US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU280

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, IN, NP, India Relations 
SUBJECT: US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 
NEPAL 
 
REF: A. A. 02 NEW DELHI 6938 
     B. B. NEW DELHI 267 
     C. C. NEW DELHI 641 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASONS: 1.5 (B 
 AND D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  US security assistance to Nepal has brought 
the ancillary advantage to the US of providing a new arena 
for fruitful US-Indian dialogue and collaboration.  Top 
Indian diplomats in Kathmandu clearly appreciate not only US 
support for common US-Indian security objectives in Nepal, 
but also the unprecedented frequency and candor of our 
bilateral discussions of Nepal-related issues.  Indian 
military intelligence officers in Kathmandu, however, are 
openly and persistently uncomfortable with US sales of lethal 
equipment -- and M16s in particular -- to the Royal Nepal 
Army.  The following describes a recent discussion with 
Indian civilian and military officers that provides some 
insights into varied Indian attitudes toward US security 
policy here.  Embassy Kathmandu remains convinced that US and 
UK arms sales to Nepal -- although modest in quantity and 
basic in technology -- have played a disproportionately 
influential role in persuading Maoist leaders to agree to a 
cease-fire and negotiations with the Government of Nepal 
(GON).  We believe our security assistance policy remains 
valid, and that it offers a continuing opportunity to 
reinforce growing US-Indian mil-mil cooperation and engender 
greater bilateral confidence.  Positive Indian involvement 
clearly is key to any longer-term resolution of Nepal's 
political and security problems, so it is important that US 
diplomacy with India accelerate along with our security 
assistance to this beleaguered kingdom.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) DCM and DATT met on February 4 with their Indian 
counterparts to discuss issues raised by the Indian 
Ambassador concerning US sales of M16 rifles to Nepal. 
Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran had asked Ambassador Malinowski 
several days earlier what plans the US had for providing 
assault rifles to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).  He needed to 
know how many rifles the US plans eventually to provide, he 
explained, because he could not justify India's continuing to 
supply INSAS rifles if the US were planning to meet Nepal's 
needs in this regard.  Although Ambassador Malinowski, the 
DCM and our DATT meet frequently with their Indian 
counterparts, and have developed unprecedented transparency 
in their discussions of such formerly sensitive issues as 
security assistance, this was the first time the DCM and DATT 
had participated in a joint meeting at the Indian Embassy. 
 
3. (C) DCM and DATT began the discussion by explaining the 
complexity of the US security assistance process, emphasizing 
that none of the money appropriated in FY 02 for security 
assistance for Nepal has yet been spent on any military 
hardware or training.  So far, they explained, the USG has 
committed only to selling the RNA -- using GON funds -- two 
orders each of 5000 M16s.  The remaining 2000 rifles of the 
first order (which was submitted by the RNA in May 2002) 
should be delivered in the next month or two, but the 
delivery date of the second 5000 is still uncertain. 
Although the Nepali press persists in reporting that the US 
eventually with provide 55,000 rifles, this has not been 
agreed.  The DCM pointed out that the US has committed also 
to providing night vision devices, pilot protective gear, and 
communication equipment, but these non-lethal items have not 
been manufactured yet and might take a year or two to 
deliver.  In contrast, the DATT and DCM pointed out, the 
Government of India (GOI) has been providing Nepal with an 
accelerating stream of rifles and other military equipment. 
In our view, India's leading role in providing military 
assistance to Nepal is consistent with its proximity, long 
history of assistance, and strong strategic interest in the 
security of the Himalayan region.   The DCM underscored that 
the US appreciates India's leading role, encourages it, and 
has no competing long-term military objectives here. 
 
