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| Identifier: | 03ROME699 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ROME699 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rome |
| Created: | 2003-02-20 17:33:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000699
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PGOV, PGOV, PGOV, IT, ITPREL, ITPREL, ITPREL, ITALIAN POLITICS, IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC
WAVE ON IRAQ
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 00699 01 OF 04 202219Z
REF: A. ROME 0443
B. ROME 6167
CLASSIFIED BY: A/POLITICAL-MINISTER COUNSELOR GARY ROBBINS
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) ITALY HAS MADE ITS STRATEGIC CHOICE ON IRAQ. THE GOI
WILL BACK FORCIBLE DISARMAMENT OF SADDAM, WITH OR WITHOUT A
UN RESOLUTION, IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY. HOW IT GETS TO THAT
DECISION POINT WILL BE MESSY, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE PM
BERLUSCONI IS CONFRONTING A MOSTLY UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL
SITUATION ON THE HOME FRONT. THE ITALIAN PUBLIC
OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSES MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ; THE
VATICAN CONTINUES TO PRESS THE "PEACE" TRACK; AND THE
CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION REFUSES TO CLIMB ON BOARD A BIPARTISAN
BANDWAGON. STRIP AWAY ITALY'S SECULAR FACE, AND A COUNTRY
THAT IS STILL HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY "CULTURAL CATHOLICISM"
SURFACES. IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THIS TRANSLATES INTO
DEEP SKEPTICISM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION, IF NOT OUTRIGHT
PACIFISM. IT MAKES THE GOI'S PUBLIC "BURDEN OF PROOF" FOR
WHY ITALY MAY NEED TO SUPPORT ARMED INTERVENTION IN IRAQ VERY
HIGH.
2. (C) THE GOI HAS SETTLED ON A WORKABLE PARLIAMENTARY
STRATEGY THAT RESULTED IN OVERWHELMING COALITION SUPPORT FOR
ITS FEBRUARY 19 MOTION ON IRAQ (SEPTEL): EMPHASIZE PEACE,
PREPARE FOR CONFLICT, AND CONSULT REGULARLY WITH PARLIAMENT.
THE CENTER-LEFT, EAGER TO RIDE THE TIGER OF PUBLIC OPINION,
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 00699 01 OF 04 202219Z
HAS SPURNED THE GOI'S EFFORTS TO TURN IRAQ POLICY INTO A
BIPARTISAN ISSUE. FOR THIS REASON, DENYING THE OPPOSITION
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PAINT THE GOI AS ISOLATED IN EUROPE WAS,
FOR BERLUSCONI, A KEY OUTCOME OF THE FEBRUARY 17 EU SUMMIT
AND MAY HELP SOME IN MANAGING PUBLIC OPINION. IN PUBLIC, THE
PM WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT ITALY IS WORKING FOR PEACE,
PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING A MAJOR ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION IN
ROME. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT IS MAKING THE CASE MORE
OPENLY THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR SADDAM TO COOPERATE WITH
THE UN INSPECTIONS. IF PRESIDENT BUSH DECIDES TO ATTACK
IRAQ, THE GOI WILL LINE UP A DIVIDED COUNTRY BEHIND A
U.S.-LED MILITARY COALITION. WE BELIEVE THE BERLUSCONI
GOVERNMENT IS SOLID ENOUGH INTERNALLY, AND STILL ENJOYS
SUFFICIENTLY BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT TO STAY THE COURSE. END
SUMMARY.
