US embassy cable - 02ABUJA3381

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 003381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR IO, AF/RA AND AF/C 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2012 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, KPAO, NI, UNHRC-1 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UN CHR-59 COUNTRY PROFILE 
 
 
REF: STATE 252917 
 
 
 Classified by CDA: ANDREWS: Reason: 1.5(d) 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
 
1. (C) Nigeria's interests in the Human Rights Commission are 
conflicting.  Nigeria wants to maintain a position of 
leadership among the developing nations.  It is very 
sensitive to the G-77 views and most especially those of the 
Africa Group.  In this vein, another Nigerian tradition has 
been to oppose country-specific resolutions on human rights. 
Given expected flaws in the conduct of the 2003 elections, 
the negative attention caused by Sharia and the lack of 
accountability for the killings at Odi and Zaki Biam, Nigeria 
will be very hesitant to support strong country-specific 
resolutions out of fear that it also might someday be a 
target of such a resolution.  While Nigeria's adherence to 
these positions is usually very strong, it is not completely 
unshakeable.  Nigeria realizes that the level of Western 
donor support for NePAD hinges on good governance and human 
rights. 
 
 
2. (C) NePAD notwithstanding, Nigerian diplomacy will tend to 
hew its traditional line.  A change in course on a major 
issue would require a decision by President Obasanjo.  While 
some issues might be worked through the Foreign Ministry, 
Foreign Minister Sule Lamido and his pugnacious Number Two, 
Minister of State Dubem Onyia, are less flexible than the 
Presidency regarding GON adherence to G-77 and African 
solidarity.  On matters that Nigeria believes it can vote 
with us but not risk its leadership position in Africa, it 
may exercise greater flexibility and USG intervention could 
possibly be persuasive in pushing Nigeria to abstain on a 
vote it ordinarily would not have supported.  However, on 
hot-button issues such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria is unlikely to 
deviate from the Africa/G-77 norm, no matter how hard we 
push.  The Nigerian line on Cuba will be that Cuba, like the 
U.S., is a "friendly" country with which Nigeria has long 
enjoyed good relations.  In fact, a strong USG push on some 
issues, particularly Zimb 
abwe, could be counterproductive, encouraging Nigeria to 
engage actively in opposition to the U.S. in order to 
demonstrate its "independence" from "Western interference." 
 
 
RESPONSES 
--------- 
 
 
3. (C) The answers to questions in para four of reftel 
follow: 
 
 
a) The Nigerian representatives in Geneva make most decisions 
based on prior voting record and general instructions. 
Changes on relatively minor issues could be decided by the 
MFA.  Any change on a major topic would be the result of a 
Presidential decision. 
 
 
b) Name and contact information: 
 
 
Mr. Ad'Obe Obe 
The President's Special Assistant for International Affairs 
White House, Abuja 
243-9-314-0285 
 
 
c) Nigeria will not want Sharia criminal punishments in 
Nigeria nor the Odi and Zaki Biam massacres to be raised. 
Nigeria will likely oppose a strong resolution against 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
d) Our USAID program and our military assistance programs are 
among the largest in Africa.  However, they offer little 
leverage on the GON in the UNHCR. On issues of cardinal 
importance, direct discussion between POTUS or Secretary 
Powell and President Obasanjo would provide the most 
effective chance to influence the Nigerian position. 
 
 
e) With the cancellation of the POTUS visit, our major 
opportunity for lobbying has been removed.  Given that the 
GON will be increasingly preoccupied with the 2003 elections 
during the first quarter of the year, there will be very few 
other significant lobbying opportunities. 
 
 
f) As no important changes in traditional voting will occur 
without the President's direct authority, public diplomacy 
outreach within Nigeria is likely to have little effect. 
Quite the contrary, in certain cases (such as Zimbabwe), it 
would likely be counterproductive. 
ANDREWS 
ANDREWS