US embassy cable - 03AMMAN855

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000855 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: USINT BAGHDAD PERSONNEL DEPART IRAQ; ARRIVE SAFELY 
IN AMMAN 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Gregory L. Berry. Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) All four Polish diplomats representing the U.S. 
Interests Section in Baghdad (along with two spouses) 
departed Iraq February 5 and have arrived safely in Amman. 
They are scheduled to fly on to Warsaw on Sunday, February 9. 
 In a meeting with poloff February 6, USINT Baghdad chief 
Krzysztof Bernacki recounted his staff's final tension-filled 
week in the Iraqi capital and its culmination with a sunset 
border crossing into Jordan the night before. 
 
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The Sun Sets . . . For Now 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Bernacki said that he had been notified by the Polish 
MFA on Thursday, January 30 that USINT's Polish staff should 
depart Baghdad on February 5.  In the intervening week they 
had been working long hours shredding documents, 
disassembling equipment and packing official USG items as 
well as their personal belongings.  He prepared a diplomatic 
note that his local staff will deliver to the Iraqi MFA on 
Saturday February 8 that will inform the GOI officially that 
USINT has "suspended operations" effective that day.  He said 
that he understood that the Department will announce this 
publicly in Washington on 2/8 as well. 
 
3. (C) Bernacki said that neither he nor his Polish 
colleagues had slept more than 3 hours per night since being 
instructed to depart, both because of the amount of work they 
had to do and the level of stress they were under (he noted 
that he had lost more than 10 pounds during that time alone). 
 Until they crossed the border last night, they were unsure 
whether the Iraqis would let them out or not. 
 
4. (S) The USINT convoy (4 vehicles all driven by the Poles 
themselves) had planned to depart Baghdad early morning 
February 5 in order to ensure that they would arrive in Amman 
by sundown.  However, at 2200 on February 4, Bernacki said 
that he "received an encrypted message" asking him to obtain 
the GPS coordinates for a number of Foreign Embassies in 
Baghdad.  In order to carry out this final task, he had to 
delay his own departure "by a few hours" while he collected 
that information (which he passed on to our DAO).  The rest 
of the convoy had departed the center of Baghdad without him 
and waited at the checkpoint on the outskirts of the city 
until he rejoined them.  From that point on, he said that the 
drive to the border was uneventful.  Traffic was light and 
they saw very few military vehicles. 
 
5. (C)  The convoy arrived at the Iraqi side of the border 
(which was empty of other travelers) at approximately 1630 
where he noticed "a lot of mukhabarat (secret police) 
observing us.  Clearly they knew who we were and that we were 
all leaving."  Bernacki said that he believed the reason they 
were not hassled on departure was because of the presence of 
UNMOVIC inspectors in the country: "they (the GOI) didn't 
want a controversy now, so they let us go.  If the inspectors 
weren't there, I think it would have been different."  After 
finishing border formalities on the Iraqi side, the convoy 
crossed over to Jordan about 1730, just as the sun was going 
down over the Iraqi desert.  After a short rest they 
continued on for the final 3 1/2 hour drive to Amman. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
In Baghdad, Iraqis Wait for the Inevitable 
and Hunger for Information 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Regarding final impressions, Bernacki said that the 
mood in Baghdad now is "very, very heavy.  People are tired 
and are waiting for a war that they believe is inevitable and 
unavoidable.  They feel that if its going to happen, let it 
happen."  He noted that "everything seems to be in suspended 
animation . . . even the smuggling.  Businesspeople -- 
legitimate or otherwise -- are worried about importing goods 
that might get destroyed or looted" should military action 
begin. 
 
7. (C) In this environment, Bernacki offered that the U.S. 
should step up its propaganda efforts with the Iraqi public 
now, before any military action commences: "Make it clear 
that they are not the target and that their future will be 
better than what they've lived under.  Do it by radio.  It's 
the most efficient and best way to reach all Iraqis and they 
are hungry for independent information." 
 
------------------------------------ 
Future Plans: A Hope To Return 
One More Time And Turn Over the Keys 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Bernacki is in the process of turning over all four 
USINT Baghdad vehicles to Embassy Amman, along with the keys 
to the Baghdad facilities and other USG equipment.  After he 
arrives in Poland, he intends to take a few days of leave and 
will then debrief the Polish MFA and call on Embassy Warsaw 
to discuss next steps.  As our discussion concluded, Bernacki 
stressed -- as he has in every meeting with us since he took 
on the responsibilities of USINT Chief in January 2001 -- 
that he would like nothing more than the honor of handing 
over the keys to the Interest Section to a U.S. diplomat when 
it becomes -- once again -- the U.S. Embassy to Iraq. 
 
 
GNEHM