US embassy cable - 92STATE324006

S E C R E T STATE 324006 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: XT, PINR 
SUBJECT:  INR ANALYSIS:  INTER-AMERICAN HIGHLIGHTS: 
SEPTEMBER 30, 1992 
 
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT (NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN 
NATIONALS) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PERU:  FUJIMORI GAINS STRENGTH 
EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS:  SOLOMONIC BORDER RULING 
NICARAGUA:  POLICE AND PROPERTY REFORMS...ALMOST 
MEXICO:  LABOR PROBLEMS 
ECUADOR:  ECONOMIC REFORM ADVANCES DESPITE PROTESTS 
 

--PERU:  FUJIMORI GAINS STRENGTH 

IN THE SIX MONTHS SINCE THE APRIL 5 CIVIL-MILITARY COUP. 
PRESIDENT ALBERTO FUJIMORI HAS OUTMANEUVERED THE 
OPPOSITION, PLACATED THE OAS. AND WON A STUNNING VICTORY 
IN THE BATTLE WITH THE SHINING PATH (SL) BY CAPTURING 
ABIMAEL GUZMAN, ITS FOUNDER AND LEADER.  ALTHOUGH PERU 
HAS ONE OF THE MOST STRINGENT AUSTERITY PROGRAMS IN 
LATIN AMERICA. FUJIMORI.S POPULARITY RATING IS CLOSE TO 
75 PERCENT IN THE WAKE OF THE SEPTEMBER 12 CAPTURE, AND 
NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT PARTIES LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT 
APPEAR POISED TO WIN A MAJORITY IN THE NOVEMBER 22 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUENT CONGRESS (CCD) ELECTIONS. 

THE NEW CONSTITUTION PROBABLY WILL STRENGTHEN THE POWERS 
OF THE PRESIDENCY AND UNDERCUT THE DOMINANCE OF THE 
TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES.  FUJIMORI.S AUTOCRATIC 
AND SECRETIVE MODUS OPERANDI ULTIMATELY MAY UNDERMINE 
HIS EFFORTS. HOWEVER.  (C) 

DEAD END FOR SHINING PATH?  THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE TO 
WIPE OUT TERRORISM BY 1995 GAINED SUBSTANTIALLY IN 
CREDIBILITY WITH GUZMAN.S ARREST' PARTICULARLY BECAUSE 
IT FOLLOWED THE JUNE CAPTURE OF MRTA LEADER VICTOR 
POLAY.  GUZMAN'S DETENTION COULD NOT HAVE COME AT A 
BETTER TIME FOR FUJIMORI, IN VIEW OF THE NOVEMBER CCD 
ELECTIONS.  THE EUPHORIA IN LIMA IS PALPABLE, THOUGH 
ACCOMPANIED BY FEAR OF NEAR-TERM SL RETALIATION.  (C) 

IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER SL CAN REGROUP UNDER NEW 
LEADERSHIP.  THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO EXPECT A 
SHORT-TERM COLLAPSE, BUT SL'S LONG-TERM PROSPECTS APPEAR 
DIMMER.  THE OUTCOME OF GUZMAN'S MILITARY TRIAL IS NOT 
IN DOUBT, THOUGH THE SCHEDULED OCTOBER 27 ANNOUNCEMENT 
OF THE VERDICT AND SENTENCE IS LIKELY TO PROVOKE A 
VIOLENT SL RESPONSE, ESPECIALLY IF FUJIMORI FINDS A WAY 
TO JUSTIFY THE DEATH PENALTY.  (C) 

INTERESTED PARTIES.  FUJIMORI JUST1FIED HIS APRIL 5 
DISSOLUTION OF CONGRESS PARTLY ON GROUNDS THAT AN 
ANTIDEMOCRATIC "PARTYOCRACY" DEPRIVED THE PEOPLE OF 
"REAL DEMOCRACY."  PROCEEDING ON THIS PREMISE, FUJIMORI 
HAS TRIED TO DIFFUSE THE POWER OF THE TRADITIONAL 
PARTIES. WHICH CONSTITUTE HIS MAIN OPPOSITION.  BOWING 
TO PRESSURE FROM THE OAS FUJIMORI AGREED TO A NATIONAL 
DIALOGUE AS A PRELUDE TO CCD ELECTIONS.  BUT THE 
FRACTIOUS PARTIES LARGELY BOYCOTTED THE PROCEEDINGS. 
ALLOWING THE PRESIDENT TO WRITE HIS OWN ELECTORAL 
RULES.  (C) 