A FAITHFUL ALLY
---------------
3. (C) THE GOI HAS ARRIVED AT THE IRAQ ENDGAME FULLY
COMMITTED TO SOLIDIFYING ITALY'S POLITICAL AND SECURITY
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. IT HAS MADE A STRATEGIC CHOICE IN
BACKING OUR FUNDAMENTAL GOAL OF DISARMING SADDAM. PM
BERLUSCONI'S SIGNATURE ON THE WALL STREET JOURNAL "LETTER OF
THE EIGHT" PROVED A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SIDES IN PUBLIC, AT
SOME POLITICAL RISK. THE GOI'S RECENT GRANTING OF ROAD,
RAIL, AND PORT ACCESS FOR MOVEMENT OF U.S. TROOPS AND
EQUIPMENT THROUGH ITALIAN NATIONAL TERRITORY MOVES ITALY
FURTHER INTO THE CAMP OF THOSE COUNTRIES OFFERING NOT ONLY
POLITICAL, BUT ALSO CONCRETE SUPPORT. ITALY IS AND WILL
REMAIN A FAITHFUL ALLY -- WILLING TO MAKE THE TOUGH CALLS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 00699 01 OF 04 202219Z
WHEN NECESSARY. NEVERTHELESS, BERLUSCONI IS MANAGING A
DELICATE DOMESTIC SITUATION THAT IMPACTS HOW THE GOVERNMENT
HAS FRAMED THE IRAQ ISSUE AND THE TACTICS THE GOI HAS ADOPTED
TO SUPPORT ITS POLICY.
TOUGH DOMESTIC SLEDDING
-----------------------
4. (C) ITALY'S IRAQ POLICY IS BEING GENERATED UNDER MOSTLY
UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES: STRONG ANTI-WAR
SENTIMENT, THE PERSISTENT INFLUENCE NOT SIMPLY OF THE VATICAN
BUT CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY MORE BROADLY, AND AN
OPPOSITION DETERMINED TO SEEK POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND THUS
UNWILLING TO BROOK ANY COMPROMISE OVER AN ISSUE IT HAS CAST
AS PEACE VERSUS WAR. NEW POLLS RELEASED LAST WEEK REVEAL A
YAWNING GAP BETWEEN THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITALIANS WHO
BELIEVE BOTH THAT IRAQ HAS TIES TO AL-QAIDA AND RETAINS WMD
CAPABILITY, BUT YET REJECT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE OUT OF
HAND, AND THE MINORITY WILLING TO COUNTENANCE WAR AS A MEANS
TO ADDRESS THE THREAT. SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC IS NOW
OPPOSED TO ATTACKING IRAQ.
5. (C) THE VATICAN'S INFLUENCE IS INDIRECT AND DIFFUSE; THE
POPE IS NOT PULLING ANY STRINGS AT THE PM'S OFFICE OR THE
SVC REF B NOT 2003 MSG
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2279
PAGE 01 ROME 00699 02 OF 04 202220Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DOEE-00 WHA-00
SRPP-00 EAP-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 OES-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00
IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SVC-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
SA-00 SSD-00 PMB-00 DRL-01 G-00 SSR-00 SAS-00
/005W
------------------3901DD 202221Z /15
P 201733Z FEB 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8354
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 000699
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC
WAVE ON IRAQ
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 00699 02 OF 04 202220Z
MFA. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE HOLY SEE CONTINUES TO CLAIM
"THERE ARE STILL AVENUES OF PEACE TO EXPLORE," IT IS
DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO ARGUE OTHERWISE. MOREOVER, ITALY,
DESPITE A DECADES-LONG TREND OF SECULARIZATION, REMAINS A
COUNTRY THAT IS "CULTURALLY CATHOLIC" AND ITS POLITICAL
CLASS--ESPECIALLY ON THE CENTER-RIGHT--REFLECTS THIS SOCIAL
REALITY. THE UPSHOT IS A PERVASIVE AND VISCERAL ANXIETY
ABOUT MILITARY CONFLICT THAT, WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION,
EXTENDS BEYOND THE TINY CENTRIST UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(UDC).