4. (C) The Indian DCM, Ashok Kumar, agreed readily with the 
DCM's characterization of the speed and volume of Indian 
security assistance to Nepal.  He asserted proudly that the 
more encouraging military situation on the ground in the 
RNA's fight with the Maoists was due completely to Indian 
assistance.  Kumar took pointed exception to the DATT's 
reference to GOI "objections" to US sales of M16s to Nepal. 
The GOI, he stressed, has no "objections;" it has only 
"concerns."  The GOI, he explained, is meeting the RNA's 
every request for lethal equipment.  It would thus make more 
sense, he argued, for the US to let India provide arms and 
concentrate instead on such equipment as night vision devices 
and helicopters where the US has the comparative advantage. 
If, however, the US intends to provide rifles, the GOI could 
not ask Indian taxpayers to subsidize the continuing supply 
to Nepal of more arms than it could effectively utilize.  The 
DCM explained (again) that the sale of M16s was based on a 
PACOM assessment in April 2002 of Nepal's most urgent 
military needs.  If India is planning to fill those needs in 
the near term, the USG is prepared to revise the profile of 
its out-year assistance to take account of changing 
requirements after we meet our current obligations.  The 
Indians refused firmly to provide specific numbers on how 
many INSAS rifles the GOI planned to provide.  Kumar asserted 
that "numbers are not important," and that he had no interest 
in getting into "a numbers game". 
 
5. (C) The DCM and DATT countered by explaining that the USG 
is not pushing M16s on the Nepali Government.  After our 
current FMF appropriation was approved in mid-2002, we asked 
the RNA leadership how it wanted to prioritize the use of 
that money -- within the parameters set by the PACOM 
assessment.  The RNA was emphatic in reiterating its request 
that the lion's share of the appropriation be spent on M16s, 
along with some non-lethal equipment and training.  The RNA 
was familiar with the M16 from international peacekeeping 
operations, knew it to be a reliable weapon, and felt that 
its induction into RNA ranks would be a major morale-booster. 
 The ammunition for the M16A2, moreover, is not available in 
the region and is difficult to obtain on the South Asian 
black market, so M16s would be less problematic than 
Indian-manufactured weapons if they were to fall into the 
hands of the Maoists or Indian extremists.  The DCM and DATT 
reiterated that the US has made no commitment to supplying 
all the RNA's needs for a modern combat rifle or any other 
arms.  We see our modest M16 sales only as a supplement to 
the rifles being supplied by India.  With the RNA expanding 
rapidly toward 70,000 soldiers, its need for rifles is 
greater than either of our governments is likely to meet in 
the short term.  The RNA's decision to standardize on a few 
weapons from different sources was not unusual or 
unreasonable; in fact, this is something India itself is 
doing (with its purchases of specialized rifles from the US 
and Israel.) 
 
6. (C) The DATT asked how the GOI proposed that the USG 
should approach the M16 issue with Nepal. After a pause with 
no answer from the Indians, the DATT asked whether they would 
want us to inform the RNA that after the current order for 
M16s is filled, Nepal should turn all its arms to India? 
Kumar again avoided giving a recommendation.  He was, 
however, quick and categorical in rejecting the DATT's 
proposal, stating that the Indian supply relationship should 
not become a subject for US-Nepal dialogue.  Clearly, he 
said, the issue of arms purchases was one the Nepal 
Government would have to decide for itself.  India would have 
to resolve its own assistance issues by talking directly to 
the Nepalis. 
 
7. (C) In conclusion the DCM pointed out that the US values 
its strengthening military-to-military relationship with 
India and has no desire to complicate it with our security 
assistance to Nepal.  On the contrary, our two governments 
recognize our common interests in helping Nepal to defeat its 
Maoist threat.  The growing frequency and candor of our 
discussions of Nepal-related security issues are an important 
benefit of our improved cooperation.  Nepal thus is becoming 
a theater for bilateral strategic cooperation rather than of 
competition.  The Indian DCM had no final comment to offer on 
M16 sales and made no explicit recommendation.  He concluded 
on a positive note by saying that we should continue our 
dialogue. 
 
8. (S/NF) Comment: Our frequent discussions with our Indian 
diplomatic colleagues here in Kathmandu are inconsistent in 
tone.  Ambassador Shyam Saran is an unusually able 
professional who is comfortable sharing his well-informed 
political and security analyses of Nepal with our Ambassador 
and official visitors.  We find that we agree in large 
measure with his views, including his profound skepticism 
about the motives of the Maoists and his emphasis on the 
importance of the legal political parties supporting the 
government.  Saran has raised questions about US arms 
supplies to Nepal, but without complaints or threats.  DCM 
Kumar, an often abrasive diplomat whose pursuit of Indian 
interests borders on chauvinism, has become more collegial 
and less plaintive as we have engaged him more frequently in 
discussions of US security policy in Nepal.  Only Defense 
Attache George Mathai, a long-time Gurkha officer, continues 
to press our DATT to minimize lethal sales to Nepal, 
obviously delivering prepared talking points without the 
benefit of supporting information. 
 