BEFORE GUZMAN'S CAPTURE, MOST PARTIES FEARED THAT 
ENTERING THE CCD CONTESTS WOULD LEGITIMIZE A FUJIMORI 
DICTATORSHIP AND HOPED THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WOULD 
FORCE CONCESSIONS.  SOME OF THESE PARTIES NOW APPEAR TO 
BE LEANING TOWARD PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS.  THE 
POPULAR CHRISTIAN PARTY HAS OPTED TO ENTER.  EXILED 
FORMER PRESIDENT GARCIA.S APRA, HOWEVER, HAS DECIDED TO 
BOYCOTT. PERHAPS FEARING AN EMBARRASSINGLY POOR 
SHOWING.  FORMER PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S POPULAR ACTION HAS 
DECIDED TO FORGO THE CCD CONTESTS BUT TO RUN IN NEXT 
JANUARY.S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.  SMALLER PARTIES ARE 
GATHERING SIGNATURES OR FORMING COALITIONS TO QUALIFY 
FOR REGISTRATION BY OCTOBER 8.  (C) 

WHILE THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES BICKER INTERNALLY ABOUT 
WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS, FUJIMORI'S 
CAMPAIGN IS ALREADY UNDER WAY.  POLLS REFLECT 
WIDESPREAD REJECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND AN 
OVERWHELMING VOTER PREFERENCE FOR NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT 
CANDIDATES.  FUJIMORI IS OFFERING SUPPORTERS THREE 
BRANDS OF THE SAME BASIC PRODUCT:  HIS 1990 ELECTORAL 
VEHICLE CHANGE 90; THE RECENTLY FORMED NEW MAJORITY 
MOVEMENT, HEADED BY HIS FORMER ENERGY MINISTER AND 
CONFIDANT JAIME YOSHIYAMA; AND, ACCORDING TO A PRESS 
REPORT, AN "INDEPENDENT" PARTY HEADED BY FORMER FOREIGN 
MINISTER CARLOS TORRES.  (C) 

IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, FUJIMORI LOYALISTS 
WOULD CLEARLY WIN A MAJORITY.  ASSUMING THEY DO SO IN 
NOVEMBER, THE NEW CCD PROBABLY WILL DRAFT A 
CONSTITUTION TAILORMADE FOR FUJIMORI, POSSIBLY 
INCLUDING NEW FROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR REELECTION OF AN 
INCUMBENT PRESIDENT.  (C) 

FUJIOCRACY.  FUJIMORI SEEMS TO BE GETTING AWAY WITH HIS 
UNUSUAL CIVIL-MILITARY COUP.  HE CONTINUES TO ENJOY THE 
SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES WHICH, DESPITE SOME 
RUMBLINGS IN THE RANKS, ARE PROBABLY DISINCLINED TO 
TAKE POWER THEMSELVES OR RETURN IT TO THE DISCREDITED 
PARTIES.  THE RECENT SACKING OF AIR FORCE COMMANDER 
VELARDE UNDERSCORES FUJIMORI.S SELF-CONFIDENCE 
VIS-A-VIS THE TOP BRASS.  HIS TIMETABLE AND GROUND 
RULES FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE 
PLACATED THE OAS, AND THE PUBLIC SEEMS UNMOVED BY THE 
PARTIES' COMPLAINTS ABOUT FUJIMORI'S MANIPULATION OF 
THE PROCESS.  (C) 