6. (C) INDEED, A STRONG CATHOLIC STREAK RUNS THROUGHOUT THE
GOVERNING COALITION; OLD LINE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN FORZA ITALIA AND ARE ACTIVE IN THE
RIGHT-WING NATIONAL ALLIANCE. WHILE THESE PROFESSIONAL
POLITICIANS ARE NOT DETERMINANT IN SHAPING THE FOREIGN POLICY
DEBATE, THEY WIELD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE. MOREOVER, A
GOVERNING COALITION THAT REACHED OUT TO CATHOLIC VOTERS AS A
KEY CONSTITUENCY CANNOT AFFORD TO USE BELLICOSE RHETORIC TO
EXPLAIN POLICY CHOICES. THEREFORE, THE RHETORICAL TONE IS
MUTED, STRATEGY IS CAST IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING THE FOCUS ON
PEACE, AND PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT IS GIVEN TO DIPLOMATIC
INITIATIVES REGARDLESS OF THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS (REF A).
WHILE PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT, THE GOI IS
TRYING TO INSULATE ITSELF FROM ACCUSATIONS THAT IT IS
PRO-WAR.
7. (C) THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION'S DISJOINTED APPROACH TO
IRAQ IS A MIXED BLESSING FOR THE GOI. THE OPPOSITION'S
TACTICAL DECISION TO TARGET GOI POLICY AS PART OF ITS
LONG-RUNNING GUERRILLA WARFARE CAMPAIGN AGAINST BERLUSCONI
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 00699 02 OF 04 202220Z
WILL PREVENT ANY SIGNIFICANT BI-PARTISAN COOPERATION, WHICH
THROUGHOUT THE POST-COLD WAR ERA HAS BEEN THE NORM ON MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. THE GOI HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO
"NATIONALIZE" ITS IRAQ POLICY, CALLING ON THE CENTER-LEFT TO
UNITE BEHIND A POLICY OF DIPLOMACY BACKED BY THE THREAT OF
FORCE. HOWEVER, WITH PUBLIC SENTIMENT RUNNING SO STRONGLY
AGAINST CONFLICT, AND THE OPPOSITION DESPERATELY SEARCHING
FOR ISSUES AROUND WHICH IT CAN RALLY VOTERS, THE CENTER-LEFT
WILL WORK TO KEEP THE DEBATE DIVISIVELY PARTISAN. WHILE THIS
COMPLICATES THE GOI'S MANAGEMENT OF THE ISSUE IN PARLIAMENT,
THERE IS AN UPSIDE.
8. SPLIT AMONG THREE CAMPS--A PACIFIST LEFT, A CENTER-LEFT
OPPOSED TO PREVENTIVE WAR BUT SENSITIVE TO THE UN, AND AN
ELITE CONCERNED ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S AND ITALIAN
PRESTIGE--THE OPPOSITION IS NOT WELL POSITIONED TO INFLICT
SERIOUS POLITICAL DAMAGE ON THE GOI. INDEED, THE CENTER-LEFT
WOULD SPLINTER BADLY IF A FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO UNSC 1441
AUTHORIZING MILITARY FORCE WERE PASSED BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. MANY IN THE OPPOSITION'S RANK AND FILE ARE PINNING
THEIR HOPES ON FRANCE TO FORESTALL THIS.
9. (C) THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC IS NOT STRONG IN ITALY; THE OFFICE HOLDER'S
INFLUENCE STEMS FROM HIS MORAL STANDING AND PERSUASIVE
ABILITIES. PRESIDENT CIAMPI, WHO ENJOYS BROAD RESPECT, ACTS
AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION AND IS
FOCUSED INTER ALIA ON ENSURING THAT INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
DO NOT BREAK DOWN. BUT HE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SHAPING
POLITICAL OPINION -- INCLUDING ON THE IRAQ DEBATE -- IF NOT
SO MUCH POLICY OUTCOMES (SEPTEL).
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 00699 02 OF 04 202220Z
10. (C) CIAMPI IS A COMMITTED INTERNATIONALIST WHO BELIEVES
AS STRONGLY IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC
RELATIONSHIP AS HE DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION. HE WOULD MAKE
HIS VIEWS KNOWN (AND HAS DONE SO) WERE THE BERLUSCONI
GOVERNMENT IGNORING ONE OR THE OTHER IN POLICY FORMULATION.
