US embassy cable - 03ABUJA343

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:02/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ZI, NI 
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA'S OBASANJO ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REFS: (A) FBIS 131123Z FEB 03 
  (B) FBIS 121434Z FEB 03 
  (C) Harare 322 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Nigerian President Obasanjo February 14 told 
DAS Bridgewater and Ambassador Jeter that Tsanvirgai had made 
a mistake by going to court.  Dialogue was not possible under 
the circumstances, and it made no sense to continue sanctions, 
still less since Australia had implemented additional measures 
outside those established by the Commonwealth.  Obasanjo urged 
the US and UK to be patient and supportive; Africans would 
produce the desired results, though perhaps not on the West's 
schedule.  End Summary. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
OBASANJO RECOMMENDS AN END TO SUSPENSION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
2.  (C) In response to visiting AF DAS Bridgewater's query, 
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo February 14 confirmed 
that he had recommended and end to Zimbabwe's suspension from 
the Commonwealth in a letter to Australian Prime Minister 
Howard and South African President Mbeki.  DAS Bridgewater 
replied that the USG urged him to reconsider that position. 
"Why?" Obasanjo asked.  Because there needs to be dialogue 
between the GOZ and the opposition first, DAS Bridgewater 
answered.  With what opposition? Obasanjo wanted to know. 
Primarily the MDC, DAS Bridgewater responded. 
 
 
3.  (C) Obasanjo contended that Tsvangirai and the MDC had 
precluded dialogue by going to court.  Obasanjo said he had 
counseled Tsvangirai against such a step: "We have a saying 
here; when you are in court, you cannot be friends."  If your 
case is in court, you cannot have dialogue.  The MDC argued 
that it had to file suit within a limited period of time or 
lose the right to contest the election and that it had been 
urged to pursue legal redress if it wanted to contest the 
results, Obasanjo continued.  Therefore, the MDC had gone to 
court despite its early rejection of that course of action. 
Now, the case had been in court for over a year, with no 
progress.  "I told [Tsvangirai] that his case could be in 
court for five years and nothing would happen."  Obasanjo 
remarked that he and Mbeki also objected to the Australian 
decision to implement sanctions that went beyond those 
prescribed by the Commonwealth. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
LET US SOLVE IT THE AFRICAN WAY 
------------------------------- 
 
 
4.  (C) Acknowledging the Nigerian efforts, DAS Bridgewater 
said the USG would continue to provide humanitarian relief. 
Obasanjo cut in, "We should press for realistic things.  I 
have always pleaded, as I did with Cote d'Ivoire, to let us 
[Africans] take care of it.  You should stand behind and give 
us support."  Obasanjo went on to describe steps ECOWAS had 
taken toward resolving the conflict and hinting that some of 
the false starts and stumbling blocks resulted from the well- 
meaning but ill-advised proposals of non-Africans. 
 
 
5.  (C) Returning to Zimbabwe and the MDC's court case, 
Obasanjo rhetorically asked what he should do.  Ambassador 
Jeter wondered what Tsvangirai's response to the implicit 
advice to drop the court challenge had been.  "He seemed 
confused," Obasanjo replied.  "he wanted to keep his options 
open." 
 
 
6.  (C) Obasanjo rhetorically moved northward, saying that the 
key to the success of Kenya's elections was that Africans had 
convinced arap Moi that he really had to give up power.  "That 
is what we must try with Mugabe."  Obasanjo said he had told 
the Zimbabwean that he (Obasanjo), though younger than Mugabe, 
was already making plans for succession.  Mugabe should do the 
same thing.  "I broached it with him, and he said, 'Oh, that 
is difficult.'"  Had he even thought about it, wondered DAS 
Bridgewater.  "No, he had not," Obasanjo replied. 
 
 
7.  (C) "I think the British influence has been negative on 
this issue," Obasanjo offered, arguing that HMG wanted too 
much, too fast.  African leaders should have time to work on 
Mugabe, to convince him to give up power without feeling 
pressured to do so.  "It may not be at your speed, Obasanjo 
concluded, but we'll get there." 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
8.  (C) Zimbabwean opposition reaction (refs A&B) to the 
letter was swift, denunciatory and vigorous.  The domestic 
profile of this issue is lower, and also lower now than it was 
six months or a year ago.  For this part, Obasanjo has become 
more relaxed and confident about addressing it.  A year ago, 
he avoided the Ambassador for nearly six weeks in order to 
preclude a discussion on Zimbabwe.  This time, Obasanjo sought 
out Ambassador Jeter to give him a heads-up; the Ambassador, 
however, was in Katsina at the time and could not return to 
Abuja in time for the requested appointment.  While the USG 
and the GON are unlikely to see eye-to-eye on Zimbabwe, the 
way to genuine dialogue is open, and with it the possibility 
to influence Obasanjo positively.  End comment. 
 
 
9. (U) Ambassador Bridgewater cleared this message. 
 
 
JETER