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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA676 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA676 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-01-27 17:43:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000676 SIPDIS STATE FOR E, EB/IFD/OMA AND EUR/SE TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS AND LEICHTER STATE PASS USTR - NOVELLI AND BIRDSEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2006 TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PREL, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY'S ECONOMY: REFORM AND BANKING REF: SECSTATE 22328 Classified by Econ Counselor Scot Marciel for reasons 1.5 (b,d). Concerns on Reform ------------------ 1. (C) On January 27, we delivered reftel message to Treasury Undersecretary Oztrak, underlining that Washington believed the GOT was now seriously off-track on its IMF program and that U.S. assistance in the event of an Iraq operation would be impossible without the GOT's first completing the IMF program's Fourth Review. Oztrak said he would relay our concerns to State Minister Babacan, and also replied: -- The government has a communication problem with the IMF, as Fund staff's briefings to the USG and others reflect graver concerns that those perceived by GOT officials in their meetings with the Fund. The government has announced some economic policy measures (pension increases, tax truce law) without prior consultations with the IMF, resulting in a loss of confidence by Fund staff in the GOT. Oztrak believes this problem is being solved, with PM Gul committed to full consultations, though he is not sure this commitment is shared by others in the GOT. (Comment: This lack of consultations with the IMF was evident in today's BRSA announcement on the two banks, see below.) -- Oztrak claimed that the draft LOI at least addressed all the policy goals desired by the IMF, though he agreed that measures to reach the goals were sometimes lacking. He believes the draft LOI, together with "some early action on outstanding structural measures," provide a basis for a full IMF staff mission, and noted that an IMF fiscal team is currently in Ankara to work on the 2003 budget. -- Oztrak agreed that the Fund's concerns are based in large measure on the lack of clear direction and policy implementation by the GOT. He agreed on the urgency. "We need a credible budget and immediate action on structural reforms to contain the negative market impact of an Iraq war." 2. (C) Comment: Oztrak will relay the message to Babacan, and the Ambassador will meet with Deputy PM Sener January 28, just before the Higher Planning Council meeting. Ambassador will follow up with State Minister Babacan January 30. End Comment. Resolution Plan for Two Banks Announced --------------------------------------- 3. (SBU) Also on January 27, the Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency (BRSA) announced some of the elements of a "protocol" it reached with the Cukurova Group on the shares of two banks (Pamuk and Yapi Kredi) previously owned by the Cukurova Group. IMF resident banking expert Carlos Pineura told us January 27 that he was upset that the BRSA announced this deal without any prior consultations. 4. (SBU) BRSA Deputy Chairman Ibrahim Canakci explained the outlines of the deal as follows: -- Cukurova Group drops its law suit challenging BRSA's take-over of Pamukbank, leaving Pamuk under the BRSA's Savings Deposit Fund. In return, BRSA agrees to restructure Cukurova's $2.7 billion debt to Pamuk on favorable terms: 15 year repayment period with a three-year grace period on principal payments; interest at LIBOR plus 0.5 percent; interest payments every six months. (Note: similar terms are being offered Cukurova for its $200 million debt to other BRSA-controlled banks.) -- Cukurova undertakes to sell 35 percent of its total 45 percent share of Yapi Kredi Bank to a strategic investor in the next three years. In the meantime, Cukurova retains its economic ownership rights in Yapi Kredi (though BRSA maintains the management rights of the 45 percent share). -- BRSA agrees to restructure Cukurova's $2.3 billion loan to Yapi Kredi on the following terms: $300 million in exchange for Cukurova's 50 percent interest in ATEL (a prepaid cellphone card business); $2 billion to be repaid over 9 years, with three year grace period on principal payments; interest at LIBOR plus 3.5 percent. -- Asked about collateral for these restructurings, BRSA's Canakci also said Cukurova would pledge its shares of Turkcell, the cellphone operator. 5. (SBU) Comment: We leave it to banking experts to assess the fairness of this deal, but we do note that Cukurova gets to keep its Yapi Kredi shares for three years without injecting any new capital into the bank (unless Yapi Kredi can quickly sell the ATEL shares supposedly worth $300 million.) This doesn't appear to us to solve the key problem of Yapi Kredi's capital weakness (except on paper, which will no longer show the Cukurova receivable as "non-paying.") PEARSON
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