US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1054

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 001054 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, EAID, MARR, MOPS, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN PLANNING TEAM VISIT HIGHLIGHTS NEED 
FOR STRENGTHENED UN/GOJ COORDINATION AND LOW-KEY CIV-MIL 
COORDINATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 40450 
     B. AMMAN 253 
 
Classified By: DCM Greg Berry, per 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  During a February 2-3 visit to Amman, 
members of the interagency Humanitarian Planning Team (HPT) 
met with GOJ Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaher 
Al-Bak, JAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Major 
General Mohamed-Majed Al-Eitan, the UN country team and the 
Hashemite Charitable Organization.  In addition to briefing 
GOJ and UN interlocutors on the USG's regional humanitarian 
contingency plan (reported ref a), the HPT also discussed key 
difficulties in Jordan's humanitarian planning in the event 
of hostilities.  Coordination between the UN and GOJ is being 
held up by GOJ financial requirements; GOJ operational 
planning is dominated by the military and does not yet have 
agreed mechanisms for dealing with the UN and NGO community; 
and the USG is still working to establish an appropriate 
civil-military coordination mechanism in Jordan, where most 
NGOs plan to base their regional operations.  Although the 
GOJ was initially receptive to the possibility of setting up 
a joint USG-GOJ humanitarian operations center, the GOJ later 
informed post it could not participate in such a center due 
to political sensitivities.  Similarly, although the GOJ has 
pledged that it would facilitate cross-border relief 
operations into Iraq, it has declined to discuss specific 
arrangements with the UN due to political sensitivities. 
Despite these significant obstacles to smooth planning and 
implementation, we are confident that the Jordanians are 
serious and committed to dealing with these critical 
humanitarian issues.  Embassy Amman will continue to work 
with the GOJ, UN and CENTCOM to address these issues.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Humanitarian Planning Team Delegation included: 
 PRM PDAS Rich Greene; Andy Wyllie, PRM/ANE; Helmut Reda, 
USMission Geneva/RMA, David Tarantino, OSD; Roger Corneretto, 
JCS; Major Ray Eiriz, CENTCOM.  USAID/OFDA Disaster 
Assistance Response Team members Guy Lawson and David Hajjar 
also accompanied the team on its meetings, as did Amman-based 
Regional Refugee Coordinator and Amman's USAID Mission 
Director.  The DCM and representatives from Amman's Defense 
Attache Office also joined some meetings. 
 
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Minister of State for Foreign Affairs:  GOJ 
Needs Funds Now; Wants Help in NGO Screening 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In a February 2 meeting, GOJ Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs (and chair of the GOJ's Ministerial-level 
emergency preparedness policy committee) Shaher Al-Bak told 
the HPT that, in the event of hostilities in Iraq, the GOJ 
would allow a certain number of Iraqi refugees to enter 
Jordan on "humanitarian grounds."  However, Bak cautioned 
that the international community must find a way to cover all 
financial costs related to any new refugee flows.  Jordan had 
spent large sums of its own money to provide financial 
assistance to refugees and TCNs during the 1990-91 Gulf 
crisis and could not afford to do the same thing again. 
Greene responded that the U.S. recognizes there would be 
major financial needs in the event of hostilities in Iraq and 
has identified the resource requirements needed to replace 
the USD 400-500 million currently entering Iraq through the 
oil-for-food program.  More immediately, the U.S. had just 
approved a USD 15 million drawdown of emergency humanitarian 
assistance funding that would allow UN agencies to 
preposition relief supplies; USAID had also provided another 
USD 10 million for similar purposes.  The U.S. was also 
asking other nations to do the same. 
 
4.  (C) Explaining that a "huge" number of NGOs currently 
seek permission to operate in Jordan -- both to provide 
assistance to new refugee populations here and as a basis for 
cross-border operations inside Iraq -- Bak asked for the 
USG's assistance in screening NGOs.  Although the GOJ will 
set up procedures for expedited registration of new NGOs, it 
will need assistance in verifying NGOs' references, goals and 
bona fides.  Greene responded that the Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (DART) could play a helpful role in providing 
references and additional background on NGOs seeking to work 
in Jordan. 
 
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GOJ Security Needs Will Remain Paramount 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Bak also emphasized that the GOJ's security needs 
will remain paramount in any humanitarian crisis.  The GOJ 
will conduct a security check on every person who seeks 
refuge in Jordan.  Some individuals, such as diplomats and 
documented citizens of the U.S. and European nations, would 
be easier to admit than others.  Emphasizing that Jordan 
cannot afford to take security risks, Bak hinted that 
"certain groups" would be denied entry entirely.  Greene 
urged the GOJ to conduct security checks as quickly as 
possible, noting that there is a direct link between 
provision of humanitarian assistance and overall stability. 
 