NOW, THEIR MUTUALLY COINCIDING GOALS--DEMONSTRATING ITALY'S
FAITHFULNESS TO AN ALLY AND KEEPING THE EU'S INTERNAL CRISIS
WITHIN MANAGEABLE BOUNDS--WORKS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE GOI.
INDEED, A LETTER FROM CIAMPI DELIVERED TO BERLUSCONI ON
FEBRUARY 14 IN WHICH HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO ITALY OF
THE EU, THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE UN, ALSO COMPLIMENTED THE
GOVERNMENT FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE IRAQ ISSUE. IF THE GOI
CANNOT FIND COVER UNDER BI-PARTISANSHIP, IT HAS FOUND SOME
COMFORT IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ARMS OF THE PRESIDENT.
MANAGING THE DEBATE
-------------------
11. (C) BERLUSCONI AND HIS CLOSEST POLITICAL
ALLIES--ESPECIALLY DEPUTY PM FINI, HOUSE OF DEPUTIES
PRESIDENT CASINI, FM FRATTINI, AND DEFMIN MARTINO--HAVE SO
FAR MANAGED TO KEEP THE WHITE HOT IRAQ ISSUE ON THE RAILS.
SVC PARA 8 HAS NO PARA MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2489
PAGE 01 ROME 00699 03 OF 04 202358Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DOEE-00 WHA-00
SRPP-00 EAP-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 OES-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00
IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SA-00
SSD-00 PMB-00 DRL-01 G-00 SSR-00 SAS-00 /005W
------------------390B91 202358Z /15
P 201733Z FEB 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8355
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 000699
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC
WAVE ON IRAQ
WITHIN THE COALITION, DISSENTERS FROM THE PM'S
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 00699 03 OF 04 202358Z
LINE--INCLUDING A GROUP OF LIBERAL LEGISLATORS PERPLEXED
ABOUT PREEMPTIVE WAR--HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO SPEAK OUT WITHOUT
BEING SHOUTED DOWN. BERLUSCONI HAS ALSO MET PERSONALLY WITH
LEGISLATORS NOT COMPLETELY COMFORTABLE WITH THE GOI'S
POSITION. SHUTTING OFF INTERNAL DEBATE WOULD HAVE BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE; BY FRAMING ITALY'S IRAQ POLICY AROUND A VIRTUOUS
GOAL--COMING TO THE AIDE OF AN ALLY IN NEED--BERLUSCONI HAS
EFFECTIVELY DEFUSED THE RISK OF A FIFTH COLUMN DEVELOPING.
12. (C) FINI, FOR HIS PART, HAS PLAYED A BEHIND-THE-SCENES
ROLE, HELPING TO CONTAIN ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN THE NATIONAL
ALLIANCE. CASINI HAS BEEN MORE OUTSPOKEN. WHILE HIS PARTY,
THE UDC, IS THE SMALLEST COALITION PARTNER, ON IRAQ ITS
SKEPTICISM TOWARD WAR IS BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
CENTER-RIGHT'S CATHOLIC ELECTORATE. CASINI IS ACUTELY
SENSITIVE TO THESE FORMER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC VOTERS--AND
THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT--AND HAS ADROITLY MIXED A
PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO PEACE WITH POLITICAL REALISM IN
FRAMING THE ISSUE PUBLICLY. FRATTINI'S STRAIGHTFORWARD
NON-POLEMICAL APPROACH IN DEFENSE OF THE UN'S CRITICAL BUT
NOT EXCLUSIVE ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT HAS HELPED KEEP THE
GOVERNMENT LINE CONSISTENT AND RELATIVELY CLEAR.
