US embassy cable - 03AMMAN980

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 000980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2013 
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, ASEC, JO 
SUBJECT: PILLARS OF THE REGIME PART III OF IV: JORDAN'S 
ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY SERVICES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) As Jordan prepares to face a possible war on its 
Eastern border, and then looks beyond the immediate crisis to 
longer term challenges, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), 
General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and Public Security 
Directorate (PSD) will serve as key pillars ensuring the 
stability of the monarchy.  Throughout its modern history, 
Jordan's military and internal security services -- drawn 
predominantly from its East Bank and Circassian populations 
-- have been a loyal and dependable source of support 
countering any threats to the regime, whether from within or 
without.  While the immediate and looming crisis with Iraq 
will test the strength and cohesiveness of these 
institutions, we expect that they will rise to the occasion 
-- as they have during every previous crisis in the nation's 
history.  Over the longer term, the GOJ will face potential 
stresses on these pillars from government reforms, economic 
changes and social pressures.   End Summary. 
 
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Always There When It Counts 
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2. (C) Throughout Jordan's modern history, the Hashemite 
Monarchy has depended on its military, intelligence and 
security forces to protect the kingdom from external threats, 
to infiltrate groups before they could act on their 
anti-regime ambitions and to maintain order when popular 
passions threatened to boil over.  At each critical juncture 
in Jordan's recent -- and not so recent -- past, these 
pillars have protected the stability of the Kingdom and 
guaranteed the continued rule of the Hashemites. 
 
3. (C) Over the past several years, with increased Al-Qaeda 
activity in Jordan, a public inflamed by the Intifada next 
door, and now a war with Iraq looking ever more probable, the 
preparedness and effectiveness of all three of these 
organizations -- the GID, JAF and PSD -- have never been more 
critical. 
 
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GID 
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4. (S) The GID is undoubtedly the most powerful of these 
three key organizations -- in the eyes of most Jordanians, 
the real "power behind the throne."  The GID maintains a 
mystique among the general population as the institution that 
"knows where all the skeletons are hidden."  Responsible both 
for internal and external intelligence, the GID's presence 
can be found in all corners of society.  Traditionally, 
Jordan's small but very Hashemite-loyal Circassian minority 
has played an outsized role in the organization, along with 
other East Bankers.  The GID has always been well-funded, 
something that has allowed it to successfully recruit many of 
the country's best and brightest into its service.  Family 
tradition also serves as a strong motivating force for 
service.  The GID's influence, always substantial under King 
Hussein, has grown even stronger since the accession to power 
of King Abdullah.  Its present Director, General Sa'ad Kheir, 
is arguably the King's closest advisor and confidant.  Using 
an array of sophisticated tools and methods, the GID keeps 
close tabs on groups and individuals that may pose threats to 
the regime. 
 
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JAF 
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5. (C) The present-day JAF is a direct descendent of the 
legendary Arab Legion, and officers and enlisted soldiers 
alike who serve in the nation's armed forces are proud of 
this lineage.  Like the GID, the vast majority of Jordan's 
armed forces are East Bankers.  Entering the JAF or the RJAF 
(Royal Jordanian Air Force) is seen as a career commitment, 
with most soldiers and airmen serving twenty-year stints. 
For many East Bankers of modest backgrounds, getting into the 
military has been, and continues to be, seen as an 
opportunity to gain steady employment, learn marketable 
skills, access the networks of "wasta" (connections) that are 
crucial in Jordanian society, serve their country, and -- for 
some -- be sent to the U.S. for training.  The primary 
mission of the armed forces is to protect the Kingdom's 
borders, whether from an invading army or from individuals 
and groups that would seek to use Jordan to smuggle weapons 
or drugs, or engage in acts of terror.  On those few 
occasions when unrest has turned bad -- such as the Black 
September civil war or (on a much smaller scale) unrest in 
Ma'an in late 2002 -- the JAF has been called in to assist 
police in restoring order. 
 
