US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU117

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CINCSOC - FOR POLAD ROBERT FITTS FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL FARGO AND COMSOCPAC 
USASFC FOR MG LAMBERT 
USASOC FOR LTG KESSINGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013 
TAGS: MASS, MCAP, PREL, PTER, NP 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  AN EXTRAORDINARY TRAINING GROUND FOR U.S. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Dear Bob: 
  I was disappointed to learn that Nepal is not included on 
USSOCOM,s High Value Target List.   As I understand it, if 
Nepal is not on this list, it will be difficult for U.S. 
Special Operations Forces to conduct deployments and training 
here.  I hope I can enlist your support to press for adding 
Nepal as a prime potential training ground for U.S. Special 
Forces. 
 
2.  (C)   As you know, Nepal has been combating a violent 
Maoist insurgency over the past seven years.  The insurgents 
seek to topple the legitimate Government of Nepal through 
force and set up an old-style Maoist dictatorship.  The 
conflict has grown increasingly brutal and destructive in the 
past year, as the insurgents have intensified their struggle 
and widened their scope of targets to include public 
infrastructure (schools, roads, power stations), 
transportation, and innocent civilians, including children. 
In many ways, Nepal's Maoists, who espouse the ideology of 
the Sendero Luminoso and the Revolutionary International 
Movement (RIM), provide a textbook example of classic, 
left-wing domestic insurgencies, while demonstrating violent 
tactics on a par with the Khmer Rouge.   Also classic is the 
Maoists' anti-Americanism, which continues to threaten our 
interests and affect the security of our personnel and 
facilities in Nepal.   In November the Maoist leadership 
acknowledged responsibility for the assassinations of two 
local Embassy security guards and issued an implicit warning 
to our diplomatic mission to cease anti-Maoist activities. 
The USG is currently reviewing the possibility of adding the 
Maoists to one of its terrorist lists. 
 
3.  (C)   Obviously, continued instability in Nepal, a 
struggling, impoverished new democracy wedged between two 
huge nuclear powers, could be a recipe for disaster in what 
is already a volatile region.  It is plain to most observers 
that the Government of Nepal will be unable to counter this 
insurgency without significant external assistance.  In 
January 2002 the US Government thus re-oriented its policy 
specifically to support the Government of Nepal in its 
efforts to combat the insurgency through a combination of 
diplomatic efforts, socio-economic aid and security 
assistance, including small arms, force protection equipment, 
NVGs, and training.  The cornerstone of our security 
assistance is a planned Counter-Insurgency center to train a 
Royal Nepal Army (RNA) cadre that will act as a mobile 
training team in Nepal.   These military assistance efforts 
rely heavily on our ability to employ Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), particularly US Army Special Forces.  These 
professionals are uniquely suited to train the RNA,  a 
professional, dedicated and disciplined fighting force that I 
believe will benefit substantially from the instruction 
provided.  In return, our Special Forces would gain 
invaluable experience in rugged, challenging terrain ranging 
from dense jungle to the highest Himalayan Mountains. 
 
4.  (C)  If we continue to exert pressure on the Maoists in 
Nepal, I am confident that it will increase the likelihood of 
a peaceful resolution to this conflict.  USSOCOM forces are 
key in this strategy, and to helping transform the RNA into a 
modern COIN force in the shortest possible time.  I would 
greatly appreciate your support and assistance. 
 
5.  (U)  Best regards, 
Mike 
 
MALINOWSKI