US embassy cable - 03ABUJA344

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS IRAQ COLLECTIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:02/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EPET, NI, IZ 
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA: OBASANJO ON IRAQ, TERRORISM AND OIL 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: President Obasanjo February 13 publicly 
called  for Iraq to disarm peacefully, noting that the US 
could not be expected to stand down its forces otherwise. 
Recalling South Africa's decision to give up WMD programs, 
Obasanjo repeated these points during a private meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter and DAS Bridgewater the following day. 
Nigeria's President thought the GON could limit and contain 
any violent domestic reaction to US military action in Iraq. 
Oil production could rise to 2.8 MBD if necessary, Obasanjo 
said.  End Summary. 
 
 
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IRAQ MUST DISARM PEACEFULLY OR EXPECT WAR 
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2.  (U) Responding to media reports of discovery of prohibited 
Iraqi ballistic missiles, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo 
February 13 told reporters Iraq must comply with UNSCR 1441 or 
risk war.  Disarming nations of weapons of mass destruction 
was a concern of all nations, not just the U.S.  It should not 
be expected that the U.S., with over 200,000 troops in the 
Gulf region, would stand down its forces without a strong 
justification. 
 
 
3.  (C) Meeting with Ambassador Jeter and AF DAS Bridgewater 
at his residence February 14, Obasanjo reiterated his public 
message.  He added that South Africa's earlier disarmament 
offered Iraq a roadmap. 
 
 
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THE WAR AGAINST TERROR IS "A FIGHT FOR ALL OF US" 
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4.  (C) Commenting on critics of U.S. policy, Obasanjo said he 
saw the U.S. as a country that had thought itself impregnable 
now forced to defend itself.  The war against terror, he went 
on, is a fight for all of us.  The UNSC must, however, be the 
instrument. 
 
 
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GON PROBABLY CAN CONTROL DOMESTIC FUNDAMENTALISTS 
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5.  (C) Taking note of Ambassador Bridgewater's expression of 
appreciation for Nigeria's support for the war on terrorism, 
Obasanjo remarked that Nigeria had to strike a balance among 
the interests of various groups.  Of particular concern to the 
GON were Christian and Muslim fundamentalists.  In response to 
Ambassador Jeter's question, Obasanjo said the GON was working 
to assess the likely internal impact of U.S. military action 
in Iraq.  The point was being made repeatedly and at all 
levels that the problems with Iraq were political, not 
religious.  He thought that the GON could "control [its] own 
fundamentalists internally."  Otherwise, "I don't see anything 
[coming], but I cannot predict [the future]." 
 
 
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OIL PRODUCTION SURGE TO 2.8 MBD POSSIBLE 
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6.  (C) Obasanjo offered that Nigeria could raise its oil 
production to 2.8, possibly 2.9, MBD if the need arose.  "We 
are talking to the oil companies about that," he added. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) The GON was caught off-guard by the violent protests 
surrounding the Miss World pageant last year.  Since that 
time, GON security organizations have nipped several nascent 
protests in the bud, in Abuja and elsewhere.  U.S. military 
action in Iraq would present a new level of challenge, and 
protests, some of them probably violent, would likely take 
place in several Nigerian cities.  We are pleased to note that 
Obasanjo believes domestic fundamentalists can be contained. 
Moreover, the GON's response to the most recent threats of 
anti-American protests has been strong.  We do not anticipate 
a strong GON response to U.S. military action.  Depending on 
circumstances (e.g., what the inspectors find in coming days, 
pronouncements by other governments, and, above all, civilian 
casualties), we can anticipate a response ranging from tacit 
support to not-very-vocal opposition.  The GON will emphasize 
that the dispute with Iraq is political and not religious.  It 
already is employing Muslim Ministers to deliver that point to 
target audiences.  We believe this and other efforts will help 
mitigate violent manifestations of disagreement with U.S. 
actions.  All the same, we are examining our security posture 
and considering what unilateral steps the Embassy and 
Consulate General can take to enhance security.  We are also 
pleased to learn of GON willingness to surge oil production in 
the event of conflict.  However, we cannot at this time verify 
surge capacity. 
 
 
8.  (U) Ambassador Bridgewater cleared this message. 
 
 
JETER