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PSD 
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6. (C) The PSD is among the most professional and competent 
police forces in the Arab world.  The PSD's responsibilities 
include investigating crimes; protecting the Royal Family, 
senior government officials, foreign diplomats and other 
dignitaries; border crossing point security; and -- the one 
with the greatest potential for internal political 
repercussions -- crowd control and suppression of civil 
disturbances.  Drawing almost exclusively from Jordan's East 
Bank populations, the PSD -- like the GID and JAF -- has long 
been seen as an avenue of opportunity for young men 
(primarily) from modest backgrounds to serve their country 
and provide reliable income for their families. Under the 
leadership of its current Director, former JAF Lt. General 
(and U.S. Army Ranger-trained) Tahseen Shurdom, the PSD has 
embarked on a coordinated effort to upgrade its training and 
technological capabilities (much of it supported through the 
DOS's Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program).  General 
Shurdom is not the only military general to join PSD's ranks 
recently.  There is a clear desire to infuse PSD with 
military quality training and discipline for the events 
coming soon. 
 
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The Immediate Challenges Ahead 
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7. (S) The possible war with Iraq will provide an immediate 
test of the capabilities and loyalty of these three key 
organizations.  While there are clear differences in the 
missions of each, they would be united in carrying out GOJ 
policies that -- at least in the beginning -- would not be 
popular with many Jordanians seeking to demonstrate pan-Arab 
solidarity with Iraq.  That said, if coalition forces are 
welcomed as liberators in Baghdad and relatively little blood 
is spilled, this initial burst of pro-Iraqi sentiment may 
lose much of its anti-American flavor and could transform 
into something potentially positive.  If, however, military 
action results in prolonged combat and high numbers of Iraqi 
civilian casualties -- and Jordanians see their government as 
complicit in this action -- the potential for anti-American, 
and possibly anti-Hashemite, popular unrest could grow 
appreciably.  The GOJ leadership fears that such an outcome 
-- coinciding with a spike in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and/or acts of violence perpetrated by Iraqi agents 
or al-Qaeda inside Jordan -- could pose challenges of a 
unique magnitude for the state. 
 
8. (C)  While various "nightmare" scenarios can be 
envisioned, the behavior of the security forces over the past 
2 1/2 years provide some indication of their current state of 
readiness.  Since the Intifada began in September 2000, the 
PSD has improved its crowd control techniques, recruited over 
1,200 new riot control police officers and, except in a 
limited number of occasions, been able to avoid the use of 
force to maintain order.  The PSD would seek to use this 
experience to defuse situations before they result either in 
violent confrontations with demonstrators or, equally as bad, 
the unwillingness of its forces to confront mobs.  Until now, 
PSD cohesion has been firm, even in the face of difficult 
situations. 
 
9. (C) For example, in April 2002, following the IDF's 
assault on Jenin, the fiercely loyal Badia police were 
deployed in Amman to prevent large-scale demonstrations.  The 
Badia's presence was a clear signal to protest organizers 
"not to cross red lines" and proved an effective deterrent to 
large rallies.  Even though the vast majority of Jordanians 
(and probably security officers themselves) agreed with most 
of the protest organizers' views, planned actions to "march 
to the Israeli Embassy and burn it down" were canceled and 
the most virulent calls by opposition groups dissipated 
significantly soon thereafter. The November 2002 standoff in 
Ma'an with Salafist Islamic extremists provided another test 
of the PSD's readiness to protect the regime.  While there 
has been criticism of the GOJ's handling of this situation 
(specifically that the PSD's approach, in this case, was too 
confrontational), the PSD did what was asked of it by the 
political leadership.  PSD was actively supported by JAF and 
RJAF forces in Ma'an. 
 