FUJIMORI IS MORE IN TOUCH WITH HIS PREDOMINANTLY 
MESTIZO AND INDIAN COUNTRYMEN THAN THE LIMA ELITE EVER 
WAS.  THE PROBLEM WITH THE "NEW PERU" UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION IS THAT IT COULD BE TOO BASED ON FUJIMORI 
TO OUTLAST HIM.  THE PRESIDENT REMAINS SKEPTICAL OF 
INSTITUTIONS, DISTRUSTFUL OF ALL BUT A HANDFUL OF 
CONFIDANTS, AND DRIVEN BY A POTENTIALLY 
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE MESSIANIC ZEAL.  HE MAY WELL ATTEMPT 
TO ENGINEER HIS OWN REELECTION IN 1995, THEREBY 
FULFILLING HIS 1991 OFF-HAND REMARK THAT PERU "NEEDS AN 
EMPEROR FOR 10 YEARS."  HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE. 
WILLINGLY OR OTHERWISE, COULD LEAVE A VACUUM THAT THE 
TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND ARMED FORCES WOULD VIE TO 
FILL.  (C) (DRAFTED BY JAMES ALLEN) 

--EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS:  SOLOMONIC BORDER RULING 

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) ON SEFTEMBER 
11 RENDERED A LENGTHY AND COMPLICATED DECISION ON THE 
LONGSTANDING SALVADOR-HONDURAS BORDER DISPUTE, AWARDING 
ROUGHLY TWO-THIRDS OF THE LAND AREAS (BOLSONES) IN 
QUESTION TO HONDURAS.  EL SALVADOR RECEIVED THE TWO 
LARGEST ISLANDS IN THE GULF OF FONSECA--MEANGUERA AND 
MEANGUERITA--WHILE EL TIGRE ISLAND WENT TO HONDURAS, 
WHICH WAS GUARANTEED ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC.  THE ICJ 
ALSO GRANTED EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA JOINT 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE GULF BEYOND 3 NAUTICAL MILES FROM 
THEIR RESPECTIVE SHORES.  (C) 

SALVADORANS STUNNED.  PRIOR TO THE DECISION, 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN BOTH COUNTRIES WAS THAT 
LAND-POOR EL SALVADOR WOULD BE AWARDED THE BOLSONES. 
THE DECISION GIVING THE MAJOR PORTION TO HONDURAS WAS A 
BITTER DISAPPOINTMENT, BUT PUBL1CLY AT LEAST MOST 
SALVADORANS TRIED TO PUT THE BEST FACE ON THE OUTCOME. 
PRIVATELY. THERE WERE MUTTERINGS THAT CRISTIANI HAD 
FAILED TO PREPARE THE POPULATION FOR AN ADVERSE 
OUTCOME  AND HIS ARENA PARTY WOULD SUFFER FOR IT.  (S) 

DEMILITARIZED ZONE?  THE FMLN, MEANWHILE, CLAIMED 
CRISTIANI WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE 
BOLSONES BECAUSE THEY WERE POPULATED PRIMARILY BY "ITS" 
PEOPLE.  ALTHOUGH THE DISPUTED AREAS ARE NOT HEAVILY 
POPULATED (ABOUT 25,000). 10,000-15,000 ARE FMLN 
SUPPORTERS OR SYMPATHIZERS WITH THEIR OWN CIVIC AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS.  HAVING OPERATED INDEPENDENTLY 
OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR YEARS, THESE CADRE DO NOT WELCOME 
A HONDURAN PRESENCE NOW.  (S) 

THE FMLN HAS PROPOSED DEMILITARIZING THE AREAS OR 
TURNING THEM INTO A FREE-TRADE ZONE AND GIVING 
RESIDENTS DUAL CITIZENSHIP.  THE FMLN ALSO WANTS 
REPRESENTATION ON THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED 
BY PRESIDENTS CRISTIANI AND CALLEJAS TO IMPLEMENT THE 
ICJ DECISION AND IS REQUESTING A UN OBSERVER MISSION TO 
PROTECT BOLSONES INHABITANTS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES' 
MILITARIES.  (S) 

