider delaying any operation until 
after that date.  He also lamented the failure of P.M. Gul to 
keep the AK parliamentary group sufficiently informed about 
the state of negotiations with the U.S. 
 
 
CHP 
 
 
5. (C) CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Ozyurek told 
us CHP will continue firmly to oppose any U.S. deployment 
because the party sees no international legitimacy for an 
operation absent a new UNSC resolution specifically 
authorizing enforcement.  However, he assumed that permission 
for U.S. deployment will pass in parliament.  Ozyurek 
confirmed that, since the deployment permission would come 
through a parliamentary decision and not a law, President 
Sezer, who has categorically proclaimed the need for a second 
UNSC resolution, cannot veto it or otherwise prevent its 
going into force. 
 
 
6. (C) Former ambassador to NATO Onur Oymen also focused on 
what he asserted is CHP's real concern -- and that of Sezer, 
he hastened to add -- over lack of international legitimacy. 
Then, when faced with our argument that one can find 
legitimacy in UNSC resolution 1441 and the resolutions it 
builds on, he quickly backtracked to the point of 
volunteering that international legitimacy can be based on UN 
Charter article 51 (self defense). 
 
 
Think Tanks 
 
 
7. (C)  Umit Ozdag, director of ASAM (Center for Eurasian 
Strategic Studies, which has long-term close relations with 
the more radically nationalist elements in the General 
Staff), attributed General Staff hesitancy to convictions 
that the U.S. has other motives in Northern Iraq.  Ozdag 
cited the General Staff's deep suspicions that the U.S. is 
ready to tolerate an independent Kurdish state and is 
unresponsive to Turkish demands for a "fair share" of 
territory and petroleum reserves for the Iraqi Turkmen. 
Ozdag asserted as well that Turks are wary of joining the 
U.S. because they are convinced our main aim is to control 
Iraq's oil reserves, not do away with WMD. 
 
 
8. (C) Deputy director of YSM (High Strategy Center, which 
has a national security focus and solid connections to the 
General Staff, National Security Council, and Turkish 
National Intelligence Organization) Demir and five members of 
his advisory board all opined to us Feb. 19 that the AK 
government is certain to agree to U.S. deployment.  They also 
underscored the determination of the Turkish State -- in the 
form of the General Staff and Presidency -- to use the Iraq 
question to shatter AK party's ability to govern by insisting 
that the AK government shoulder all the responsibility for 
the decision while they (the representatives of the State) 
drag their feet and refuse to give AK advice.  We have heard 
the same from many AK party reps -- e.g., deputy chairman for 
policy Firat, Erdogan foreign policy advisors Bagis and 
Celik, and parliamentary foreign policy committee deputy 
chairman Sirin, who stated bluntly, "The Army is making us 
wear the jacket." 
 
 
9. (C) Demir had a different assessment of timing when we 
followed up with him Feb. 20.  The dawning realization that 
the U.S. is moving ahead and that further delay would 
jeopardize chances for an economic package big enough to help 
AK win both Erdogan's election in March and country-wide 
municipal elections in April 2004 has shaken the AK 
leadership's confidence and for the first time introduced the 
fear of electoral defeat, Demir said.  However, the window of 
opportunity will last only a day or two before AK either 
regains the sense that it can get away with continuing to 
test the U.S. or sinks into a more defeatist, but still 
defiant, attitude. 
 
 
10. (C) Demir added that a smaller group in the General Staff 
is reluctant to have the U.S. deploy in a northern front 
through Turkey lest U.S. forces get in the way of what Demir 
characterizes as this group's keen desire to hit the Kurds 
hard in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey.  However, the 
main group in the General Staff, aside from using the delay 
in decision-making to put the AK government under further 
pressure, favors a delay because it fears that a war will 
suck the Turkish military into its own Vietnam in northern 
Iraq, Demir concluded. 
 
 
11. (C) One of Demir's advisory board, General Director of 
Customs Saygilioglu, expressed regret that the U.S. had not 
been more decisive, with unmovable deadlines, earlier.  Lack 
of USG pressure or credible deadlines led both the GOT and 
General Staff to think they had extra room to delay. 
 
 
Press 
 
 
12. (C) Akif Beki, an Islamist-oriented journalist with 
exceptionally open access to Erdogan and Gul, also insisted 
that the GOT will approve U.S. deployment.  He explained the 
delay in decision-making as stemming from P.M. Gul's 
conviction that he could prevent war by delaying the U.S. 
deployment request.  In this regard, Gul has been influenced 
most by (1) Islamist journalist Fehmi Koru, who has 
insistently hammered home the line that the U.S. is powerless 
to go to war absent Turkish support for a northern front, and 
(2) the prime ministry's senior foreign policy advisor Ahmet 
Davutoglu, who has convinced Gul that blocking the U.S. 
through a continuing Turkish-Islamic peace initiative is best 
for the U.S. as well. 
 
 
13. (C) Beki added that one reason the Turks have insisted on 
a much larger economic package than the U.S. is ready to give 
is Erdogan's and Gul's conviction that the main U.S. goal is 
to control Iraq's oil and that Turkey should have the right 
to a healthy slice of what Davutoglu and others have told Gul 
will be huge ensuing profits for the U.S. 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
14. (C) While virtually all our interlocutors assume some 
agreement for deployment is inevitable, none has given us a 
clear and convincing timetable.  Feb. 18-20 saw ambiguous 
bluster from AK chairman Erdogan and at the same time a 
flurry of consultations with foreign policy advisors by an 
increasingly nervous-looking P.M. Gul.  Several interlocutors 
interpret Gul's increased activity as a sign that, under our 
lobbying barrage, the AK government is now becoming aware of 
the financial costs of not agreeing to U.S. deployment and 
has finally accepted that we are serious about enforcing 
Iraq's WMD disarmament. 
 
 
15. (C) However, the GOT and parliamentary leadership have 
deferred any possible consideration of a deployment 
resolution past Feb. 21, i.e., until the week of Feb. 24; we 
have also heard from AK party through the Swedish ambassador 
that the government may split any draft resolution into two: 
one which would authorize deployment of Turkish troops in 
Iraq (certain to pass) and one which would authorize U.S. 
deployment through Turkey but which would not be submitted 
until we have reached agreement on the economic package, 
military operations MOU, and a joint declaration on post-war 
aims in Iraq. 
PEARSON