10. (C) The JAF, in the immediate period ahead, will be 
focused on protecting Jordan's borders, responding to any 
humanitarian crisis that might arise should there be an 
influx of Iraqi refugees, and if required, bolstering the PSD 
to ensure calm and order within the Kingdom.  The JAF has 
earmarked the entire special operations command for 
suppression of possible internal turbulence in Amman and 
Zarqa.  The King, PM, FM and other senior GOJ officials have 
repeatedly told the Jordanian public that the JAF will not be 
involved in any military action against Iraq. While there 
have been reports of lower level JAF personnel airing 
personal views sometimes sympathetic to Saddam or even Bin 
Laden, there is no indication that this has become widespread 
or problematic for JAF operations.  That said, soldiers in 
the JAF are not immune to the sentiments of frustration with 
U.S. policy prevalent in Jordanian society as a whole. 
 
11. (C) While the GID's immediate tasks are formidable, many 
of the threats that it is working to root out have foreign 
connections, a factor that makes it less likely to have 
domestic political ramifications.  Going after Iraqi agents 
and Al-Qaeda cells who would seek to commit acts of violence 
and destabilize the Kingdom is something most Jordanians see 
as fully justifiable. 
 
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Over The Longer Term 
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12. (C) Assuming the GID, JAF and PSD handle the near-term 
challenges successfully, all three institutions (but 
particularly the JAF and PSD) will still face longer term 
structural issues in the years ahead.  On a philosophical 
level, there is the question of how, or if, more Jordanians 
of Palestinian origin can be incorporated into these 
organizations.  Memories of "Black September" in 1970 and 
questions of loyalty still deter the GOJ from allowing 
significant numbers of Palestinians to serve in sensitive 
positions.  It is likely that until some solution is found to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jordan will be unable to 
resolve its own internal tensions between East and West 
Bankers and the ethnic makeup of these institutions will 
remain essentially unchanged. 
 
13. (C)  On a more concrete level are questions of salaries, 
expertise and talent.   Given the limited job opportunities 
for young Jordanians in provincial East Bank communities, the 
numbers seeking entrance into the military or PSD greatly 
outstrips available slots.  In an average year, for instance, 
18,000 Jordanians will apply to fill the roughly 2,000 new 
available slots in the JAF.  Typically, meritocratic criteria 
have played a less important role in the selection process 
than tribal or other "wasta" factors.  These patterns, which 
may have been acceptable in the past, will prove more 
problematic as the JAF (in particular) becomes a more 
technology-based force that demands selection more on 
qualifications than on connections. 
 
14. (C) A related issue concerns the JAF's ability to attract 
and retain individuals with high-tech aptitudes and skills to 
a military career at low pay when such skills will be in high 
demand at better pay in the private sector.  As it currently 
stands, the majority of career soldiers earn very modest 
incomes.  Army Captains, for instance, earn about 208 JD (USD 
291) per month.  (Note: Jordanian soldiers earn substantially 
more when serving overseas in international peacekeeping 
operations, an important factor in the GOJ's strong support 
and involvement in such missions.  End Note.)  The PSD will 
face similar issues as it too has embarked on an ambitious 
program to upgrade the technological component of its work. 
The GID, because of its traditionally higher salaries, faces 
less pressures from this direction. 
 
15. (C)  Another challenge will be finding a politically 
acceptable way to reform the overly generous military pension 
system, which the IMF has said places the largest burden on 
the government budget and largest impediment to the 
government's goal of reducing debt and reliance on foreign 
aid.  The military pension system currently runs a deficit 
equivalent to 3.2 percent of GDP and will peak at 4.5 percent 
of GDP over the next 15 years.  Pension benefits provide an 
important unearmarked source of income, particularly to the 
tribal and rural areas from which the military recruits. 
Government proposals, supported by the IMF, to reduce 
benefits and increase contributions and length of service 
requirements are likely to be a major bone of contention in 
relations with the military and security services over the 
next few years. 
 
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Comment 
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16. (C) Like the other "pillars" of the regime -- the tribes 
and the economic elite -- Jordan's military, intelligence and 
security forces have benefited from the more than eight 
decades of Hashemite rule.  To ensure the loyalty and 
effectiveness of these institutions in the years ahead, the 
GOJ will need to ensure that it targets its resources 
properly so that those who are tasked with carrying out 
sometimes unpopular actions are provided the tools, training 
and compensation to do so effectively and enthusiastically. 
 
 
BERRY