US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO218

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 02-07-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  SA/INS Director visits Jaffna -- discussions 
with military and Tamils focus on security zone issue 
 
Refs:  Colombo 202, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  SA/INS Director David Good led a 
Mission team to Jaffna on February 6.  The major topic 
of conversation was the Sri Lankan military's "high 
security zones."  The military stated that there were 
other pressing needs that need to be addressed before 
the security zones should be reviewed.  Tamil leaders 
stressed that the zones had displaced large numbers of 
civilians and that a reduction in their size allowing 
the resettlement of IDP's would be a major confidence- 
building measure.  Even with the disagreement over the 
zones, there was a palpable feeling among interlocutors 
-- GSL and Tamil -- that the peace process was a net 
positive and needed to continue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Sri Lankan General stands firm 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Visiting SA/INS Director David Good led a Mission 
team including Poloff and Pol FSN to Jaffna on 
February 6.  The first stop for the team was the Sri 
Lanka Army's (SLA) headquarters at Palaly Airbase.  SLA 
commander for the Jaffna Peninsula Major General Fonseka 
used the discussion to stress the need for the GSL and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to pursue 
issues other than the "high security zones." 
(Note:  The Sri Lankan military's security zone network 
covers about 18 percent of Jaffna's land area.  The LTTE 
and other Tamils have been demanding a sharp reduction 
in the size of the zones.  See Reftels for further 
background.) 
 
3.  (C) While admitting that the security zones were 
large and that he understood the source of Tamil 
concerns, Fonseka spent a significant amount of time 
detailing his argument that only a small number of 
families were actually affected by the security zones in 
a negative way.  He further argued that a very 
substantial part of returning Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP's) could be settled outside of the security 
zones.  In any case, Fonseka asserted, there had been a 
net population outflow from Jaffna in the past several 
months, as Tamils left due to concern with the LTTE. 
(Note:  We are not sure the evidence backs up this last 
statement by Fonseka.  According to the latest UNHCR- 
generated information, over 300,000 IDP's -- mostly 
Tamils -- have returned to their places of origin in the 
north and east since the start of the peace process in 
December 2001.) 
 
4. (C) Another of Fonseka's key points re the security 
zones was that the LTTE remained a serious threat to GSL 
armed forces in the Jaffna region.  Fonseka pointed to 
what he characterized as a pattern of LTTE-instigated 
incidents meant to harass some of the SLA's smaller 
military outposts in Jaffna.  He also asserted that 
whereas the Sri Lankan military had withdrawn from areas 
stipulated in the February 2002 ceasefire accord, the 
LTTE continued to violate terms of the agreement.  Given 
this situation, the GSL had to move cautiously with 
respect to the security zone issue -- a hasty withdrawal 
could provide the LTTE a decisive strategic advantage. 
He also commented that he was working closely with 
Satish Nambiar, a retired Indian general who was 
drafting a report on the security zone issue.  Fonseka 
showed little enthusiasm for the report, reiterating 
that the key objective must be security for GSL armed 
forces in the region.  (Note:  The LTTE has underscored 
that it will reject Nambiar's report if the draft not 
meet its demands for a sharp reduction in the size of 
the zones.  Nambiar is currently visiting Sri Lanka and 
his report should be released soon.) 
 
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Tamils press Humanitarian Needs 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) While in Jaffna, Director Good also met with a 
variety of Jaffna's religious and civil leaders.  The 
leaders -- most of whom were Tamil -- focused their 
concerns on what they considered the humanitarian 
aspects of the security zones, arguing that they should 
be reduced in size.  They argued that government steps 
in this key area would constitute a major confidence- 
building measure.  Catholic Bishop of Jaffna Thomas 
Savundranayagam summarized the basic argument when he 
stated that the IDP's returning to Jaffna do not want to 
just have a roof over their head as the military might 
suggest.  Rather, they want to return to their ancestral 
homes and return to their previous professions of 
farming or fishing.  For this to take place, the IDP's 
required and hoped for considerable outside assistance. 
Senior Hindu priest for Jaffna Somasundaram Swamigal 
added that the continued overwhelming presence of the 
military throughout the peninsula served to remind Tamil 
civilians that they remained "under military 
occupation."  He argued that the negative psychological 
effect that this situation has on Tamil children was 
immeasurable. 
 
6. (C) P. Vigneswaran, leader of the NGO Council in 
Jaffna, was even more strident.  He stated that the 
military had to vacate the security zones immediately. 
He repeatedly stressed that the military is the main 
impediment to progress toward peace in Jaffna. 
 
------------------------- 
Some Convergence of Views 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Good stressed during each meeting that the issues 
currently being discussed were issues of peace and not 
of war, thus there was improvement over just a year ago. 
Despite their sharp disagreement over the security zone 
issue, all interlocutors -- military and Tamil -- agreed 
with that.  The ease of travel, the lifting of 
checkpoints, and -- most importantly -- the end of 
fighting created a measurable improvement in the quality 
of life for all involved.  Good also asked his 
interlocutors about their perception of commitment by 
the GSL and LTTE to the peace process.  Everyone 
believed that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was 
committed to making the peace process work.  Although 
Fonseka did not address the issue of the politics in the 
south, informal conversations with his staff seemed to 
show the same concern in the military as Jaffna's 
civilian population for the issue of "cohabitation" 
between the president and Prime Minister.  Where the 
views diverged was on the role of the LTTE.  The 
military, the Muslim community, and the international 
aid workers (UNICEF, ICRC, and Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission representatives) all focused on some of the 
practices of the LTTE that had to end.  On the other 
hand, Tamil civil society leaders (though not religious 
leaders who did not touch on the matter) either stated 
that the LTTE was not carrying out acts such as the 
recruitment of children or excused incidents such as 
taxes as needed in response to the military. 
 
8. (C) Good emphasized during each meeting the USG's 
commitment to help where it could.  He stated that the 
highest levels of the USG were interested in Sri Lanka's 
peace process and that we were committed to help.  He 
stated that the USG will commit to more demining 
activities and that the Deputy Secretary hoped to attend 
the upcoming donor's conference in Tokyo (see Reftels). 
Each interlocutor expressed gratitude for the efforts of 
the USG and for the visit to Jaffna. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9. (C) During the Jaffna visit, the security zone issue 
came out loud-and-clear as the issue on most everyone's 
mind.  With the military and most Tamils on different 
sides of the fence regarding this matter, it is 
obviously going to be a very complicated and tricky to 
work out.  As he moves forward with his report, General 
Nambiar is clearly going to have his hands full.  On the 
positive side of the ledger, there was a convergence of 
opinion among all interlocutors of whatever stripe that 
the peace process had brought improvements and needed to 
continue.  (Note:  The fifth round of GSL-LTTE peace 
talks is scheduled to take place February 7-8 in 
Berlin.)  END COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U) Director Good cleared on this message. 
 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS