US embassy cable - 03ANKARA418

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF WARNS GOVERNMENT 
 
 
REF: A. 02 ANKARA 8873 
     B. 02 ANKARA 8252 
     C. 02 ANKARA 9051 
     D. 02 ANKARA 7682 
     E. IIR 2 193 0016 03 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. 
Reasons:1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: TGS Chief Ozkok's Jan. 8 prepared statement 
to assembled media reps: 1) reprimanded AK government's 
alleged support for Islamic "reactionaries" and AK's softer 
line on Cyprus; 2) denied that the military opposes AK's 
pursuit of EU membership; and 3) noted that while the 
military will conduct Iraq policies pursuant to a "political 
decision," Turkey "is considering various alternatives" 
(i.e., unilateral "humanitarian" intervention in N. Iraq). 
Party, press, and political observer contacts tell us the 
statement aims to clip AK's wings and signals further 
pressure by the State against the elected government, 
reminiscent of previous military-civilian tensions and 
orchestrated downfall of Islamist-led government in 1997. 
End summary. 
 
 
-------------------- 
A Clear Statement... 
-------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) At the Jan. 8 reception hosted by the Turkish General 
Staff for some 250 media reps, TGS Chief Gen. Ozkok, flanked 
by Deputy Chief Gen. Buyukanit, delivered a prepared speech 
that a broad range of contacts describe as a "harsh and 
blunt" warning to the AK (Justice and Development) Party 
government.  Ozkok's speech is seen as a warning shot calling 
on AK government to cease pursuing policies allegedly at odds 
with the principles of the Kemalist Republic.  Separately, a 
major media mogul and three leading journalists (a prominent 
columnist for "Hurriyet," a senior columnist until recently 
with "Yeni Safak," and a correspondent for "Janes' Defense 
Weekly") who attended told us that Ozkok asserted: 
 
 
-- Prime Minister Gul is encouraging Islamic fundamentalism 
by voicing reservations about the recent Supreme Military 
Council (YAS) decision to expel alleged "reactionaries" from 
the ranks.  Moreover, the Army "will not tolerate" the 
wearing of the (Islamic) headscarf "as a political symbol 
against the basic principles of the Republic"; 
 
 
-- Cyprus is very important to Turkish security, and a 
solution to Cyprus that does not meet Turkey's security 
interests will confine Turkey to Anatolia and obstruct its 
links to the world (Note: as reported in ref C, AK views 
"TRNC" leader Denktas, who has strong ties to the Ankara 
Establishment, as an obstacle to reform and is trying to 
undermine him politically.  End note); 
 
 
-- the Army is not against Turkey's EU entry bid, but does 
not want to sacrifice "Turkish honor" in the process; 
 
 
-- while the military will conduct Iraq policies pursuant to 
a "political decision," Turkey "is considering various 
alternatives" should war become unavoidable. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
...And Clear "Warning" to AK 
---------------------------- 
 
 
3. (C) Using the same words as our journalist contacts, and 
drawing attention to the same aspects of Ozkok's speech, some 
Jan. 9 headlines in the mainstream press described the affair 
as being "like a memorandum" ("Muhtira Gibi") -- precisely to 
suggest a parallel between Ozkok's remarks and the 1971 "Coup 
by Memorandum" ("Muhtira") against then-P.M. Demirel.  Our 
journalist and political contacts tell us that Ozkok's 
statement is widely understood as a warning to AK and a 
veiled threat of further pressure against the government 
should it continue to pursue policies at odds with the status 
quo.  According to a senior journalist in attendance, Ozkok 
was setting down a marker, telling the AK Government that the 
TGS is calling the shots on the major political and security 
issues.  The owner-CEO of a major media conglomerate 
characterized the warning as the strongest since the 
military's "February 28 Process" in 1997 that ousted the 
Islamist Erbakan Government.  He opined that Ozkok is facing 
strong pressure from his colleagues and subordinates and was 
essentially forced to speak out publicly -- "while the rest 
of the officer corps watched and listened." 
4. (C) In its role as standard-bearer for the Establishment, 
opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) is telling us 
privately of its "severe discomfort" at AK's moves to accord 
official respect for the headscarf.  Senior CHP M.P. Bulent 
Tanla asserted to Jan. 9 that Ozkok is thus "perfectly within 
his rights" to express his disapproval, adding that "this is 
bad for P.M. Gul." 
 
 
5. (C) Meanwhile, some of our general-officer contacts aver 
that the military is not trying to bring AK down, but merely 
wants the civilian government to shoulder the responsibility 
to make national security decisions.  They assert that the 
Jan. 13 decision to allow resumption of mil-mil discussions 
of Iraq-related activities reflects a move to a commonality 
of view between the military and government.  According to 
press reporting on the "surprise" Gul-Ozkok meeting Jan. 13, 
the government and the military "are in full agreement on the 
need for a 'warless' solution in Iraq" -- a report which 
seems to contradict earlier assertions by TGS Deputy Chief 
Buyukanit that the military leadership was irritated at AK 
for dragging its feet on Iraq.  As reported in Ref E, while 
many officers are indeed eager to side with the USG, other 
more senior figures are content with the delay. 
 
 
6. (C) Privately, AK tells a different story, one more along 
the lines offered to us by contacts across the political 
spectrum.  Jan. 9, party Vice Chairman for political and 
legal affairs Firat charged that the military is trying to 
force AK into decisions that will leave the party exposed to 
the ire of the voters if it supports an operation against 
Saddam -- but that AK does not want to wear the jacket for 
the generals.  Jan. 14, Firat returned to the theme, 
declaring to us that the military and its bureaucratic allies 
are using Iraq and Cyprus to: 1) warn the AK Party/Government 
to toe the line; and thus 2) to reassert the superiority of 
the State over elected civilians.  Referring to public 
allegations that the Gul Government is "indecisive" on 
pressing security issues, Firat asked rhetorically whether 
the Embassy really believes that "military decisions in 
Turkey are made by the civilians?" 
 
 
7. (C) Our journalist contacts offered a similar view: the 
TGS wants the government to make a political decision along 
the lines essentially to be dictated by the TGS.  Regarding 
Iraq, they also characterize Turkish military activity on 
both sides of the Turkey-Iraq border as a signal that the TGS 
refuses to be limited to what the government, the Kurds, or 
the USG wants regarding policy matters traditionally 
dominated by the TGS. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
8. (C) Ten days before the national election last Nov. 3, the 
Court of Appeals Prosecutor's Office filed a case to close 
down AK in what Turkish observers say was, in part, a 
last-minute attempt by the State to undercut the party at the 
ballot box.  If past practice is any guide (ref B and 
previous), Ozkok's charge that Gul is "encouraging" Islamic 
reactionaries will eventually be featured as evidence against 
the Party.  Although Ozkok implied that Gul acted illegally, 
the P.M. in fact operated within his formal purview by 
registering his objections to the military's expulsion 
policy.  Nevertheless, whether or not Kemalist strictures 
are, in fact, "legal" has not traditionally prevented them 
from being used against elected civilians. 
PEARSON