US embassy cable - 03ABUJA333

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO POL FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013 
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PREL, PTER 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MANPADS INFORMATION REQUEST 
 
REF: A. STATE 32841 
     B. ABUJA 249 
     C. 02 ABUJA 720 
     D. 02 ABUJA 1131 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASON 1.5(D) 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The GON maintains a stockpile of several 
hundred poorly maintained SA-7s and has made efforts to 
purchase more modern SAMs from Russia and Ukraine.  The GON 
maintains control of MANPADS stocks, but poor security and 
an active illicit arms trade make theft a very real risk. 
The GON can be expected to participate in efforts to 
enhance the security of its MANPADS and other weapons 
stocks provided the USG or third country picks up the bill. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
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GENERAL MANPADS SITUATION IN NIGERIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
2.  (C) The GON has a stockpile of several hundred poorly 
maintained MANPADS. After Russia declined its request for 
more modern SAMs, the GON contracted to purchase an unknown 
number of SAMs from Ukraine (REF B).  (COMMENT: While the 
degradation of the GON's SA-7 stockpile makes it less 
effective against the military aviation the missiles are 
designed to attack, they would prove more than adequate 
against slower moving and easier to track civilian 
aircraft. END COMMENT.) 
 
 
3.  (C) Nigerian MANPADS are under the control of the GON 
and are stored as ammunition by the Nigerian Armed 
Services.  Security is considered to be lax and highly 
ineffective.  Theft by security personnel or private 
individuals is possible. 
 
 
4.  (C) The Nigerian small arms black market is very 
active.  Post is unaware of any reports of MANPADS sales on 
the Nigerian black market.  (COMMENT: Post might not be 
aware of MANPAD availability on the black market.  Nigerian 
military personnel are poorly paid, and a relatively small 
payoff by an arms trader might be sufficient to suborn a 
guard.  There were rumors after the Ikeja ATD fire and 
explosion in early 2002 that the fire was set to cover up 
illicit transfers.  These rumors were never substantiated. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
5.  (C) Post is unaware of any Nigerian effort to export 
MANPADS. 
 
 
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR GON COOPERATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
6.  (C) The GON sees MANPADS as vital to its national 
defense and is unlikely to take action to reduce its 
stockpile. 
 
 
7.  (C) While the GON may state it will take action to 
control the black/gray arms market, its enforcement 
mechanisms are too weak to have a significant impact. 
 
 
8.  (C) Without prodding or proctoring, post does not 
expect the GON to appreciate the gravity of the threat its 
improperly secured MANPADS pose to civil aviation nor the 
magnitude of the GON's liability should one of its MANPADS 
be used in a successful attack. 
 
 
9.  (C) The GON might be amenable to a USG-funded program 
that upgraded existing storage facilities to adequate 
security standards or built entirely new facilities if the 
USG could allay GON concerns over espionage.  In that 
regard, the GON refused USG offers of assistance, except in 
three limited cases, in determining the safety of Nigerian 
ammunition depots after the January 2002 Ikeja disaster 
because of espionage concerns.  Since personnel present a 
major vulnerability, it would also be necessary for the USG 
to pay for the training of GON security personnel. 
 
 
10.  (U) Appropriate GON contacts for this issue are 
Minister of Defense T. Y. Danjuma and National Security 
Advisor Aliyu Mohammed. 
 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT: In addition to maintaining its current 
stocks of MANPADS, the GON will most likely continue to 
attempt to acquire ever more sophisticated types of MANPADS 
and other surface-to-air missiles.  The GON could accept a 
USG-funded program to enhance the security of its MANPADS 
stocks.  However, the success of such a program is doubtful 
since the most serious security concern is the poverty- 
level wages the GON pays to the soldiers guarding storage 
sites.  Until the GON boosts the pay of those guarding its 
weapons stockpile, the risk of stolen equipment finding its 
way to the black market will remain high. 
JETER