US embassy cable - 02HANOI3099

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ASSESSING NONG DUC MANH'S LEADERSHIP

Identifier: 02HANOI3099
Wikileaks: View 02HANOI3099 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Hanoi
Created: 2002-12-31 02:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR PREL VM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

310206Z Dec 02

                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7109

PAGE 01        HANOI  03099  01 OF 03  310253Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    CIAE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    EB-00    
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   DCP-01   
      NSAE-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /003W
                  ------------------1E6C8C  310253Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8497
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 003099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
SECDEF FOR ISA/ACHUA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/13 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, VM 
SUBJECT: ASSESSING NONG DUC MANH'S LEADERSHIP 
 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, 
REASON: 1.5 (D) 
 
2. (C)  SUMMARY.  NONG DUC MANH IS PERHAPS THE MOST 
TELEGENIC VIETNAMESE LEADER SINCE HO CHI MINH.  DESPITE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  03099  01 OF 03  310253Z 
CONSTANT MEDIA EXPOSURE, LITTLE IS KNOWN OF HIS 
PERSONAL VALUES OR ALLIES.  WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF HIM 
AS A POLITICAL REFORMER ARE LIKELY OFF THE MARK, AS 
MANH MORE PROBABLY SHARES THE CONVICTIONS OF HIS PEERS 
ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE CPV TO RETAIN EXCLUSIVE 
POLITICAL POWER AND TO MOVE DECISIVELY TO COUNTER-ACT 
WOULD-BE CHALLENGES TO "NATIONAL SOLIDARITY."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
PUBLIC PERSONA 
-------------- 
 
3.  (C)  SINCE HIS ELECTION AS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV) AT THE NINTH PARTY 
CONGRESS IN APRIL 2001, NONG DUC MANH HAS RARELY BEEN 
OUT OF THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT.  AS DE JURE LEADER OF THE 
ALMOST 3-MILLION MEMBER CPV AND AS DE FACTO PARAMOUNT 
LEADER (OF SORTS) OF THE NATION, MANH'S PRESENCE IS 
UBIQUITOUS.  RARELY DOES A DAY GO BY WITHOUT A PHOTO OF 
HIM ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE CPV'S "NHAN DAN" NEWSPAPER 
OR WITHOUT COVERAGE OF HIM RECEIVING SOME HONORED GUEST 
OR EXHORTING SOME CADRES ON NATIONAL NEWS.  WHETHER DUE 
TO A SUNNY DISPOSITION OR A CAREFULLY CALCULATED SENSE 
OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, MANH IS THAT RARE VIETNAMESE WHO 
TURNS ON A SMILE FOR A CAMERA.  MOST OTHER VIETNAMESE 
IN AND OUT OF LEADERSHIP RANKS SEEM TO FEEL OBLIGED TO 
ADOPT A DIGNIFIED, SOLEMN DEMEANOR IN THE PRESENCE OF A 
PHOTOGRAPHER.  HO CHI MINH WAS PROBABLY THE LAST 
VIETNAMESE LEADER WHO WAS ROUTINELY SHOWN IN A BENIGN 
AND EVEN HAPPY LIGHT IN THE OFFICIAL MEDIA. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  03099  01 OF 03  310253Z 
4.  (C)  FOR ALL HIS PUBLIC PERSONA, HONED AS WELL 
DURING ALMOST TEN YEARS AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN, 
MANH THE MAN REMAINS A MYSTERY TO VIRTUALLY ALL FOREIGN 
OBSERVERS, AND LIKELY TO MOST VIETNAMESE AS WELL. 
UNLIKE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY COUNTERPARTS, HE DOES 
NOT ROUTINELY MEET WITH FOREIGN DIGNITARIES VISITING 
HANOI, UNLESS THEY ARE FRATERNAL PARTY DIGNITARIES IN 
THEIR OWN RIGHT.  (HE DID, HOWEVER, RECEIVE SECRETARY 
POWELL DURING THE JULY 2001 ASEAN MEETINGS.)  HIS 
FOREIGN TRIPS AS GENERAL SECRETARY HAVE ALSO BEEN 
CONSPICUOUSLY FEW: IN 2002, HE MADE ONLY TWO OVERSEAS 
TRIPS, TO JAPAN AND TO RUSSIA AND BELARUS, BOTH WITHIN 
THE SPACE OF A MONTH.  HIS ONLY KNOWN VISIT TO THE U.S. 
WAS AS NA CHAIRMAN IN 2000.  AMBASSADOR HAS NOT MET 
WITH MANH SINCE ARRIVAL AT POST IN DECEMBER 2001, 
DESPITE A STANDING REQUEST DATING BACK FROM THE TIME OF 
PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS IN FEBRUARY 2002.  INDEED, 
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CHINESE AND RUSSIAN 
AMBASSADORS, WHO ESCORTED HIGH LEVEL VISITORS FROM 
THEIR CAPITALS TO CALL ON MANH, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY 
OTHER AMBASSADORS WHO HAVE MET HIM IN VIETNAM.  THE 
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR MET MANH ONLY DURING MANH'S VISIT 
TO TOKYO EARLIER THIS YEAR. 
 