13. (C) MARTINO'S JOB IS TO HELP MANAGE THE POLITICAL
PROCESS IN THE LEGISLATURE. BY AND LARGE, HE HAS WIDESPREAD
CREDIBILITY BECAUSE HE IS CONSIDERED HONEST, SERIOUS, AND
GENERALLY REFUSES TO BE DRAGGED IN TO THE DAILY "TEATRINO" OF
POLITICAL SHADOW DANCING. THE GOI'S DECISION TO CONSULT WITH
PARLIAMENT ON DETAILED FLOW OF FORCES ISSUES CERTAINLY WAS
TAKEN WITH AN EYE TO CONTAINING OPPOSITION RANCOR, BUT IT HAS
ALSO PROBABLY HELPED KEEP THE COALITION IN LINE. INDEED,
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 00699 03 OF 04 202358Z
MARTINO, WHO WE ARE TEMPTED TO CALL A RELUCTANT HAWK, MUST,
IN DEALING WITH PARLIAMENT, MANAGE A FLOCK OF DOVES WHO ARE
CULTURALLY ALLERGIC TO SEEING ITALY ENGAGED DIRECTLY IN
MILITARY CONFLICT.
14. (C) THE DEFMIN, WHO SOWED HIS POLITICAL OATS IN THE NOW
DEFUNCT ITALIAN LIBERAL PARTY, OWES HIS ALLEGIANCE TO
BERLUSCONI, NOT TO ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL GROUPING. HE
SERVES AS A LIGHTENING ROD FOR THE PM, AND MARTINO'S CAUTION
REFLECTS, WE THINK, MOSTLY A RECOGNITION THAT THE GOI IS FAR
OUT IN FRONT OF PUBLIC OPINION. MARTINO HAS AT TIMES SAID
MORE IN PUBLIC THAN WE THOUGHT NECESSARY. HOWEVER, AS
HIGHLIGHTED IN REF B, IN GETTING OUT IN FRONT ON
CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS IRAQ, HE MORE OFTEN
THAN NOT SETS THE TERMS OF DEBATE, AND USUALLY IS ABLE TO
STEER IT IN A DIRECTION FAVORABLE TO OUR INTERESTS.
15. (C) DENYING THE CENTER-LEFT AN OPPORTUNITY TO USE EUROPE
AS A WEDGE ISSUE ALSO HAS BEEN FUNDAMENTAL TO THE GOI'S
OVERALL STRATEGY. WITH 56 PERCENT OF ITALIANS SAYING THEY
JUDGE POSITIVELY THE ROLE OF FRANCE AND GERMANY ON IRAQ
VERSUS 41 PERCENT SAYING THE SAME ABOUT THEIR OWN COUNTRY'S
ROLE, EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE INTRA-EU GAP HAVE A DUAL FOREIGN
POLICY (PAVING THE WAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL ITALIAN EU
PRESIDENCY) AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. EVEN A PAPER
EXERCISE SUCH AS THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED EU SUMMIT SHOULD HELP
BERLUSCONI AMELIORATE HIS "EUROPE" PROBLEM AND REDOUND
POSITIVELY WITH PUBLIC OPINION. AT THE SAME TIME, BERLUSCONI
MUST BE ATTUNED TO LATENT AND NOT-SO-LATENT ANTI-AMERICANISM
CREEPING AROUND THE EDGES OF ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN ITALY. THE
MORE EU COVER HE CAN SECURE FOR HIS VERY PRO-US POLICY
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 00699 03 OF 04 202358Z
POSITIONS, THE BETTER THE GOI WILL BE ABLE TO COUNTER THIS
PHENOMENON. COMPLETING A "TRIFECTA" BY HELPING TO MEND THE
RIFT BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S., WITHIN THE EU, AND BETWEEN
THE GOI AND THE ITALIAN PUBLIC, IS ONE OF BERLUSCONI'S KEY
POLICY OBJECTIVES.