HONDURANS CAUTIOUS.  MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP 
BOTH APPEARED PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY THE RULING AND 
ALERT TO THE SENSITIVITY OF UPROOTING OR RELOCATING 
BOLSONES RESIDENTS.  GENERAL DISCUA AND OTHERS 
REPORTEDLY HAVE ADVISED CALLEJAS TO PROCEED WITH 
CAUTION AND WITHOUT ARROGANCE.  NEVERTHELESS HONDURAS 
IS NOT LIKELY TO ALLOW THE FMLN TO REMAIN IN CONTROL IN 
HONDURAN TERRITORY.  NEITHER IS GENERAL DISCUA LIKELY 
TO ACQUIESCE IN A DEMILITARIZED ZONE ON THE HONDURAN 
BORDER.  BOTH COUNTRIES SAY THEY WILL RELY ON THE 
BINATIONAL COMMISSION TO RESOLVE DIFFICULT HUMAN RIGHTS 
ISSUES.  (S) 

CALLEJAS WILL LEAD A LARGE DELEGATION TO SAN SALVADOR 
FOR CONSULTATIONS AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER  THUS 
BEGINNING THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD OF BILATERAL 
DISCUSSIONS BEFORE DEMARCATION OF THE NEW BORDERS.  THE 
ICJ RULING APPARENTLY REQUIRES ALL THREE RIFARIAN 
COUNTRIES--HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, AND NICARAGUA--TO 
WORK OUT ISSUES OF ACCESS AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS EXTENDING 
FROM THE GULF OF FONSECA INTO THE PACIFIC.  AT THE 
MOMENT, NO ONE APPEARS EAGER TO ENGAGE FORMALLY WITH 
NICARAGUA ON THIS ISSUE.  (C) (DRAFTED BY VIVIAN 
GILLESPIE) 

--  NICARAGUA:  POLICE AND PROPERTY REFORMS...ALMOST 

RECENT PERSONNEL CHANGES AND A NEW "ORGANIC" LAW APPEAR 
TO MAKE ONLY SUPERFICIAL CHANGES IN THE 
SANDINISTA-DOMINATED POLICE.  THE PROGRESS OF THE 
CHAMORRO GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN POLICE REFORM, 
INVESTIGATION OF ANTI-CONTRA VIOLENCE, AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT REMAINS GLACIALLY INCREMENTAL.  (C) 

THE ORGANIC POLICE LAW PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 11 SETS 
TERMS OF OFFICE AND PERMITS DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE. BUT IT 
ALSO ENSURES CONTINUED SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP IN TOP 
JOBS BY PROMOTION FROM WITHIN.  MOREOVER, IT DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO GIVE THE NEW CIVILIAN VICE MINISTER OF 
GOVERNMENT. ROLAND AVILES. CONTROL OVER PERSONNEL 
ASSIGNMENTS AND, HENCE. PROMOTION.  AVILES IS DESCRIBED 
AS STRIDENTLY ANTI-SANDINISTA, BUT VERY CLOSE TO 
PRESIDENCY MINISTER LACAYO AND MORE OF AN IMPLEMENTER 
THAN AN INITIATOR.  (S) 

REACTION TO POLICE CHANGES.  REACTION AMONG 
NON-SANDINISTAS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF FERNANDO CALDERA 
TO REPLACE RENE VIVAS AS POLICE CHIEF HAS BEEN 
NEGATIVE, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY MANAGUA.  NICARAGUAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBE CALDERA AS 
"DANGEROUS" AND A "COMMITTED SANDINISTA."  THE BISHOP 
OF CHONTALES, WHO CLASHED WITH CALDERA IN YEARS PAST, 
SAID HE WAS "AMAZED" BY THE APPOINTMENT.  THE BISHOP 
AND OTHERS CITED RAMPANT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND BAD 
PRISON CONDITIONS UNDER CALDERA.S TENURE AS A REGIONAL 
POLICE CHIEF IN THE EARLY-TO-MID 1980S.  (C) 

