US embassy cable - 92RANGOON2619

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BURMA'S APRIL 23 "PALACE COUP"

Identifier: 92RANGOON2619
Wikileaks: View 92RANGOON2619 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 1992-05-07 09:20:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PINR BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
P 070920Z MAY 92
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0397
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 02619 
 
 
STATE FOR EAP/TB AND INM/AMB BORG 
CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 
TAGS:  PGOV, PINR, BM 
SUBJECT:  BURMA'S APRIL 23 "PALACE COUP" 
 
REF:  RANGOON 2558 (NOTAL) 
 
1.  SECRET ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  ON MAY 6-7, TWO SOURCES WITH UNUSUALLY GOOD 
ACCESS TO BURMA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP PROVIDED CHARGE 
WITH A TOUR D'HORIZON ON RECENT POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS HERE.  BOTH CONFIRMED OUR INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT OF BURMA'S APRIL 23 "PALACE COUP" WHEREIN 
FORMER HEAD OF STATE AND ARMED FORCES COMMANDER SAW 
MAUNG CEDED PLACE TO GENERAL THAN SHWE WHILE 
INTELLIGENCE KHIN NYUNT REMAINED "DE FACTO PRIME 
MINISTER" AND BEARER OF NE WIN'S EPISODIC POLICY 
SUGGESTIONS (REFTEL).  CONCURRING THAT SAW MAUNG WAS 
GONE FOREVER DESPITE FACESAVING OFFICIAL RHETORIC TO 
THE CONTRARY, THEY NOTED THAT HIS SECURITY 
DETACHMENTS (ABOUT 1300 SOLDIERS IN ALL) HAD BEEN 
TRANSFERRED WITHIN 24 HOURS.  AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER 
HAVE ALSO BEEN DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING BY MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE (DDSI).  ADDITIONALLY, THE DDSI IS 
CLOSELY MONITORING ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF TIN 00 AND 
SEVERAL OTHER SENIOR MILITARY WHO HAD ARGUED FOR 
KEEPING SAW MAUNG IN POWER DURING SEVERAL MID-APRIL 
SLORC STRATEGY SESSIONS. 
 
3.  ONE SOURCE, A LONGTIME NE WIN CONFIDANTE, SAID 
THAT SAW MAUNG'S RETIREMENT, WHILE PRECIPITATED BY A 
SHARP DECLINE IN HIS HEALTH IN EARLY APRIL, HAD 
ACTUALLY BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. 
IMPARTING MESSAGES VIA KHIN NYUNT, NE WIN HAD AT 
LEAST TWICE PUT OUT THE WORD THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE 
AILING SENIOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER STEPPING DOWN. 
COMMENT:  THIS TRACKS WITH EARLIER AARO/RANGOON 
REPORTING AND OTHER EMBASSY INTELLIGENCE.  HOWEVER, 
IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE INITIAL IMPETUS CAME FROM 
NE WIN OR FROM THAN SHWE/KHIN NYUNT WHO HAD EARLIER 
PUSHED SAW MAUNG UNSUCCESSFULLY TO INITIATE SOME 
POLITICAL/ECONOMIC REFORMS.  IN THIS REGARD, OUR 
OTHER SOURCE -- THE ONLY FOREIGNER GENUINELY CLOSE TO 
THE JUNTA -- ALLOWED THAT IT WAS DISTINCTLY POSSIBLE 
THAT KHIN NYUNT HAD PRESENTED NE WIN WITH REASONS FOR 
LEVERING SAW MAUNG OUT OF POWER.  THESE MAY THEN HAVE 
BEEN PLAYED BACK, WITH NE WIN'S IMPRIMATUR, TO THE 
COLLECTIVE SLORC IN MID-APRIL. 
 
4.  ONE INFORMANT NOTED THAT WHILE THE SLORC HAD 
COLLECTIVELY AGREED THAT SAW MAUNG SHOULD STEP DOWN, 
THE FINAL PUSH CAME VIA A FOLLOW-UP LETTER FROM NE 
WIN.  QUOTING SAW MAUNG'S SON AND STAFF AIDE AS HIS 
SOURCES, OUR INTERLOCUTOR SAID THE LETTER HAD BEEN 
HAND DELIVERED BY A "WEEPY" KHIN NYUNT.  REACTING 
ANGRILY -- "NE WIN COULD HAVE TOLD ME PERSONALLY" -- 
SAW MAUNG THEN DESPATCHED HIS SON TO NE WIN'S 
RESIDENCE WITH A RECLAMA, WHICH PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL. 
THEREAFTER, SAW MAUNG WAS UNDER HEAVY SEDATION MIXED 
WITH PULLS FROM THE BOTTLE, AND ALL BUT INERT ON 
APRIL 23. 
 
5.  LOOKING AHEAD, BOTH SOURCES SAID THAT THE NEW 
REGIME'S RECENT POSITIVE STEPS DID NOT PRESAGE A 
WHOLESALE LIBERALIZATION OF BURMA.  THE MILITARY 
MIND-SET THAT PERCEIVES THE ARMY AS "INDISPENSIBLE TO 
A BELEAGUERED, FRAGILE NATION" IS STILL THERE.  THAT 
SAID, THEY EXPECTED AT LEAST HALTING PROGRESS TOWARDS 
A COSMETIC DEMOCRACY AND TRUE ECONOMIC REFORM.  TO 
THESE ENDS, SENIOR REGIONAL COMMANDERS ARE TO BE 
CALLED IN WITHIN A WEEK OR SO TO DISCUSS BANKING 
LIBERALIZATION, CURRENCY RATE READJUSTMENT AND WAYS 
TO BUILD ON THE RECENT GOB CEASE-FIRE VIS-A-VIS THE 
KAREN INSURGENTS. 
 
6.  AS FOR THE STABILITY OF BURMA'S REVISED MILITARY 
LEADERSHIP, NEITHER FORESAW AN/ SPECIFIC IMPENDING 
PROBLEMS.  THAN SHWE, THOUGH NOT PARTICULARLY CLOSE 
TO THE OLDER MEMBERS OF THE SLORC, ENJOYS GENERALLY 
GOOD TIES WITH THE KEY UPCOUNTRY COMMANDERS AND 
ACCEPTABLE WORKING RELATIONS WITH KHIN NYUNT AND 
OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS IN RANGOON.  ALSO, LEST THE 
WATERS BE UNDULY ROILED (AND TO CONCENTRATE HIS OWN 
POWER), THE NEW HEAD OF STATE PLANS FOR NOW TO LEAVE 
THE DEPUTY ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND ARMY CINC 
POSITIONS VACANT.  COMMENT:  WE HAVE ALSO HEARD 
INDICATIONS THAT THAN SHWE HAS ABOLISHED OR WILL SOON 
ABOLISH THESE POSITIONS. 
 
 
HUDDLE 

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