US embassy cable - 03HARARE267

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MOU: CAN'T LIVE WITH IT, CAN'T SURVIVE WITHOUT IT

Identifier: 03HARARE267
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE267 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-02-06 12:02:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: ECON EAGR PGOV ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON, EAGR, PGOV, ZI 
SUBJECT: MOU: CAN'T LIVE WITH IT, CAN'T SURVIVE WITHOUT IT 
 
REF: HARARE 239 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET POSTING. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  The proposed Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the GOZ and the Commercial Farmers' Union 
(CFU), foreshadowed in reftel, typifies the bad faith 
underlying current efforts by the GOZ to use the CFU in 
support of its propaganda.  The specific language in the 
proposed MOU demonstrates that the GOZ's position is, in 
effect, "what's yours is ours, and what's ours is 
non-negotiable."  However, if the CFU refuses outright to 
continue a dialogue with the Minister of Lands, the GOZ may 
well seize the farmers' remaining assets anyway.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  The introductory rhetoric in the MOU clearly states 
that:  the CFU must cooperate in order to demonstrate that it 
is not acting as an "instrument of or representative of any 
foreign power or interest, but as a Zimbabwean organisation 
representing the interests of its members"; the 11 million 
hectares seized from commercial farmers is "STATE LAND that 
cannot and will not revert back to any previous status for 
whatever reason whatsoever"; and "lawfully resettled farmers, 
whether under the Model A1 or Model A2 schemes that are on 
the 11 million hectares shall not be evicted therefrom."  In 
short, by signing such an MOU, the CFU would concede defeat 
on behalf of its individual members. 
 
3. (SBU)  Further introductory clauses address the ambiguous 
policy of "one man, one farm" by stating that CFU members 
("and others similarly affected" -- possibly an oblique 
reference to Justice for Agriculture, the hardline farmers' 
group which is pushing for farmers to retain their title 
deeds and challenge the GOZ's program through legal action), 
are eligible to receive land under the resettlement program. 
However, the MOU states that such farmers "shall be 
accommodated ELSEWHERE on land compulsorily acquired by the 
Government for resettlement purposes, OVER AND ABOVE the 
already mentioned 11 million hectares, where they shall be 
allocated portions of land within and up to the applicable 
maximum farm size depending on the agro-ecological region in 
question (emphasis added)."  The careful phrasing of this 
clause confirms the fears expressed by CFU members in 
previous meetings:  the GOZ may allocate some small pieces of 
marginal land, possibly virgin bush, probably several hundred 
miles from their original homes, to CFU applicants -- but 
only after the CFU members have turned over their title deeds 
and submitted themselves to the authority of the Minister of 
Lands, effectively signaling their acquiescence to their own 
plunder. 
 
4. (SBU)  The active clauses detailed as the substantive 
"record of understanding between the parties" require the CFU 
to commit the personal property of its members to a 
GOZ-sponsored forced purchase.  The GOZ undertakes to 
guarantee that applications by CFU members for new land will 
be "favourably considered" not later than August 31, 2003; in 
return, the GOZ demands that the CFU urge its members to sell 
and/or lease their warehoused equipment, as well as their 
expertise, to the government for the use of the new farmers 
resettled on their former property.  The MOU further insists 
that the CFU provide the Minister of Lands with an inventory 
of such moveable equipment and skills "that may be offered 
for sale" or rental within thirty days of the execution of 
the document.  Although the MOU, on the surface, appears to 
recognize that the farm equipment in question is the 
individual property of CFU members, the clear implication is 
that the GOZ wants the equipment -- and may seize it if it is 
not meekly offered up.  This is a potent and credible threat. 
 Just last week, sources reported that a government minister 
broke into a warehouse and "seized" a combine tractor worth 
over US$27,000 from a former commercial farmer for the 
minister's use. 
 
5. (SBU)  Comment.  The underlying theme of this entire 
document, other than the attempt to gain access to 
badly-needed agricultural equipment, is that the land 
seizures will not be reversed and that the CFU should join 
the GOZ in placing the responsibility for compensation on 
Great Britain.  The MOU states in two separate places that 
the GOZ "is ready and willing to assist the CFU to 
constructively pursue and finalise the matter (compensation) 
with the former colonial power or any other (identified) 
party..."  This correlates with the GOZ's urgent request for 
an exonerating "statement" which CFU president Colin Cloete 
reported in his meetings with various ministers last week, 
see reftel. 
 
6. (SBU)  In a strictly legal sense, it is highly unlikely 
that the CFU has the authority to commit its individual 
members to acceptance of the terms of this MOU.  Even if the 
CFU president agrees that acquired land cannot and will not 
revert to individual ownership, that would not preclude an 
individual CFU member from pursuing a  challenge through the 
courts.  Even if the CFU agrees to urge its members to sell 
farm equipment to the GOZ, it cannot force a sale.  The 
greatest value to the GOZ in executing this version of the 
MOU lies in its propaganda value.  It would suit the GOZ's 
frantic attempts to ease international censure if the CFU is 
seen as accepting the land resettlement as a fait accompli, 
for which the "former colonial power" is morally and 
financially responsible.  It would also suit the GOZ if the 
CFU helped persuade its members to turn over their farming 
equipment to the resettled farmers -- for an unspecified 
payment at an unspecified future date.  Commercial farmers 
throughout the nation are carefully watching these meetings 
play out, and many believe that the CFU is openly betraying 
its membership by continuing a dialogue in which no 
concessions or relief are gained by its members.  Ongoing 
contacts with Cloete indicate that he is aware of tightrope 
he is walking, and that he is unlikely to sign the MOU in its 
current form.  End comment. 
SULLIVAN 

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