FORMER RESISTANCE LEADER AND NOW SOCIAL CHRISTIAN 
DEPUTY AZUCENA FERREY SAW ONE POSITIVE ASPECT:  THAT 
FORMER SANDINISTA INTERIOR MINISTER TOMAS BORGE WAS NOW 
FINISHED" IN NICARAGUA BECAUSE THOSE DISMISSED WERE 
FROM HIS WING OF THE FSLN.  (C) 

THE GOVERNMENT INSISTS THAT CALDERA WAS THE BEST CHOICE 
OF THOSE ELIGIBLE FOR THE JOB.  CALDERA, FOR HIS FART. 
HAS PLEDGED TO IMPROVE POLICE BEHAVIOR AND INVESTIGATE 
THE ASSASSINATIONS OF FORMER CONTRA LEADER ENRIQUE 
BERMUDEZ AND OTHERS.  (C) 

ARCHBISHOP OBANDO Y BRAVO HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPAL TO 
PARTICIPATE IN A TRIPARTITE COMMISSION. TOGETHER WITH 
REPRESENTATIVES OF OAS/CIAV AND THE GOVERNMENT. TO LOOK 
INTO KILLINGS OF MORE THAN 100 EX-CONTRAS SINCE 1990. 
PLANS TO ESTABLISH THE COMMISSION FRAMEWORK APPEAR TO 
BE MOVING AHEAD.  (C) 

PROPERTY DECREES ANNOUNCED.  THE COMPLICATED PROCESS OF 
UNTANGLING 10 YEARS OF SANDINISTA CONFISCATIONS AND 
LAND REFORM IS INCHING FORWARD.  ON SEPTEMBER 9 A 
DECREE SIGNED BY CHAMORRO CREATED A PROPERTY ATTORNEY 
TO HEAD A THREE-PERSON NATIONAL COMMISSION TO 
INVESTIGATE AND RECOMMEND RETURN OF PROPERTY OR 
COMPENSATION.  THE REMAINDER OF THE PROPERTY 
PACKAGE--AN OFFICE IN THE FINANCE MINISTRY TO DETERMINE 
CLAIM VALUES AND TO ESTABLISH A COMPENSATION FUND AND 
AN ARBITRATION MECHANISM--SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED LATER 
THIS MONTH, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY MANAGUA.  THIS 
APPROACH LEAVES IN SANDINISTA POSSESSION PROPERTIES 
SEIZED AFTER THE ELECTION, WHILE IT OBLIGATES THE 
GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ANY COMPENSATION DUE THE ORIGINAL 
OWNERS.  (C) 

THIS FAR AND NO FURTHER.  THE CHAMORRO GOVERNMENT 
EVIDENTLY HOPES THE CHANGES WILL BE SUFFICIENT FOR 
RELEASE OF BADLY NEEDED US ASSISTANCE.  FAILURE TO 
RECEIVE THE US FUNDS PROBABLY WILL PUT NICARAGUA IN 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS IMF PROGRAM AND WOULD ENDANGER 
THE RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC PROGRAM.  INCENSED 
BY US PRESSURES, CHAMORRO NONETHELESS HAS WARNED SHE 
WILL RESIGN RATHER THAN ACCEDE TO MORE DRASTIC US 
DEMANDS, AND LACAYO SHOWS NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO 
CONSIDER FURTHER CHANGES IN THE POLICE OR ARMY 
LEADERSHIP AT THIS TIME.  (C) (DRAFTED BY VIVIAN 
GILLESPIE) 

--  MEXICO:  LABOR PROBLEMS 

ANTICIPATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(NAFTA) IS BRINGING A WRENCHING ADJUSTMENT TO FIRMS IN 
MEXICO.  LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ARE BEING REDEFINED 
AS FIRMS SEEK TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY 
BY INTRODUCING MORE FLEXIBLE WORK RULES AND NEW FORMS 
OF MANUFACTURING AND INVENTORY CONTROL.  THIS OFTEN 
MEANS FEWER WORKERS AND LINKING WAGE HIKES TO 
PRODUCTIVITY, THREATENING THE POWER OF TRADITIONAL 
UNION BOSSES ACCUSTOMED TO DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE 
ON COMPANY OPERATIONS.  (C) 

