US embassy cable - 03AMMAN967

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000967 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, SOCI, ECON, KPAL, JO 
SUBJECT: PILLARS OF THE REGIME PART II OF IV: THE EAST BANK 
TRIBES 
 
REF: AMMAN 6535 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Traditionally, the most important pillar of the 
Hashemite regime has been its East Bank constituency, 
including both Bedouin and non-nomadic tribes.  East Bank 
tribes have also played an integral role in the other pillars 
that have emerged--the military/security services and the 
economic elite.  However, reform-minded King Abdullah may 
face problems as he tries to move Jordan into the 21st 
century while seeking to maintain the support of the most 
conservative elements of Jordanian society--the East Bank 
tribes.  End Summary. 
 
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WHO ARE THE TRIBES? 
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2. (U) The East Bank tribes of Jordan constitute roughly 
35-45 percent of the total population of Jordan.  The 
Bedouins--nomadic tribes--make up roughly seven percent of 
the population.  The Bedouin tribes, including the 
historically famous Howeitat (of Lawrence of Arabia fame), 
were instrumental in the formation of the Hashemite regime 
and continue today to serve in disproportionately large 
percentages in the armed forces and security services.  They 
also make up one of the Public Security Directorate (PSD)'s 
best-known units, the Badia, or desert, police.  The 
semi-nomadic tribes--traditionally herders--make up roughly 
13-15 percent of the population and include the single 
largest tribe in Jordan, the Bani Hassan, who number over 
200,000. 
 
3. (U) The non-nomadic tribes account for much of the rest of 
the East Bank population and include such notable Jordanian 
families as the Majalis and the Tarawnehs from Kerak, both of 
whom have produced a number of Jordanian leaders and 
Hashemite advisors.  These families, whose names are 
instantly recognizable in Jordan, are very influential 
elements of Jordanian political and economic life. 
 
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THE HASHEMITE DEPENDENCE ON THE TRIBES 
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4. (C) There has long been a symbiotic relationship between 
the Hashemite rulers in Jordan and the East Bank tribes. 
Jordan's tribes figured prominently in the Arab revolt 
against the Ottoman empire, led by King Abdullah I's father. 
Until recently, the tribes were unquestionably the 
Hashemites' most significant source of political power.  As 
such, the Hashemites have cultivated personal relationships 
with the tribes, while carefully maintaining the balance of 
power between each.  Regular contact with the tribes became a 
mainstay of Hashemite rule, beginning with King Abdullah I, 
who received tribal representatives at his al-Ma'wa palace 
every Friday during his reign.  The Hashemites also often 
bestowed generous cash payments on the tribes to ensure their 
loyalty. 
 
5. (U) King Hussein continued the tradition of nurturing the 
relationship with the tribes.  He often camped with the 
Bedouins and frequently visited individual tribes for mensaf 
(the traditional East Bank Jordanian meal).  On many 
occasions, he brought his sons, including King Abdullah and 
Crown Prince Hamza, to instill in them the importance of 
tribal ties.  At the same time, King Hussein ably used 
historic tribal rivalries to check the power of individual 
tribes, thus ensuring that no tribal sheikh could ever rival 
his base of power. 
 
6. (C) The tribes in turn benefited from their exclusive 
relationship with the Hashemites.  While West Bank 
Palestinians are a majority of the population in Jordan, 
political institutions favor members of the East Bank tribes. 
 While some ministerial positions traditionally are reserved 
for Christians and others, Muslim East Bankers occupy almost 
all the upper ranks of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the 
General Intelligence Directorate, and the PSD, (their 
children are favored in university admissions at Jordan's 
competitive public universities); and they dominate almost 
every level of Jordan's bureaucracy. 
 
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KING ABDULLAH AND THE TRIBES 
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7. (C) When King Abdullah II ascended to the throne, he 
lacked his father's touch with the tribes and initially spent 
little effort in shoring up their support. He also ascended 
to a cash-strapped throne and, as some contacts have 
insinuated, he was unable to continue with the generous 
payments to the tribes.  In 2000, just over a year into the 
King's reign, a tribal leader told us that the King had made 
a poor first impression on the tribes; "...his father left 
him a large political inheritance with the tribes, but he is 
spending it quickly."  In 2001, during visits with the 
Howeitat and the Bani Hassan, tribal members voiced support 
for the Hashemites (and King Hussein), but rarely singled out 
the King for praise.  To avoid direct criticism of the King, 
tribal members criticized the King's advisors, blaming them 
for what they perceived as the King's disappointing 
performance. 
 
