US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL96

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EFIN, TU, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JANUARY 14 EXCHANGES WITH ISTANBUL 
BUSINESS, ACADEMIC AND MEDIA LEADERS 
 
REF: ANKARA 392 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett.  Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: In a series of January 14 discussions, the 
Ambassador reassured prominent Turkish businessmen, 
academics, and journalists that there is no crisis in 
U.S.-Turkish relations.   He outlined in general terms the 
USG-GOT discussions on Iraq, and made the case that the 
status quo in Iraq is detrimental to Turkey's long-term 
interests.  He criticized wildly inflated estimates of damage 
from an Iraq operation that have appeared in the Turkish 
media.   Ultimately, he said, the U.S. will accept whatever 
Turkey decides and plan accordingly, but the window for a 
Northern Flank option is narrowing rapidly.  His 
interlocutors made clear that the Iraq operation, and 
particularly the introduction of U.S. ground troops through 
Turkey, will be a tough sell, but that a UN mandate and 
broader European and Middle East support would aid the 
effort.  All three groups were critical of GOT Iraq policy, 
however, as contradictory, indecisive, and short on vision. 
And despite negative public opinion, all recognized that if a 
conflict is inevitable, Turkey's interests would be best 
served by cooperating with the anti-Iraq coalition.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) In each discussion, Ambassador stressed that despite 
sensationalist press stories, there is no crisis in 
U.S.-Turkish relations.  He expressed confidence that the two 
sides will reach a mutually acceptable arrangement on support 
for a U.S. operation.  Continuance of the status quo is 
clearly not in Turkey's interest, he argued, suggesting that 
there are clear benefits that would flow to Turkey from a 
regime change in its southern neighbor.  He challenged his 
interlocutors to think proactively about Turkey's future 
international role and to take a strategic, long-term 
approach to regional stability.  He also asked for support in 
calming fears about the potential impact on Turkey of an 
operation, noting that estimates of USD 100-140 billion in 
damage are wildly exaggerated.  The U.S., he stressed, is 
committed to providing aid that will effectively address the 
impact an operation might have on Turkey (leading investment 
houses estimate the impact at 4-15 billion USD).  The 
assistance numbers, while large, will not resonate unless 
current exaggerated public fears are addressed, he stressed. 
Ultimately, he said, the U.S. will accept Turkey's decision 
and plan accordingly, but the window for a Northern Flank 
option is narrowing rapidly. 
 
 
3. (C) According to the businessmen, academics, and 
journalists, the task of selling an operation to the Turkish 
public will be difficult: not only are over 80 percent of 
Turks opposed, but the newly-elected Justice and Development 
(AK) Party's base consists of the strongest opposition.  As 
Yeni Safak columnist Cengiz Candar put it, "Given their 
mindset and upbringing, these guys never imagined that they 
might be the ones to invite U.S. troops into the region." 
While no one disputed the Ambassador's characterization of 
the damage estimates on the Turkish economy as "inflated," 
some voiced skepticism about the USG's ability to shepherd a 
package through the Congress (the Ambassador remarked that 
early, whole-hearted Turkish cooperation would help make that 
task easier).  Most were somewhat critical of the AK 
government's recent indecision and mixed messages, pointing 
particularly to State Minister Tuzman's visit to Iraq and the 
failure to begin preparing public opinion for a decision to 
cooperate on Iraq.  Turkish conglomerate head Sakip Sabanci 
questioned the government's difficulty in choosing between 
its "loyal" ally in Washington and Baghdad and expressed 
whole-hearted support for TUSIAD President Ozilhan's January 
13 critique of the government (reftel).  In the end, most 
agreed that assuming a war is inevitable, Turkey will suffer 
economically whether it participates or not.  Personal views 
on Iraq aside (Bilgi University professor Soli Ozel opined 
that "the U.S. has not yet made a case for a just war"), 
Turkey will be best served by cooperating.   The consensus, 
however, was that another UNSCR and wide European and Middle 
East support will be crucial to getting Turkish support, 
although opening bases to U.S. ground troops may still be too 
tall an order for the AK government. 
ARNETT