THE NEW MEXICO.  TO INCREASE MEXICO.S ATTRACTIVENESS TO 
FOREIGN INVESTORS, PRESIDENT SALINAS HAS TRIED STEADILY 
TO TRIM UNION POWER YET NOT BREAK FAITH WITH THE 
POWERFUL MEXICAN LABOR CONFEDERATION (CTM). A 
TRADITIONAL, ALBEIT WANING, PILLAR OF THE RULING PRI 
AND A MECHANISM FOR CONTROLLING LABOR.  SINCE TAKING 
OFFICE, SALINAS HAS ORDERED THE ARREST OF CORRUPT UNION 
OFFICIALS, PROMOTED NEW LABOR LEADERS, AND USED THE 
DECENTRALIZATION OF PARASTATALS (PEMEX. FOR EXAMPLE) 
AND SUCH GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AS EDUCATION TO WEAKEN 
CORPORATIST UNION POWER.  BUT HE HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO 
TAKE ON THE CTM AND ITS POWERFUL NONAGENARIAN LEADER. 
FIDEL VELAZQUEZ, DIRECTLY BY ATTEMFTING TO REFORM 
MEXICO.S RIGID, OUTDATED LABOR CODE.  (C) 

A TURNING POINT?  THE SALINAS ADMINISTRATION SENT A 
STRONG SIGNAL TO LABOR WHEN THE NATIONAL LABOR BOARD, 
PROBABLY AT SALINAS'S BEHEST, RULED ON AUGUST 17 IN 
FAVOR OF VOLKSWAGEN, MEXICO'S LARGEST CAR MAKER, IN ITS 
DISPUTE WITH DISSIDENT UNIONISTS.  IN EARLY JULY THE 
DISSIDENTS LED A STRIKE OF 14,000 MEMBERS OF THE 
INDEPENDENT AUTO WORKERS UNION AT VW.S PUEBLA PLANT, 
WHICH MAKES MEXICO'S BEST-SELLING BEETLE, AND CARS FOR 
EXPORT.  THE STRIKERS CLAIMED THE ELECTED UNION 
PRESIDENT HAD SIGNED A NEW CONTRACT--ACCEPTING 
PROVISIONS TYING RAISES AND PROMOTIONS TO 
PRODUCTIVITY--WITHOUT VETTING IT WITH THE RANK AND 
FILE.  (S) 

VW RESPONDED BY VOIDING ITS OLD UNION CONTRACT. LOCKING 
OUT STRIKERS, AND THREATENING TO LEAVE MEXICO--A 
DEVELOPMENT THE GOVERNMENT FEARED COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE 
EFFECT ON NAFTA AND POTENTIAL INVESTORS.  THE LABOR 
BOARD'S RULING WILL PERMIT THE COMPANY TO REHIRE MOST 
OF THE WORKERS ON TERMS THAT ENSURE GREATER MANAGEMENT 
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FUTURE.  VW REPORTEDLY PLANS TO 
BRING IN 40 GERMAN AUTO PARTS MANUFACTURERS TO ALLOW IT 
TO MEET NAFTA CONTENT RULES.  (S) 

MEANWHILE. 20,000 TEXTILE WORKERS WENT ON A 58-DAY 
STRIKE TO DEMAND HIGHER WAGES AND TO PROTEST WORK RULES 
THAT MEANT FEWER JOBS.  ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS 
REPORTS  MOST OF THE TROUBLE WAS IN NONCOMFETITIVE 
FIRMS PRODUCING FOR THE DOMESTIC MARKET:  MEXICAN 
EXPORT COMPANIES ARE ALREADY MAKING THE CAPITAL 
INVESTMENTS NEEDED TO COMPETE UNDER NAFTA.  THE STRIKE. 
WHICH WAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED BY CTM LEADER VELAZQUEZ, 
ENDED AMICABLY ON SEPTEMBER 4 WHEN GOVERNMENT. LABOR. 
AND INDUSTRY LEADERS AGREED TO A 14-PERCENT WAGE HIKE 
AND 50-PERCENT PAYMENT FOR LOST WAGES.  (C) 

