US embassy cable - 03ANKARA626

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: FOLLOW-UP READOUT ON AK PARTY CHAIRMAN 
ERDOGAN'S VIEWS 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) In Jan. 20 follow-up to Jan. 19 Ambassador-AK leader 
Erdogan meeting, Erdogan foreign policy advisor Bagis told us: 
 
 
--Erdogan understood Ambassador's message that it's up to him 
(Erdogan) to make the case on Iraq to the Turkish public and 
parliament. 
 
 
--One factor holding Erdogan back from more active commitment 
to get parliament and public on board is his skepticism at 
U.S. evidence.  Dec. 10 briefing Erdogan received in 
Washington didn't convince him, given that it lacked hard, 
current information on Iraq's WMD stocks and production 
capacity.  Erdogan is telling his advisors he needs better 
evidence regarding current threat and extent of Saddam's 
stocks and production capacity.  Bagis asked whether the USG 
could provide a more detailed briefing with current 
information. 
 
 
--Erdogan is also disconcerted by what he perceived to be too 
cautious an answer from President Bush at their Dec. 10 White 
House meeting in response to Erdogan's question how the U.S. 
would defend Turkey if attacked by Saddam.  Erdogan asks 
whether the U.S. in position to offer protection, e.g., 
large-scale supplies of gas masks? 
 
 
--As a follow on to Erdogan's complaint that all the U.S. 
talks about is mitigation of operation-related economic 
damages and his desire that we discuss the benefits to Turkey 
from an operation, Bagis asked whether we can be more 
concrete regarding commercial and financial benefits accruing 
to Turkey from a regime change. 
 
 
--Erdogan was dismayed that we had not more forcefully 
disassociated the Embassy/USG from Ambassador's immediate 
predecessor's public remarks in Turkey critical of Turkey's 
delay on Iraq decision-making.  We reiterated that there has 
been some frustration with lack of Turkish decisions but 
noted that the Embassy had issued a statement underscoring 
categorically that the former ambassador does not represent 
the USG, and asked Bagis to relay this to Erdogan.  (Note: we 
have heard similar expressions of concern at these remarks 
from other AK party officials.  End note.) 
 
 
--AK party and government want us to understand that the 
Turkish General Staff is not being as straightforward on Iraq 
as it tells us it is.  "TGS has set a trap for AK, putting 
itself in a win-win situation," he concluded with resignation 
and frustration. 
 
 
2. (C) Bagis doesn't know whether Erdogan will run in repeat 
of general elections in Siirt province.  Bagis has family 
ties in Siirt and considers the people from Siirt to be a 
treacherous lot, still run by the feudal landlords whose only 
criterion is payoffs, which Erdogan isn't willing to indulge 
in.  However, asking all three deputies from Rize to resign 
to arrange by-election there would be awkward for Tayyip, who 
never wants to say no to anyone or cross them.  Bagis 
estimated that if Erdogan does run in Siirt on March 9, it 
will take up to mid-April to become P.M., given built-in 
procedural delays. 
 
 
PEARSON