5.  (C)  JUDGING FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS, MANH MAINTAINS A 
VIGOROUS IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL SCHEDULE, ESPECIALLY 
TARGETING VIETNAM'S POORER PROVINCES AND MOUNTAINOUS 
AREAS DOMINATED BY ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS, LIKE HIS OWN 
HOME PROVINCE OF BAC KAN.  ACCORDING TO BAC KAN 
OFFICIALS, MANH RETURNS TO HIS HOMETOWN AT LEAST ONCE A 
YEAR, AND IS SAID TO BE A CONVIVIAL IMBIBER OF THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  03099  01 OF 03  310253Z 
LOCAL POTENT LIQUOR.  THERE ARE REPORTS THAT HIS WIFE 
REMAINS IN BAC KAN. 
 
WHAT DOES HE STAND FOR? 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  FOR ALL HIS MEDIA EXPOSURE, MANH'S OWN 
POLITICAL CREDO OR INCLINATION TO SHAPE IDEOLOGY ARE 
DIFFICULT TO DISCERN.  THE CPV UNDER HIS WATCH HAS MADE 
A PUSH FOR STRENGTHENING "GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY" AND 
FOR REINFORCING POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION AT 
ALL LEVELS OF SCHOOLING.  THESE APPEAR TO BE 
COMPLEMENTARY EXERCISES NEITHER IN EXPANDING PUBLIC 
PLURALISM NOR IN RETURNING TO MARXIST ROOTS, BUT RATHER 
IN REASSERTING A STRONGER CPV ROLE AT A TIME OF 
DRAMATIC DOMESTIC CHANGE. 
 
7.  (C)  MANH WON KUDOS FROM MANY INTERNATIONAL 
OBSERVERS FOR HIS APPARENT EFFORTS TO WAKE UP THE OFTEN 
MORIBUND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE THERE, 
INCLUDING SUCH INNOVATIONS AS TELEVISION COVERAGE AND 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7110 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  03099  02 OF 03  310253Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    CIAE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   DCP-01 
      NSAE-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------1E6C94  310253Z /38 
R 310206Z DEC 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8498 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HANOI 003099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
SECDEF FOR ISA/ACHUA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/13 
SUBJ: ASSESSING NONG DUC MANH'S LEADERSHIP 
 
FORMAL Q&A SESSIONS BETWEEN AT LEAST A SELECTED NUMBER 
OF MINISTERS AND NA DELEGATES.  SOME FOREIGN ACADEMICS 
DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT MANH WAS AT HEART A POLITICAL 
REFORMER, AND, POSSIBLY, A CLOSET LIBERAL.  SUCH AN 
INTERPRETATION DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  03099  02 OF 03  310253Z 
SUBSEQUENTLY.  THE CPV UNDER MANH (AS BEFORE) HAS 
ORCHESTRATED PLENUMS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE EACH OF THE 
PLENARY NA SESSIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF, AND 
COMMENTED PUBLICLY AND SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT THE NA 
SHOULD TRY AND SHOULD NOT TRY TO ACCOMPLISH DURING 
THOSE SESSIONS.  AS SUCH, MANH HAS AT LEAST INDIRECTLY 
UNDERCUT THE GROWING PUBLIC LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY 
THE NA HAD BEGUN TO ACHIEVE. 
 
8.  (C)  FURTHER, UNDER MANH'S LEADERSHIP, THE GVN AND 
CPV HAVE MOVED AGGRESSIVELY AGAINST SOME PERCEIVED 
THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL UNITY, 
INCLUDING FATHER NGUYEN VAN LY, NEW AND OFTEN YOUNG 
"CYBER-DISSIDENTS," AND WOULD-BE MONTAGNARD ACTIVISTS. 
THESE ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS GO AGAINST THE BROADER 
TREND OF GROWING PERSONAL FREEDOMS WITHIN VIETNAM THAT 
HAVE EMERGED OVER THE PAST DECADE.  THERE ARE NO REAL 
INDICATIONS OF ANY IMMINENT PERIOD OF POLITICAL 
LIBERALIZATION OR GREATER EASE ABOUT ACCEPTING PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE CRITICISM OF THE PARTY AND COMMUNIST SYSTEM 
SYSTEM UNDER MANH'S RULE.  TWO MORE PROMINENT ACTIVISTS 
WERE DETAINED SHORTLY AFTER CHRISTMAS. 
 