9. (C) On February 11 our DATT was told that the Indian 
Embassy had placed a hold on the delivery of additional INSAS 
rifles, although the Embassy had not informed the GON yet of 
that.  According to the DATT's source, the GON planned 
eventually to transfer the Indian-made rifles to the Nepalese 
Armed Police, and the Embassy did not want them to recommend 
that more rifles be diverted from Indian forces for the 
subsidiary purpose. AMB Saran has confirmed this freeze on 
further INSAS sales, assuring us that this step was taken not 
in response to US arms sales, but because he believed the GON 
was not being candid with the GOI regarding its need for and 
intended use of Indian-made rifles. 
 
10. Conclusions we tentatively have drawn from the discussion 
summarized above and numerous others like it are the 
following: 
 
-- (C) The GOI, like the USG, is attempting to be responsive 
to Nepali requests for modern combat rifles as an urgent 
priority.  What is frustrating to the Indians is that the 
Nepalis have never requested India to meet their complete 
needs for rifles, and have indicated a preference for the M16 
as their front-line weapon.  For many reasons -- diplomatic, 
economic, military and psychological -- the GOI would like 
the RNA to be totally dependent on it for arms, although the 
GOI is itself moving toward some foreign military sourcing 
for small arms. 
 
-- (C) Indian analysts are increasingly persuaded that the 
Maoist movement in Nepal poses a security threat to India. 
Their dilemma is that they have wider and deeper interests in 
a secure Nepal than any other nation, but their influence in 
the Kingdom is constrained by a long history of bilateral 
tension and suspicion.  Objective observers increasingly 
acknowledge that US security assistance and diplomatic 
support in Nepal are helpful for the realization of Indian 
objectives here during this time of turmoil. 
 
-- (C) Indian attitudes toward US security assistance to 
Nepal are complex.  On the one hand, they are pleased by the 
growing transparency and collegiality of our bilateral 
dialogue on Nepal.  On the other hand, some GOI elements here 
apparently are having difficulty coming to terms with growing 
US and UK military activism in Nepal as a conspicuous 
dilution of the dominance in  military assistance that India 
has long enjoyed and defended. 
-- (C) Given the tensions already present in Indo-Nepal 
relations, Indian diplomats here want assiduously to avoid 
complicating those relations by allowing them to become 
tripartite -- with the US openly becoming an interlocutor in 
the shaping of the Indo-Nepal security relationship.  We 
suspect that the reported decision of the GOI to hold up 
INSAS deliveries is another attempt by India to remind Nepal 
of the extent to which it is beholden to India without 
explicitly mentioning US arms sales. 
 
-- (S/NF) At least in Kathmandu, Indian concern about US arms 
sales to Nepal appears to vary significantly between its 
civilian and military representatives.  Indian diplomats 
understand the importance to India of enhanced US-Indian 
defense collaboration, and do not want to jeopardize that, 
and their own dialogue with us, over so small an issue. 
Indian military intelligence officers, on the other hand, 
appear to be more focused on traditional relations and local 
military equations, and have been more willing to signal 
their discomfort about our potential competition. 
 
11. (C) Comment.  The best information we have seen on Maoist 
thinking indicates that the US and UK's announced policy of 
military assistance to the GON, coupled with the first 
deliveries of our M16 and British-purchased helicopters, has 
been a major consideration in persuading the Maoist 
leadership to opt for a cease-fire and political 
negotiations.  The GON has made it clear that, despite 
eventual peace talks, US steadfastness in providing military 
support -- and M16s in particular -- will be an important 
factor in keeping the Maoists at the negotiating table. 
Obviously, the positive exercise of Indian military aid and 
political influence is absolutely key to a final resolution 
of Nepal's complex political and security problems.  Embassy 
applauds efforts in New Delhi and Washington (see, for 
example, Delhi's useful cable, reftel) to strengthen our 
constructive dialogue with India on Nepal, and intends to 
redouble our efforts here to build on our new strategic 
relationship with India as we press forward with our arms 
assistance to Nepal. 
 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI