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| Identifier: | 03KUWAIT613 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03KUWAIT613 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kuwait |
| Created: | 2003-02-19 17:10:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | ETTC MOPS MARR PARM PREL PTER KU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T KUWAIT 000613 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013 TAGS: ETTC, MOPS, MARR, PARM, PREL, PTER, KU SUBJECT: INPUT TO MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS REF: SECSTATE 36950 Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; FOR REASON 1.5 (B, D) 1. (S) Prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the Kuwaiti Armed Forces (KAF) owned SA-7, SA-8, and SA-14 missile systems. Since 1991, the Kuwait Ministry of Defense (MOD) has claimed that all of their missile inventory was stolen by the Iraqi military. In 1995, the Kuwaiti MOD purchased 48 Starburst MANPADS from the United Kingdom. While Kuwait still possesses this inventory, all the missiles are past the certification date. Despite these missiles not performing well during the last exercise in March 2002, they are still considered capable of bringing down slow moving aircraft. 2. (S) According to Embassy-Kuwait's DIALO, Kuwait has evidenced good control of its Starburst inventories which are stored in tightly guarded government and/or military warehouses. At the present time, Kuwait does not export or allow the transfer of these weapons systems. There is a very small "black-market" for illicit small and/or light arms in Kuwait, but there is no evidence of illicit traffic in the larger weapon systems. Currently, there is no known excess inventory of the Starburst MANPADS. 3. (S) The GOK has, and continues to take, pro-active measures against the possibility of a terrorist attack, by conventional or non-conventional means, against one of its civilian aircraft. 4. (S) Financial or other incentives are not presently necessary to induce the GOK to alter its present command and control of its Starburst MANPADS. As cited previously, the GOK is currently handling its advanced weapons systems in a safe and secure manner. 5. (S) Presently, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, and primary point of contact regarding this issue, is Shaykh Jaber Mubarak Al-Sabah. MOD and other government ministries in Kuwait have a long history of providing strong support to the USG regarding military matters. JONES
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