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GOJ Crisis Management Center:  Planning for 
TCNs and Refugees, With Security Screening 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) General Mohamed-Majed Al-Eitan briefed the HPT 
February 2 on the GOJ's plans to establish a border screening 
facility and two camps (one for TCNs and another for 
refugees, each with a capacity of 25,000) at Ruweished, 
approximately 75 km from the Iraqi border, in the event of 
hostilities in Iraq.  Should events warrant, the GOJ also had 
developed contingency plans to establish a camp for Iraqi 
asylum seekers and disarmed Iraqi soldiers at Nadayim 
airbase, just inside Iraqi territory.  (Details of plan 
reported ref b.)  Echoing comments made by Minister of State 
Shaher Al-Bak, Al-Eitan emphasized that Jordan needed 
financial help in order to respond to a new refugee crisis. 
Although the GOJ had held meetings with the UN and NGOs, no 
financial assistance from these organizations was yet 
forthcoming.  The Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) already had spent 
50,000 JD (roughly USD 70,000) on preparations for a refugee 
influx and needed new resources in order to continue its 
preparations.  The JAF wanted to establish a camp for 5,000 
refugees in order to be able to respond appropriately in the 
first 36-48 hours of any crisis but could not do so without 
funding.  Al-Eitan hoped to finalize funding arrangements 
through a still-to-be-signed framework agreement with UNHCR. 
 
7.  (C) Al-Eitan told the HPT that GOJ security needs would 
remain paramount in the event of a refugee crisis.  The GOJ 
expects a number of Iraqi military forces posted near the 
border to surrender immediately but, for security reasons, 
the GOJ will not allow any Iraqi soldiers to enter Jordan. 
Referring explicitly to Mujahadeen El-Khalq militants, 
Al-Eitan added that some other nationalities also would not 
be allowed to enter Jordan. 
 
 
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Cross Border Operations Dependent on 
Iraqi Agreement, at least in Initial Stages 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Al-Eitan told Greene that, although the GOJ had a 
strong interest in facilitating the provision of humanitarian 
assistance inside Iraq, the GOJ at least in the initial 
stages of a conflict would not be able to do anything inside 
Iraq without the approval of the Iraqi government.  In the 
event of regime change or collapse, however, the GOJ "will do 
everything" to ensure provision of relief from Jordanian 
territory.  Greene emphasized that rapid provision of 
humanitarian assistance inside Iraq would be key to 
maintaining stability inside Iraq and hence minimizing the 
displacement of Iraq's civilian population.  Even before any 
change in regime, for example, the World Food Program likely 
would need authorization to trans-ship food assistance 
through Jordan.  Al-Eitan agreed but again noted that the GOJ 
could not infringe on Iraq's sovereign authority as long as 
that authority remained intact.  He suggested that 
coordination of cross-border humanitarian assistance under 
the auspices of the Jordan and Iraq Red Crescent Societies 
could be a useful approach. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GOJ Ready to Facilitate USG Humanitarian Assistance 
But Civ-Mil Coordination Must be Low-Profile 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  (C) Al-Eitan told the HPT that he had been given 
instructions from "the most senior levels" to provide all 
necessary assistance and cooperation to U.S. Government 
humanitarian assistance efforts.  He noted specifically that 
the DART's humanitarian assistance would be granted duty-free 
status both into and out of Jordan and offered to provide 
prefabricated storage space near the camp sites at Ruweished. 
 General Al-Eitan asked that the US Government provide a 
liaison officer at both the JAF HQ and at the crisis 
management center's planned HQ at Ruweished.  HPT members 
suggested that a more robust coordination mechanism, similar 
to the planned Humanitarian Operations Center in Kuwait, 
would be more helpful than a sole liaison officer.  Al-Eitan 
asked his staff officers to hold a follow-on discussion with 
the HPT on February 3. 
 