9.  (C)  MANH HAS ACKNOWLEDGED OFTEN AND FORCEFULLY THE 
NEED FOR THE CPV TO CLEAN UP ITS OWN ACT AND MOVE 
QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY AGAINST CORRUPTION IN ITS MIDST. 
THE UPCOMING "NAM CAM" MAFIA CASE IS APT TO BE THE 
SHOWCASE EFFORT IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH MOST OF ITS 
OFFICIAL VICTIMS HELD GVN -- RATHER THAN CPV -- POSTS. 
THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION ON DECEMBER 19 
FORMALLY CRITICIZED THE MEDIA (IN PARTICULAR TUOI TRE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  03099  02 OF 03  310253Z 
"YOUTH" AND GIA DINH VA XA HOI "FAMILY AND SOCIETY") 
FOR REPORTING "IRRESPONSIBLY" AND "INACCURATELY" THAT 
SENIOR OFFICIALS EVEN ABOVE THE DEPUTY MINISTER-LEVEL 
WOULD BE IMPLICATED IN THIS CASE. 
 
POLITICAL ALLIES? 
----------------- 
 
10.  (C)  UNFORTUNATELY, EMBASSY HAS NO INSIGHT INTO 
THE ALLIANCES WITHIN THE CPV LEADERSHIP MANH HAS 
FORGED, OR INTO THE DYNAMICS OF DECISION-MAKING AT THAT 
LEVEL.  HIS TECHNOCRATIC BACKGROUND AND STUDIES 
OVERSEAS LEFT HIM PRETTY MUCH OUT OF THE 
MILITARY/PUBLIC SECURITY LOOP, AND OUR ASSUMPTION IS 
THAT THESE LINKS ARE NOT HIS MAJOR STRENGTHS, DESPITE 
HIS CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CPV'S MILITARY COMMISSION.  NOR 
ARE THERE OBVIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH THE ONCE ALL- 
POWERFUL PROPAGANDA AND IDEOLOGICAL ORGANS OF THE CPV; 
WE DO NOT EXPECT SCHOOLCHILDREN TO START READING NONG 
DUC MANH'S COLLECTED WORKS, OR TO SEE ANY MANH-PRODUCED 
VERSION OF JIANG ZEMIN'S "THREE REPRESENTS" ENTER THE 
THE CPV PANTHEON ANY TIME SOON.  THE ORGANIZATIONAL/ 
PERSONNEL WING OF THE CPV APPARENTLY REMAINS UNDER THE 
DOMINATION OF NA CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN AN, WHO MANY 
ASSUME MAY STILL BE A REAL OR POTENTIAL RIVAL AFTER 
HAVING LOST THE GENERAL SECRETARY SWEEPSTAKES TO MANH 
AT THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS. 
 
GOING OUT ON A LIMB 
------------------- 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  03099  02 OF 03  310253Z 
11.  (C) WAS MANH'S ELEVATION TO THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP 
SLOT MERELY A MATTER OF NICE GUYS -- OR AT LEAST 
SOMEONE WITHOUT ANY KNOWN CORRUPT TINGES IN HIS FAMILY 
TREE -- FINISHING FIRST?  WAS IT DYNASTIC DEFERENCE TO 
HIS ALLEGED DESCENT FROM HO CHI MINH?  IS HE AN 
UNLIKELY PUPPET OF FORMER "SENIOR ADVISER" DU MUOI OR 
PENULTIMATE CPV LEADER LE KHA PHIEU (BOTH OF WHOM WERE 
DUTIFULLY TROTTED OUT AT THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE 
LATEST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSIONS IN ANOTHER GESTURE OF 
SOLIDARITY)?  OR IS HE JUST THAT LOWEST COMMON 
DENOMINATOR CANDIDATE WHO COULD BE COUNTED ON NOT TO 
ROCK THE SHIP OF STATE AT A DELICATE HISTORICAL 
JUNCTION? 
 
12.  (C)  WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE 
QUESTIONS; NOR, WE SUSPECT, DOES VIRTUALLY ANYONE IN 
VIETNAM TODAY.  WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE 
IS A LOT MORE TO MANH THAN MEETS THE EYE, BUT THAT HE 
NEEDS TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY GIVEN A POLITBURO AND 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PROBABLY NOT OF HIS OWN DESIGN OR 
SHAPING.  AT THE END OF THE DAY, MANH LIKELY SHARES THE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ7111 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  03099  03 OF 03  310253Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    CIAE-00  DOTE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    EB-00 
      FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   DCP-01 
      NSAE-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /003W 
                  ------------------1E6C96  310253Z /38 
R 310206Z DEC 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8499 
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
SECDEF WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HANOI 003099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
SECDEF FOR ISA/ACHUA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/13 
SUBJ: ASSESSING NONG DUC MANH'S LEADERSHIP 
 
CONVICTION OF HIS PEERS THAT THE CPV MUST BE VIGILANT 
IN RETAINING ITS EXCLUSIVE HOLD ON POLITICAL POWER AS 
WELL AS ITS FINAL SAY ON THE ECONOMY.  THE CPV UNDER 
MANH IS UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT NEW BOUNDARIES FOR PUBLIC 
DISSENT OR TURN A BLIND EYE TO PERCEIVED CHALLENGES TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  03099  03 OF 03  310253Z 
NATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND UNITY. 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 

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