SPOKESMEN FOR THE WORKERS CLAIM THE SETTLEMENT MEANS 
THE INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE CONTRACT, WHICH EXPIRED IN 
JULY, REMAINS IN FORCE.  MANY TEXTILE WORKERS HAD 
PREVIOUSLY REACHED SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH THEIR 
COMPANIES. HOWEVER; WORKERS IN MONTERREY'S HIGHLY 
AUTOMATED PLANTS RECEIVED 30-PERCENT SALARY HIKES. 
MOREOVER. DESPITE THE PRI.S PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE 
STRIKERS. THE GOVERNMENT IN PRACTICE ALLOWED THE 
COLLECTIVE LABOR LAW TO BE IGNORED. THEREBY SETTING A 
PRECEDENT FOR RESOLVING FUTURE LABOR CONFLICTS.  THIS 
SETTLEMENT, LIKE THE ONE AT VOLKSWAGEN, REPRESENTS A 
VICTORY FOR MANAGEMENT.  (C) 

NO PAIN, NO GAIN.  EXPANDED TRADE SHOULD INCREASE REAL 
WAGES FOR MOST MEXICAN WORKERS, BUT MANY OTHERS FACE 
DISLOCATION AS COMPANIES RESTRUCTURE OR FOLD.  LABOR 
ACTIVISTS IN THREATENED AREAS SAY BUSINESSES ARE USING 
NAFTA AS A PRETEXT TO WEAKEN THE UNIONS, INCREASING THE 
POTENTIAL FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFLICT IN THE SHORT TO 
MEDIUM TERM.  GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE WELL AWARE THAT 
ONE DOWNSIDE OF NAFTA IS THAT AS LABOR POWER BECOMES 
LESS CENTRALIZED. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL 
THE UNIONS THROUGH TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PAYOFFS, AND 
LABOR'S LOYALTY TO THE PRI MAY BE IMPERILED.  (S) 
(DRAFTED BY ANGELO IOFREDDA) 

--  ECUADOR:  ECONOMIC REFORM ADVANCES DESPITE PROTESTS 

THE NEW PRESIDENT OF ECUADOR, FREE MARKET PROPONENT 
SIXTO DURAN, IS IMPLEMENTING A SERIES OF SPENDING CUTS 
AS THE FIRST STAGE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO 
LIBERALIZE AN ECONOMY MIRED IN RECESSION.  (C) 

AUSTERITY NOW, LIBERALIZATION SOON.  AS HE PROMISED AT 
HIS INAUGURATION. DURAN THIS MONTH OUTLINED A REFORM 
PROGRAM INTENDED TO REVERSE SHARP ECONOMIC DECLINE. 
THE GOVERNMENT DEVALUED THE SUCRE BY 28 PERCENT AND 
RAISED THE SUBSIDIZED PRICES OF GASOLINE BY 125 PERCENT 
AND ELECTRICITY BY AS MUCH AS 120 PERCENT.  DURAN PLANS 
TO CUT GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY 4 PERCENT ACROSS THE 
BOARD, AND ALREADY HAS OBTAINED ASSURANCES FROM 
COMMANDERS THAT THEY WILL NOT OPPOSE SIMILAR CUTS IN 
THE MILITARY.  TO FORESTALL POPULAR UNREST, THE 
PRESIDENT HAS FROZEN PUBLIC TRANSPORT PRICES AND 
PROMISED WAGE INCREASES.  AT THE SAME TIME, ECUADOR 
WILL LOWER TRADE BARRIERS WITH COLOMBIA. BOLIVIA. AND 
VENEZUELA.  (C) 