10.  (C) At the February 3 follow-on meeting, Al-Eitan's 
staff officers suggested that the Hashemite Charitable 
Organization (HCO), in its role as overall humanitarian 
coordinator for the GOJ, would be the best partner for a 
joint US-GOJ coordination structure.  The HPT then held a 
separate meeting with HCO President Prince Rashid, where the 
HPT explained the US-GOK Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) 
and discussed ways in which a similar organization could be 
established in Jordan under the auspices of the HCO. 
Although Prince Rashid initially seemed receptive to the 
idea, he informed USAID Mission Director and DART members on 
February 4 that the HCO would not be able to host any USG 
military presence.  The Prince said that the HCO Board of 
Trustees would not accept a US military presence "of any 
form" due to the Society's relationship with other Arab 
nations, who are key donors and also rely on the HCO to 
transport donated goods to the West Bank and Gaza.  Prince 
Rashid emphasized that the HCO Board cannot allow the 
organization to be seen as in any way connected to the US 
military, as such a relationship would jeopardize the 
organization's role in Jordan as a neutral, charitable 
society.  (Comment:  Political sensitivities in Jordan may 
limit our ability to facilitate civ-mil coordination along 
the lines of the HOC in Kuwait.  One short-term solution 
could be for the UN to host a daily civ-mil briefing with US 
military participation.  We will work with the UN, CENTCOM 
and the GOJ to set up an initial coordination mechanism that 
is agreeable to all and will develop plans for making this 
more robust as times goes by.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
UN Country Team:  Focused on TCNs 
But Also Planning for Refugees 
--------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) UN Resident Coordinator Christine McNab told the HPT 
that movement of third-country nationals (mostly Egyptians 
and Sudanese) from Iraq would be the UN's biggest 
responsibility in Jordan in the event of hostilities in Iraq. 
 Jordan is the usual gateway for Egyptian and Sudanese 
laborers traveling to Iraq and the Gulf and the UN fully 
expects that they would seek to return through Jordan in the 
event of a crisis.  IOM is planning to repatriate up to 
60,000 TCNs, by sea (ferry service from Aqaba, Jordan to 
Nuweibeh, Egypt) and by air.  IOM estimates that up to 50,000 
Egyptians will seek repatriation through Jordan; while the 
remaining 10,000 will represent a mix of Sudanese, Eritrean, 
Ethiopian, Somali and various South Asian citizens. 
 
12.  (C) McNab reported that UN planning figures for refugee 
flows toward Jordan are far less certain, as would-be 
refugees likely would be able to find easier routes out of 
Iraq but those routes may not be accessible during 
hostilities.  The UN is using 35,000 refugees as its initial 
planning figure.  Yet given GOJ concerns about internal 
stability and security, UNHCR is quite concerned about 
refugee access to Jordan.  UNHCR Representative Sten Bronee 
reported that the GOJ has made it very clear that 
"undesirables" such as Iraqi soldiers or Iranian militants 
would not be welcome in Jordan.  UNHCR plans to provide 
assistance to Iraqis held at the border who are denied entry 
to Jordan but has not been able to clarify who would have 
overall responsibility for the security of this area and 
these would-be refugees. 
 
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UN-GOJ Coordination Complicated 
------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) The UN country team reported that humanitarian 
planning coordination within and with the GOJ is not 
consistent.  While Minister of State Shaher Al-Bak is 
responsible for policy-level decisions, Minister of Planning 
Bassam Awadallah is responsible for securing funds for any 
GOJ humanitarian efforts -- a mandate that has proved a major 
obstacle to further GOJ preparations, pending a pledge of 
funds from the UN.  (UNHCR Representative Sten Bronee later 
told refcoord that the UN would be unable to pledge funds to 
the GOJ, as none of the USD 15 million given by the US to 
UNHCR for preparations has been turned over to local UNHCR 
offices.)  The Jordan Armed Forces' Crisis Management Center, 
led by General Al-Eitan, is responsible for operationalizing 
the GOJ's plan, but according to the UN is not driving the 
process consistently.  The UN's key challenge, according to 
McNab, is how to encourage the GOJ to serve as a focal point 
for relief agencies and NGOs seeking to provide assistance in 
Jordan and use Jordan as a base for relief operations inside 
Iraq.  OCHA Representative Daniel Augstburger noted that most 
NGOs seeking to work in and from Jordan have no legal 
presence here and that an expedited GOJ registration process 
is therefore essential.  In addition, the GOJ needs to 
delegate some coordination responsibilities from the 
Jordanian military to an appropriate (and sufficiently 
strong) civilian ministry. 
 
---------------------------- 
GOJ Assurances But No Detail 
on Cross-Border Operations 
---------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) McNab reported that GOJ Prime Minister Ali Abul 
Ragheb provided assurances to both UNDP and UNHCR that the 
GOJ would facilitate the provision of cross-border assistance 
into Iraq.  However, given GOJ sensitivities about its 
political relationship with Iraq, the GOJ has not yet 
provided a detailed plan for the UN to actually deliver 
cross-border assistance.  As the GOJ has a strong 
self-interest in maintaining stability inside Iraq, the UN is 
confident that the GOJ will in fact allow cross-border relief 
operations.  But the lack of a concrete plan could pose major 
logistics problems if there is any break in the UN's 
Oil-for-Food pipeline. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Jordan Crucial Transport Corridor 
for UN Staff in Iraq 
--------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) Finally, the UN country team in Jordan also has 
responsibility for the safe evacuation of 900 international 
UN staff from Iraq.  The UN hopes that it would have adequate 
notice before the beginning of hostilities in order to 
evacuate staff overland through Jordan.  Should the UN not 
have sufficient notice, it would be required to evacuate its 
staff by air.  McNab noted that if there were any use of 
chemical or biological weapons inside Iraq, the UN would 
require U.S. military assistance in order to return its staff 
and restart its programs. 
 
16.  (U) PRM/ANE cleared this message for the HPT. 
 
GNEHM