US embassy cable - 03AMMAN893

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SOCI, ECON, KPAL, JO 
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KING ABDULLAH SOLID, BUT CHANGING: 
PART I OF IV 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) This is the first cable in a series that will examine 
the stability of the Hashemite regime based on the support of 
its traditional pillars. 
 
2. (C) Despite troubling times in the region and a majority 
Palestinian population angry over continued Arab-Israeli 
violence, King Abdullah maintains the support of his 
traditional base of power: the East Bank tribes, the 
military/the security services, and the economic elite.  We 
foresee no near term loss of support from these "pillars of 
the regime" despite difficult circumstances in the region. 
However, political and economic reforms that do not result in 
any demonstrable improvements in living standards, as well as 
the ever-present influence of Islamists, may pose future 
challenges to the King.  End Summary. 
 
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KING ABDULLAH: NOT HIS FATHER 
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3. (C) When King Abdullah ascended to the throne on February 
7, 1999, it became clear that his relationship with the 
traditional pillars would differ from his father's.  King 
Hussein built his reign on fostering personal relationships, 
especially with East Bank tribal leaders.  King Abdullah has 
not been able to pursue these relationships with the same 
deftness.  Consequently, King Abdullah does not command the 
same personal, emotional appeal with many Jordanians that his 
father did.  While most saw King Hussein as a father figure 
(even as a divine right King, an image he spent decades 
cultivating), King Abdullah sees himself, and is viewed by 
most, as the head of state, more a constitutional monarch. 
It does no good to point out to Jordanians that King Hussein 
had many very difficult moments in his long career--for 
better or worse, he is an icon. 
 
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THE PILLARS 
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4. (C)  In the three following cables, we will be examining 
the regime's relationship with each pillar and its 
challenges. 
 
--  One of the most important pillars that we will examine is 
the King's East Bank constituency, particularly his reliance 
on several notable tribes.  The tribes constitute 35-45 
percent of the population, but also figure prominently in the 
other two pillars.  The second cable in our series will 
address the East Bank tribes. 
 
--  The military/security services consist of the Jordanian 
Armed Forces (JAF), Public Security Directorate (PSD), and 
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID).  As the Kingdom 
faces crises on both of its borders, King Abdullah has become 
more reliant on the military and security services--whose 
upper ranks are also mostly East Bankers--to consolidate his 
support and keep a lid on popular dissent.  The third cable 
in our series will examine the role of the military and 
security services. 
 
--  We would argue that the economic elite, with whom King 
Abdullah has an affinity, should be considered another pillar 
in modernizing Jordan.  It is the only pillar to include 
Palestinians as a major force.  The King and government look 
to the economic elite to finance the economy; the business 
community in turn depends on the other pillars, particularly 
the military/security services, to provide a secure 
environment to invest and do business.  The fourth cable in 
our series will look at who the economic elite are and what 
role they play in Jordanian society and in supporting the 
monarchy. 
 
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CHALLENGES 
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5. (C) Even though support of the traditional pillars and the 
economic elite is firm, King Abdullah will face numerous 
challenges as he moves Jordan along the path of economic 
(and, hopefully, political) liberalization.  The wasta-based 
system of patronage (including the very generous military pay 
and pension system) that underpins East Bank society will 
come under pressure from those--including many in the 
economic elite--who support a more merit-based and 
transparent system.  Resistance to economic reform could come 
from the first two pillars, some of whom see the reform 
efforts as benefiting Palestinian Jordanians at the expense 
of "real" Jordanians. 
 
6. (C) The King's success in confronting future challenges 
will depend in large part on his success in raising living 
standards and reducing the wide cleavage between the haves 
and have-nots.  During his four years in power, King Abdullah 
has attempted to close the disparities with economic and 
social development programs.  In the framework of his 
commitment to sound macroeconomic policy, these programs have 
had some success in raising living standards and 
productivity, but poverty and underemployment will continue 
to be issues for the King, especially to the extent that 
regional political uncertainty keeps Jordan from reaching its 
full economic growth potential. 
 
7. (C) As in the rest of the region, managing Political Islam 
will also be a challenge to King Abdullah.  Historically, the 
GOJ has been able to co-opt the Islamists (i.e. offering the 
Islamic Action Front--the political arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood--legitimacy and an occasional ministry) instead 
of trying to quash them.  As descendants of the Prophet 
Mohammed, the Hashemites also have some religious legitimacy 
among the Islamists.  However, the IAF offers the only 
organized opposition in Jordan, and as such, holds popular 
appeal with those who oppose the GOJ's peace treaty with 
Israel and its "neutrality" vis a vis the Iraq issue.  King 
Hussein rewrote the election law in 1993 to undermine the 
political power of the IAF, but the IAF has channeled its 
efforts to other venues, such as the professional unions. 
 
8. (C) King Abdullah has acted aggressively in containing the 
influence of Islamists--moderate and radical.  In November 
2002, the JAF and security services moved into the city of 
Ma'an with overwhelming force to ferret out members of the 
radical Islamic group, Takfir wa Hijra, led by Mohammed 
Shalabi, aka Abu Sayyaf (who is still at large).  At the same 
time, the GOJ moved to encourage the political unions to 
divest from politics and focus on professional development. 
It remains to be seen what balance King Abdullah will strike 
in continuing his father's twin policies of co-opting 
Islamists, and, when necessary, aggressively countering their 
influence. 
 
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MITIGATING FACTORS 
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9. (C) Apart from the pillars, there are a number of other 
factors that will support stability in the Hashemite Kingdom. 
 While King Abdullah's popularity does not yet equal his 
father's, there are no popular rival leaders in Jordan, nor 
is there any other Jordanian public figure--within the regime 
or outside--who has the following or leadership to challenge 
the King.  Cultural constraints also favor the King. 
Jordanians generally support monarchy as the best form of 
government for Jordan, and are uncomfortable criticizing the 
Royal Family.  The self-censoring press also adheres to the 
unspoken rule of never criticizing the King--at least not 
directly.  These two factors work to mute criticism of the 
King, and blunts the ability of opposition groups to 
publicize or gain wide acceptance of criticisms of the King 
or Monarchy. 
 
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COMMENT 
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10. (C) The three pillars form the foundation of the 
Hashemites, and so far, we have identified no major cracks. 
All three pillars continue to benefit from Hashemite rule and 
King Abdullah has moved cautiously on reforms that threaten 
the status quo.  A major conflict in Iraq will have an effect 
here, and while we expect public displays of anger,  all of 
our contacts predict that the pillars will hold steadfast. 
The biggest challenges the King will face down the road will 
come from within: political and economic reform, raising 
living standards, and dealing with the Islamic opposition. 
BERRY