8. (C) That said, support for the Hashemites never really 
wavered.  Tribal contacts are quick to stress their loyalty 
to the regime.  One Howeitat told Poloff that he and his 
tribe would support the Hashemites down to Princess Salma 
(King Abdullah's youngest child).  On a recent visit to the 
Shihab tribe, one tribal member told the Ambassador that it 
didn't matter if "we go to sleep hungry, it is fine with us" 
as long as the King was okay. 
9. (C)  Over the past two years, according to Palace 
contacts, King Abdullah moved to strengthen his ties with his 
tribal base.  The King has done this by shuffling the Palace 
offices responsible for tribal relations, increasing 
(somewhat) his personal contact with key tribal leaders, 
greater attention to small tribal requests, and job-creation 
programs in tribal areas (such as busing employees from 
tribally-dominated areas such as Shobak, Kerak, and Tafileh 
to QIZ factories). 
 
10. (C) These efforts have paid some dividends.  During one 
outing last summer, the King met with almost 2,000 tribal 
leaders.  In addition to pursuing closer contacts with the 
tribes, he initiated his social and economic development 
program, which targets the rural (more undeveloped) and 
heavily tribal areas.  Sheikh Nawaf Eiton, a leader of the 
Bani Hassan tribe, had sharply criticized those around the 
King during a 2001 visit with Poloff.  By the Summer of 2002, 
however, Sheikh Eiton was effusive about the King, telling 
one Poloff that the King had begun to reach out to the "real" 
tribal leaders (whom Eiton described as those leaders who 
have a genuine or moral authority with the tribe.) 
 
11. (C) Prior to the build-up to the Iraqi situation, King 
Abdullah was also winning praise for his international 
political sensibilities.  Politically savvy tribal members 
have commented on the King's ability to shore up regional 
alliances, secure economic and military assistance, and 
become a player in the international arena.  Other tribal 
leaders have also positively remarked on the influence that 
King Abdullah has built in Washington. 
 
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CHALLENGES 
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12. (C) King Abdullah will likely weather any tribal 
discontent stemming from a U.S. offensive against Iraq, 
though not without some difficulties.  Some Jordanian tribes 
have  links to Iraq and/or extensive business ties.  However, 
the desire for the stability and patronage offered by the 
Hashemites will likely overcome any pro-Iraqi sentiment. 
Looking into the future, however, the King will be challenged 
to move forward with the political and economic progress he 
envisions for Jordan while maintaining the support and 
loyalty of the East Bank tribes, who may be displaced by this 
progress. 
 
13. (C) As the King attempts to move Jordan forward, his 
political and economic reform efforts threaten to undermine 
the patron-client relationship the tribes have traditionally 
enjoyed.  Since King Hussein's "one man, one vote" electoral 
reform in 1993, tribes have enjoyed increased proportional 
representation in Parliament.  King Abdullah reaffirmed this 
policy when he approved of a new electoral law in July, 2001, 
which increased the number of seats in Parliament but did not 
redistribute them.  Whereas one representative in the second 
district of Amman represents roughly 500,000 people, one 
representative in Ma'an represents close to 50,000.  (The 
Ma'an governorate houses the Howeitat--one of the King's most 
loyal tribes--although the non-Howeitat town of Ma'an has 
proved more troublesome to the Hashemites in the last decade. 
 See Ref.)  There has been intense pressure from those 
underrepresented groups--namely West Bank-origin 
Palestinians--to democratize the electoral system.  Thus far 
the King has resisted the pressure to do so because it would 
severely undercut the representation of the tribes--his most 
loyal constituent--in Parliament. 
 
14. (C) Political reform has affected the tribes on the local 
level.  Since the early 1990s, the Kingdom has moved to 
decrease the number of municipal governments.  In 1991, there 
were over 700 municipalities in Jordan, each with their own 
government and employing thousands of people.  To increase 
the solvency of the municipal governments (many of which were 
bankrupt), King Abdullah moved in 2001 to again reduce the 
328 municipalities to less than 100.  Tribal leaders 
complained that this undermined their ability to secure 
employment (and other patronage) for their members.  To 
counter criticism from the tribes, the King ensured that 
tribes would remain at the helm of municipal governments by 
changing the law to allow the central government to appoint 
mayors instead of electing them. 
 
15. (C) The King is also under domestic and international 
pressure to decrease the prevalence of the patronage system 
(wasta), the power base of the East Bank tribes.  As King 
Abdullah moves (slowly) towards a merit-based system, the 
tribes have the most to lose. 
 
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COMMENT 
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16. (C) The loyalty offered by the East Bank tribes may be 
the most important component of Hashemite rule.  King 
Abdullah in the future will have to engage in a very 
important balancing act: moving forward in reforming 
political and economic systems, which the majority of the 
population demand, while maintaining the support of his most 
important pillar, which benefits most from the status quo. 
BERRY