US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1081

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013 
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PREL, PTER, JO 
SUBJECT: MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS: POST INPUT FOR JORDAN 
 
REF: STATE 36950 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) This message responds to reftel request for input on 
the MANPADS situation in Jordan. Answers are keyed to 
questions posed in reftel paras 7-13. 
 
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General Information 
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2. (S) Jordan possesses a limited stock of MANPADS, all of 
which are under the physical control of the Jordanian Armed 
Forces (JAF).  The JAF has/had old U.S.-made Redeye MANPADS 
but it is likely these systems, which were phased out of the 
active U.S inventory more than 20 years ago and are well past 
their shelf life, are no longer functional.  The JAF does not 
have any open FMS Repair and Return cases on the Redeye, 
which most likely means they are no longer maintaining the 
system.  The JAF does, however, have operational 
Russian-origin SA-8 and SA-13 MANPADS in an Air Defense 
battalion.  To confirm numbers and serviceability  status of 
the Redeyes and SA-8/13s would require bilateral coordination 
with the JAF. 
 
3. (S)  Thus far, no MANPADS have been seized in Jordan 
during interdiction operations, although the Kingdom has been 
a very active weapons smuggling location for terrorist groups 
including Hizbullah, Hamas, PIJ, IRGC and al-Qaeda.  That 
said, the quantity and sophistication of other weapons that 
have been confiscated raise the possibility that 
terrorist-linked groups in Jordan could seek to obtain 
MANPADS now or in the future. 
 
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Government Cooperation 
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4. (S) The U.S. maintains an extremely close and productive 
working relationship with the GOJ on a wide range of 
military, security, anti-terrorism, political and economic 
issues.  As part of this overall relationship, and within the 
constraints of Jordan's limited resources, we can expect the 
GOJ to respond very cooperatively to a U.S. effort to 
strengthen MANPADS anti-proliferation measures. 
 
5. (S) Jordan, with USG assistance, continues to strengthen 
its border security operations.  USG has worked closely with 
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) in the deployment 
of detection and screening equipment in border areas. 
Similarly, FMF funding for the JAF has devoted considerable 
resources to enhancing the Kingdom's ability to patrol and 
stop infiltration along its long borders.  The JAF recognizes 
that the groups that would use MANPADS for terrorist attacks 
pose a threat to the GOJ and foreign targets alike and thus 
the JAF, GID, and PSD are partners in preventing MANPADS from 
falling into the wrong hands.  As an example, Sky Marshals 
for the national airline -- Royal Jordanian (RJ) -- are drawn 
from the ranks of serving JAF officers and many JAF generals 
are alumni of this program. 
 
6. (S) Having noted Jordan's overall commitment to counter 
MANPADS and other threats, it is important to recognize that 
the GOJ's tools have certain limitations.  For instance, the 
JAF's standards for security and storage areas for these 
weapons may not be equal to those of the U.S.  The JAF would 
likely welcome any U.S.-funded upgrade to JAF MANPAD storage 
facilities.  In an similar vein, the Kingdom's export control 
laws and legal enforcement mechanisms could benefit greatly 
from USG training and assistance.  The planned NP-sponsored 
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
program would address some of these shortcomings in designing 
and implementing a national export control system.  The GOJ's 
receptivity for such training is indicative of a broader 
recognition that it needs to shore up legal and other 
deficiencies in its control of goods exported from or in 
transit through Jordan. 
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Feasible Arguments 
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7. (S) The GOJ is acutely aware of, and is actively 
combating, threats posed by terrorist groups seeking to use 
MANPADS, WMD and/or other weapons to wreak economic havoc on 
the local or international economy.  The GOJ's success in 
uncovering the Millennium Plot in which al-Qaeda cells 
planned to execute mass casualty terrorist attacks on hotels 
and other tourist sites in the Kingdom is testament to the 
seriousness with which it views such possibilities.  The 
national air carrier -- Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) -- is 
owned by the state.  A successful MANPADs attack on one of 
its planes would have deeply negative consequences not only 
for RJ but for Jordan's overall business climate.  The GOJ, 
as it seeks to build Jordan's tourism sector and reform its 
economy, would be responsive to efforts aimed at lessening 
MANPADS threats. 
 
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Financial Incentives 
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8. (C) Any GOJ concern about participating in a coordinated 
MANPADS anti-proliferation strategy would stem not from a 
philosophical disagreement but rather from a lack of 
resources.  Earmarking USG funds for the destruction, 
purchase, or enhanced storage of MANPADS in JAF stocks would 
be a useful incentive in this regard. 
 
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Government Contacts and Engagement Opportunities 
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9. (C) The JAF, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) 
and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) are the GOJ 
agencies that would be most usefully engaged in a bilateral 
MANPADS strategy.  When NP's EXBS program begins later in 
2003, we believe it would offer a useful forum to engage 
these government bodies and other relevant GOJ players on 
MANPADS.  Similarly, future visits by senior Washington 
policymakers to Jordan on CT and military/security issues 
should highlight the importance of countering MANPADS threats 
as part of their overall bilateral presentations. 
GNEHM