US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL127

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPAO, PTER, KISL, TK 
SUBJECT: RISING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND U.S. POLICY 
TOWARDS IRAQ 
 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 108 AND 114 
     B. ANKARA 549 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Widespread and increasingly vocal opposition 
to a possible war against Iraq is on the verge of evolving 
into a more general anti-American backlash in Istanbul.  Our 
observations, Istanbul contacts, and recent polls and surveys 
lead us to believe that anti-American sentiment is sharply 
rising in Istanbul.  "sessiz Although much of this opposition is 
directed primarily at our policies in Iraq, the overall 
climate provides fertile ground for extremists hostile 
towards the United States.  Some leftist groups (including 
terrorist groups DHKP-C and KADEK) and the populist media 
tycoon and would-be politician Cem Uzan are seizing the 
opportunity to stir up trouble and rally support to their 
causes.  U.S. reassurances of its commitment to Iraq's 
territorial integrity and support for an economic assistance 
package are helping to address Turkish concerns.  However, 
sustained public diplomacy in Istanbul -- with 15% of the 
country's population and key opinion makers in media, higher 
education, and business -- remains critical to winning the 
Turkish public's support for our goals in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (SBU) We have been following with concern the fervent and 
widespread opposition in Istanbul to U.S. policy in Iraq. 
Recent polls (E.G., the Pew Global Attitudes Project and 
local polls) affirm that up to 90% of Turks oppose U.S. 
military action against Iraq and that anti-American sentiment 
is on the rise in Turkey.  We have observed that Istanbul 
reflects those trends.  In recent months, ConGen Istanbul has 
consistently found Turks to be much more vocal and critical 
of U.S. policies towards Iraq and the Middle East.  "No to 
War" bumper stickers and placards have been plastered across 
the city, and the Consulate has received dozens of virulent, 
even threatening, anti-war letters. 
 
 
3. (C) The frequency and attendance of anti-war 
demonstrations have been steadily increasing over the last 
month.  In the largest demonstration so far, over 5000 
protesters gathered in Beyazit square on January 26 
brandishing placards reading "Damn U.S. Imperialism" and "We 
Won't Be The U.S. Soldiers" (ref A) (Note: Press reports 
indicate that there was a much larger demonstration in the 
southeastern city of Mersin on the same day.  End Note).  A 
meeting of over 2000 organizational representatives on 
January 25 was held in Istanbul to plan for even larger 
demonstrations in the coming weeks.  Demonstrators dumped a 
(presumably) American military uniform and boots on the steps 
of a prominent Turkish business association last week to 
protest the chairman's recent "hawkish" public remarks. 
Turkish police sources told us last week that they suspect 
that these demonstrations are being secretly sponsored by 
various anti-American leftist groups, including DHKP-C, MLKP 
(Marxist Leninist Communist Party), and KADEK (formerly the 
PKK) terrorist cells. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Others are also seizing the opportunity to fan the 
flames of anti-Americanism and gather personal support. 
Recent spurious allegations that the U.S. has had official 
contacts with KADEK/PKK in northern Iraq have received 
considerable Istanbul-based national press coverage (ref B). 
Additionally, media tycoon and Youth Party leader Cem Uzan 
has reached out to all of Istanbul (as well as the rest of 
Turkey) over the last week with an enormous anti-American 
media campaign  (Note: Uzan's Youth Party emerged just a few 
months before last year's November 3 elections and captured 
over 7 percent of the national vote with its anti-American, 
anti-Western populist rhetoric.  End Note).  Using print, 
radio, and television, Uzan has put out a well-crafted, 
populist, anti-war message under the title "Who is the U.S. 
Attacking?"  Uzan's message strikes popular chords by 
touching on themes like "Turkey should make its own decision 
on war," "The U.S. has not kept its promises to compensate 
Turkey for $100 billion in damages from the Gulf War," and 
"Who will suffer from this anti-Muslim U.S. aggression?"  Not 
content with using his private media outlets, Uzan has bought 
air and radio time as well as entire pages in all of the 
major newspapers.  Local staff tells us that this campaign is 
unprecedented in its coverage and cost. 
 
 
5. (U) All of this is troubling to Americans who know Turkey 
well.  Turkish hospitality is unstinting and Turkish-American 
friendship runs deep.  Additionally, U.S. "soft power" in 
Turkey appears alive and well. Turkey sends over 10,000 
students to study at American universities every year 
(placing it in the top ten countries worldwide).  Turkish 
television routinely features American programs (current fare 
includes Friends, Ally McBeal, Dawson's Creek, and NYPD Blue) 
in prime time network slots, and NBC and CNN also have 
popular local franchises.  American films dominate local 
theaters, and American pop music has made significant inroads 
in local radio programming.  U.S. products, from McDonald's 
and Coca-Cola to Ford automobiles and Boeing aircraft, are 
commonplace. 
 
 
6. (SBU) Nonetheless, our sense is that the reservoir of good 
will towards the United States is gradually being depleted. 
Simple opposition to U.S. policies (i.e. "what we do") among 
the large majority of Turks who are generally sympathetic to 
the U.S. is spilling over and contributing to the small core 
of anti-American Turks who dislike "who we are."  The Pew 
Project found that only 31 percent of Turks had a positive 
view of "Americans" (versus 30 percent of the U.S.), 78 
percent viewed the spread of U.S. ideas and customs 
negatively, and 46 percent disliked American popular culture. 
 The timing and the discrepancy between the intensely 
pro-American mood in late 1999 and early 2000 (following 
former President Clinton's November 1999 visit to Turkey) and 
the generally pessimistic mood last summer during the waning 
months of the unpopular Ecevit government may have 
exaggerated these numbers.  But this cannot fully account for 
the sharp turn in public opinion against the United States 
that we observe in Istanbul. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Most Istanbul Turks continue to value the 
U.S.-Turkey strategic alliance and enjoy American products. 
Adversely affected by the ongoing economic crisis, however, 
many in this group mistakenly blame the IMF (and, by 
extension, the U.S.) for the country's crushing debt and the 
current strict economic program.  Initially sympathetic to 
the U.S.'s war on terrorism, most of them have since come to 
believe that the operations directed against Afghanistan and, 
now, Iraq are heavy-handed personal American vendettas and 
perhaps even anti-Islamic in nature.  They feel that the U.S. 
has its priorities confused (i.e., Iraq before 
Israel/Palestine) and is bent on pursuing its goals 
unilaterally with little regard for international, and 
particularly Turkish, opinion. 
 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Our contacts in Istanbul, like embassy 
contacts elsewhere in the country, have never been fond of 
Saddam Hussein; most recognize that he represents a threat to 
regional stability, and many even admit that he probably does 
have biological and/or chemical weapons.  Nonetheless, there 
is a strong, widespread Turkish desire to preserve stability 
in the region - critical for Turkey's economic and political 
development.  Much of the opposition to an operation against 
Iraq rests with our contacts' pessimistic predictions of the 
duration of hostilities, an unstable post-war power vacuum, 
and the possible disintegration of the Iraqi state into 
several components, including a Kurdish north.  CONGEN 
reassurances -- that we would prefer a peaceful solution to 
war, that we will continue to seek wide international support 
for any necessary military operation, that we are committed 
to Iraqi territorial integrity and long-term regional 
stability, and that we are prepared to help Turkey weather 
the negative economic shocks of a war -- have gone a long way 
towards addressing these concerns.  Continued multilateral 
diplomacy and public diplomacy efforts to address these basic 
concerns will be critical to winning the Turkish public's 
support for our goals in Iraq.  End Comment. 
ARNETT