HOLDING IT TOGETHER
-------------------
16. (C) THE ONE MILLION (UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES) PEACE
DEMONSTRATORS WHO MARCHED IN ROME ON FEBRUARY 15 WILL NOT
CHANGE THE GOI'S DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM. BERLUSCONI HAS
SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE BELIEVES THEY UNDERMINED THE CAUSE OF
PEACE BY GIVING SADDAM FALSE HOPE THAT FULL COOPERATION WITH
THE UN INSPECTORS MAY NOT BE NECESSARY. HE KNOWS THAT, WHILE
CERTAINLY SOME CENTER-RIGHT VOTERS PARTICIPATED, GENERALLY
ITALY'S CONSERVATIVE CLASSES DO NOT TAKE TO THE STREETS.
WHILE LOCAL ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED IN MAY, VOTERS DO NOT
HAVE A HISTORY OF USING THEM AS REFERENDA TO REGISTER
DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ON NATIONAL
ISSUES. THE GOI IS HOPING THAT BY THE TIME ELECTIONS TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ROLL AROUND NEXT YEAR, IT CAN TOUT THAT
ITALY ON IRAQ WAS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2490
PAGE 01 ROME 00699 04 OF 04 202359Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DOEE-00 WHA-00
SRPP-00 EAP-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 OES-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00
IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SA-00
SSD-00 PMB-00 DRL-01 G-00 SSR-00 SAS-00 /005W
------------------390BA4 202359Z /15
P 201733Z FEB 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8356
INFO NTO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORECE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SEDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 000699
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC
WAVE ON IRAQ
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 00699 04 OF 04 202359Z
17. (C) NEVERTHELESS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS DID HIGHLIGHT THE
VERY SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC RELATIONS DILEMMA THE GOI MUST STILL
TRY TO RESOLVE. ON THE ONE HAND, BERLUSCONI, IN HIS PRESS
STATEMENTS, WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS
PURSUING ALL OPTIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE
CRISIS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOLLOWING HIS FEBRUARY 18 MEETING WITH
KOFI ANNAN, HE SAID, "NO ONE IS THINKING ABOUT GIVING UP
EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION." YET, IN MORE
FORMAL SETTINGS, SUCH AS HIS FEBRUARY 19 STATEMENT BEFORE
PARLIAMENT, THE PM IS ADOPTING A MORE COLDLY RATIONAL
APPROACH. ITALY, HE SAID, IS WORKING FOR PEACE BUT IRAQ MUST
BE DISARMED; SADDAM ALONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS FATE; AND
NON-COOPERATION WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. WE MUST
SPEAK THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE, BUT NOT OF SURRENDER, BERLUSCONI
AFFIRMED.
18. (C) WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT
WILL BE ABLE TO SHIFT PUBLIC OPINION DRAMATICALLY ON IRAQ.
IN LEADING FROM THE FRONT, THE GOI HAS PLACED THE U.S.-ITALY
RELATIONSHIP AND ITS PERCEPTION OF ITALY'S NATIONAL INTEREST
AT THE FORE -- WITH THE ADVANTAGE OF A SECURE PARLIAMENTARY
AND ELECTORAL BASE, WHICH, IT PROBABLY CALCULATES (WE THINK
CORRECTLY) WILL CAST FUTURE VOTES ON THE BASIS OF MORE
PAROCHIAL ISSUES. UNTIL THE UN INSPECTORS REPORT AGAIN ON
MARCH 1, ITALY WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A RHETORICAL
BALANCING ACT, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT THE WAITING GAME MAY BE
NEARLY OVER. OUR ACE IN THE HOLE IS THAT BERLUSCONI WILL
FOLLOW OUR LEAD ON HOW LONG IS LONG ENOUGH. IN THE EVENT OF
MILITARY ACTION, BERLUSCONI WILL ALIGN A DIVIDED COUNTRY WITH
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 00699 04 OF 04 202359Z
THE U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL COALITION. UN AUTHORIZATION
WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC -- AND
POLITICAL -- OPINION. IT WOULD ALSO HELP BUFFER THE GOI AND
ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO MANAGE WHAT COULD BE EXTREME DOMESTIC
TURBULENCE IF A CONFLICT WERE TO BE PROLONGED AND RESULT IN
UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.
SEMBLER
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2003ROME00699 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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