DURAN INTENDS TO FOLLOW THIS INITIAL ROUND OF MEASURES 
BY FREEING INTEREST RATES AND SUBMITTING TO CONGRESS 
BILLS ON CAPITAL MARKET REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION.  THE 
GOVERNMENT PLANS TO BEGIN PRIVATIZING THE HUGE STATE 
SECTOR BY FIRST LEGALIZING PRIVATE COMPETITION TO 
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES AND THEN SELLING ITS HOLDINGS IN 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.  UNDER THIS CAUTIOUS APPROACH, 
THE PRIVATIZATION OF LARGE STATE COMPANIES WILL 
FOLLOW.  (C) 

ECONOMY IN DOLDRUMS.  DURAN.S IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IS TO 
REDUCE INFLATION BY CUTTING EXPENDITURES AND INCREASING 
TAX REVENUES.  DURAN'S TEAM OF FREE MARKETEERS IS 
HEADED BY HIS VICE PRESIDENT. PRINCETON-EDUCATED 

LIBERALIZATION LED THE OPPOSITION TO CALL HIM  AN 
"ECONOMIC TERRORIST."  EIGHT OF 14 CABINET MEMBERS ARE 
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, INCLUDING THE MINISTERS OF 
FINANCE. INDUSTRY. AND ENERGY.  (C) 

DURAN INHERITED AN ECONOMY BESET BY STAGNATION, 
50-PERCENT INFLATION, A BUDGET DEFICIT OF 7 PERCENT OF 
GDF AND OVERRELIANCE ON OIL INCOME.  OIL NOW ACCOUNTS 
FOR HALF OF GOVERNMENT INCOME AND 40 PERCENT OF 
EXPORTS. BUT RESERVES ARE EXPECTED TO BE DEPLETED 
WITHIN 12 YEARS.  NEGOTIATIONS WITH CREDITORS ON 
ECUADOR.S ALMOST US DOLS 13 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT ARE 
STALLED.  UNDEREMFLOYMENT IS ESTIMATED AT 50 PERCENT. 
DEMAND FOR LABOR IS HELD DOWN BY A LABOR CODE OF MORE 
THAN 600 ARTICLES THAT REGULATES ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF 
EMPLOYMENT  EFFECTIVELY PROHIBITING MANAGEMENT FROM 
FIRING OR LAYING OFF WORKERS.  CONGRESS REFORMED THE 
CODE SLIGHTLY LAST YEAR, BUT MANAGERS STILL REGARD 
HIRING NEW WORKERS AS A LAST RESORT.  (C) 

WEAK PROTESTS AGAINST REFORM.  THE LARGEST LABOR GROUP, 
THE UNITED WORKERS FRONT, THREATENED TO CALL FOR 
NATIONWIDE CIVIL UNREST IF THE PRESIDENT WENT AHEAD 
WITH HIS PLANS, AND THE HEAD OF THE PUBLIC EMFLOYEES 
UNION LABELED THE REFORMS "NEFARIOUS."  PROPAGANDA 
SUPFORTING PERU.S SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORISTS HAS NOW 
APPEARED IN SEVERAL CITIES   ANTICIPATING A REACTION TO 
HIS SEPTEMBER 4 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AUSTERITY PACKAGE. 
THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED 
FORCES, AND TROOPS WERE ORDERED INTO THE STREETS ON 
SEPTEMBER 7 AFTER FOUR SMALL BOMBS EXPLODED AT 
GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS.  (C) 

SO FAR THE PROTESTS HAVE HAD NO EFFECT.  A RESOUNDING 
REJECTION BY THE ELECTORATE OF THE FAILED STATIST 
POLICIES OF THE PAST HAS GIVEN THE DURAN ADMINISTRATION 
A CLEAR MANDATE TO IMFLEMENT ITS SWIFT AND FAR-REACHING 
ECONOMIC REFORM AGENDA.  IN THE FIRST ROUND OF 
PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTING, DURAN AND HIS LIKE-MINDED CHIEF 
OPPONENT RECEIVED 55 PERCENT OF THE VOTE  AND THE THREE 
CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES IN COALITION WITH THE NEW 
PRESIDENT HOLD 39 OF THE 77 SEATS IN THE UNICAMERAL 
LEGISLATURE. 
 
 
(C) (DRAFTED BY MICHAEL ZAK) KANTER 

 
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