US embassy cable - 03RANGOON29

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2013 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON WWII REMAINS RECOVERY IN BURMA 
 
Classified By: CHIEF OF MISSION CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5 (D) 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The recovery of the remains of some 600 
WWII missing personnel (mostly crews of aircraft that crashed 
while flying "the hump" from India to China) is an important 
USG priority in Burma.  With fairly good cooperation from the 
Government of Burma, the recovery operation is moving ahead 
more or less on schedule.  The limited availability of 
helicopters this dry season is a major obstacle and has 
probably reduced significantly the operation's chances of 
dramatic success in the initial phases.  There are many 
policy and public diplomacy minefields that Post will try to 
help the operation avoid while working in this sensitive 
area.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) PROGRESS TO DATE:  Following the September 2002 
framework agreement reached between visiting DASD Jennings 
and S1 General Khin Nyunt, three Burmese officials traveled 
to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii 
(CILHI) for a familiarization visit.  A well-attended Joint 
Planning Meeting held in Rangoon in October ironed out many 
technical details of the operation.  The U.S. side included 
CILHI, DoD's Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office 
(DPMO), and Embassy Rangoon -- both State and DAO.  A health 
and logistics advance team visited Burma in December to 
establish medevac and other logistical procedures.  The team 
to scout out potential recovery sites, the Investigative 
Element (IE), is scheduled to arrive in Rangoon January 12. 
 
3.  (SBU) THE IMPORTANCE OF HELICOPTERS:  Most of the 
probable crash sites are located in Kachin State in the far 
north of Burma.  Dense jungles, high mountains (up to 19,000 
ft.), and poor roads make travel by land difficult. 
Poisonous snakes, bandits, drug traffickers, thousands of 
armed members of the Kachin Independence Army, and rugged 
terrain make off-road travel in this area difficult. 
Helicopter medevac capability would be important for any 
sustained trek to a crash site by a recovery team.  Normally 
both the scouting team, the IE, and the actual recovery team 
(the Recovery Element, RE) would use helicopters extensively. 
 
 
4.  (C) THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS:  The Burmese air force has a 
fleet of Soviet-era helicopters and a small number of 
helicopters given by the USG to the GOB two decades ago for 
drug eradication purposes.  Given maintenance and repair 
practices, the reliability of these aircraft is unknown. 
Further, during the October technical talks the Burmese air 
force's opening rental price was $16,000 per blade hour, 
which they quickly dropped to $8,000/hr. after the loud, 
unison guffaw from the U.S. side.  This is still two to three 
times the going commercial rate.  Rather than be fleeced to 
rent helicopters of uncertain reliability, the COM and DATT 
strongly recommended that commercial helicopters be used to 
augment GOB helicopters in the recovery efforts. 
Unfortunately, it appears that the DoD-certified helicopter 
lease companies in the region are booked up until mid to late 
February.  This means the January IE will be restricted to 
land transport. 
 
5.  (C) LIMITATIONS OF A LAND-BASED IE:  Locating and 
excavating promising recovery sites is no mean feat. 
Normally an IE would helicopter to a potential site 
identified by a combination of aerial reconnaissance and 
local human information.  If the site looked promising to the 
IE after its helicopter-borne visit, a landing zone would be 
cut and larger helicopters would ferry in the RE to work the 
site.  If the January IE were restricted to Kachin State's 
road network, a general impression of the topography of the 
possible crash site would be about all an IE could glean in 
the field.  The IE also will interview inhabitants who claim 
to know of crash sites.  It seems likely that CILHI will need 
to conduct further investigations in late February just prior 
to the beginning of the recovery effort when commercial 
helicopters are available.  This compressed and restricted 
scouting phase will make it more difficult, but not 
impossible, to achieve a major recovery success this year. 
 
6.  (C) POLITICS, SENSITIVITIES, AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:  Post 
is keenly aware of the sensitivities of working (on any 
issue) in Burma.  The remains recovery operation in Kachin 
State is a particularly complex, sensitive, and difficult 
case. 
 
--  The 1.2 million Kachin have a particular affinity for 
Americans; over 10,000 fought alongside U.S. troops in WWII 
and U.S. Baptist missionaries have converted many Kachin to 
Christianity.  A long-running Kachin separatist movement, 
spearheaded by the 20,000-strong Kachin Independence Army, 
has signed a cease-fire with Rangoon's military government 
but retains its weapons and controls much of Kachin State. 
As one observer bluntly put it, "Kachins like Americans but 
distrust (ethnic) Burmese."  The investigative and recovery 
teams will likely pass back and forth between territory 
controlled by Burmese soldiers and armed KIA members. 
Interviewing Kachins who claim knowledge of crash sites in 
front of ethnic Burmese members of Military Intelligence also 
poses some challenges. 
 
-- While S1 General Khin Nyunt, who heads Burma's military 
intelligence, is the point man for the GOB on the recovery 
efforts, it will be the regional military commander in Kachin 
State (who doesn't report to Khin Nyunt) who controls the 
military resources on the ground.  Just as there appeared to 
be a different approach on helicopter rental between MI and 
the Burmese air force, we could possibly see independent 
action in Kachin State not in keeping with the outline agreed 
to with MI.  However, the DATT held coordination discussions 
27 DEC 02 with military commander Maung Aye and S1 Khin Nyunt 
to help head off any such difficulties. 
 
-- Post personnel are aware of standard procedures routinely 
employed by MI in Burma.  For example, MI apparently 
attempted to dragoon an English-speaking local to translate 
for the December logistics visit.  A member of the DAO took 
note, and asked that the man be released from his translating 
duties, which he was.  This same officer saw MI brusquely 
interrogating a Kachin interlocutor just after his discussion 
with the American.  The officer approached his MI minders and 
told them to stop harassing the man, which they did.  Post, 
DPMO, and CILHI have discussed in detail with the GOB the 
serious negative ramifications of any forced labor or forced 
contributions being used to support this project.  The main 
concern is that some local Burmese commander might not get 
the word from on high. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  We are optimistic that the remains recovery 
effort will be successful.  It is important that the Embassy 
- State and DAO - play an active leading role in the 
operation to help avoid potential local pitfalls.   Perhaps 
the most promising sites (some of which are extremely remote) 
can only be investigated and excavated next dry season, after 
thorough analysis of local knowledge and a 
helicopter-assisted IE.  Nevertheless, the recovery of even a 
few remains this year is important, both in itself and to 
establish procedures for an ongoing recovery effort.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez