US embassy cable - 03AMMAN150

S E C R E T AMMAN 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2013 
TAGS: SNAR, PTER, KCRM, PREL, JO, NL 
SUBJECT: MULLAH KREKAR EXTRADITION: JORDANIANS THINK THE 
DUTCH ARE ASKING FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE 
 
REF: (A) THE HAGUE 27 (B) 12/30-12/31 BERRY-RUSSEL 
     E-MAILS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (S) Post shares Embassy The Hague's frustration with the 
current state of play of the Mullah Krekar extradition case. 
To have Krekar walk free would be an outcome that would serve 
no one's interests and would send the wrong signal to all 
those working tirelessly in the fight against terrorism 
around the world.  In the last week, the Ambassador has 
talked with the Foreign Minister about the case, the DCM with 
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and other 
appropriate officers with GOJ counterparts. 
 
2. (S/NF) Based on those multiple discussions and many 
previous contacts over the past several weeks, we have a 
different perspective from that in reftel on where the 
problem lies and what needs to be done to address it.  The 
bottom line is that GOJ -- and the GID in particular -- has 
little confidence that anything they can provide the GONL 
will be sufficient to satisfy Dutch legal requirements.  Both 
the Dutch reaction to the Jordanians' original efforts to get 
Krekar extradited on assassination charges, and the recent 
outcome of the Courtallier case (ref b) have solidified their 
thinking on this.  Moreover, there is a real cost to the 
Jordanians in providing detailed intelligence information 
which will become public in a court hearing. 
 
3. (S/NF) In the first instance, the Dutch refused to 
consider a Jordanian extradition request based on a valid 
Interpol arrest warrant because the charge in question was 
attempted assassination -- a crime which we understand the 
Dutch system does not recognize as a basis for extradition. 
Then, with the Courtallier case, the Dutch court ruled that 
information gathered through intelligence channels does not 
constitute a suitable basis for extradition.  As the Krekar 
case is -- like Courtallier -- based on intel, the GID sees 
the writing on the wall and believes that there is little to 
be gained by providing the Dutch with yet more information 
that once in the public domain would jeopardize sources and 
methods.  The end result, they believe, will be the same -- a 
Dutch court will refuse to extradite Krekar. 
 
4. (S) In our view the current dilemma springs not from some 
sort of uncharacteristic recalcitrance on the Jordanians' 
part (although we agree that they could have been much more 
transparent in presenting their concerns to us at an earlier 
stage of the process), but rather with the standards of 
evidence required by Dutch courts.  The Jordanians 
conscientiously have taken steps to address Dutch concerns 
(providing written assurances that Krekar would only be tried 
on the drug trafficking charges and, if convicted, would not 
face the death penalty).  They tell us they have provided the 
evidence available to them short of compromising sources and 
methods.  However, neither our Jordanian counterparts nor we 
can see how they can meet Dutch requirements in a case 
clearly based on sensitive intelligence information. 
 
5. (S)  As we are not familiar with Dutch law we can not 
offer suggestions as to whether there are unexplored avenues 
to deal with the case in Dutch courts.  We would welcome 
Embassy Oslo's comments on the likely outcome if Krekar is 
expelled from the Netherlands to Norway, as presently seems 
likely.  Recommendations from the Department on legal aspects 
of the case would also be most welcome. 
 
6. (C) Note: For the record, we note that the Dutch are 
mistaken if they believe a Jordanian security court has 
overridden the civilian courts on the matter of Ra'ed 
Hijazi's appeal of his death sentence (ref A).  The issue 
will ultimately be decided by the Court of Cassation, not by 
the Security Court. 
GNEHM