US embassy cable - 02ANKARA9183

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 009183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH PARLIAMENT RE-ENACTS VETOED CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS; ALL EYES ON PRESIDENT SEZER 
 
REF: ANKARA 9073 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John W. Kunstadter; 
reasons: 1.5 (b,d) 
 
 
1. (U) Turkish Parliament Dec. 27 re-enacted without changes 
a package of constitutional amendments designed to pave the 
way for Justice and Development (AK) Party leader Erdogan to 
regain his political rights, run for parliament, and thus 
become Prime Minister (reftel).  The package -- approved by 
parliament Dec. 13 but vetoed by President Sezer -- passed 
strongly with 437 votes in the 550-seat parliament, including 
fairly broad support from opposition Republican People's 
Party (CHP).  Forty-four deputies, mostly CHP, opposed; one 
abstained. 
 
 
2. (C) Sezer is obliged to sign the re-enacted package, but 
has the authority to call for a national referendum or send 
the package to the Constitutional Court for a judgment.  A 
move in either direction would suspend application of the 
amendments, thereby leaving Erdogan in limbo and thus 
ineligible to run in a Feb. 9 by-election.  Opinion makers 
are divided as to whether Sezer will call for a referendum, 
but most think such a move would be risky for Sezer's image 
since it is very likely the referendum would pass. 
 
 
3. (C) That said, Sezer, who as a lifelong civil servant and 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has exhibited no 
patience for or understanding of the vagaries of party 
politics, defended his earlier veto on the grounds that the 
constitution cannot be amended "for the benefit of one 
person". 
 
 
4. (C) This is an exceedingly narrow judgment but one 
consistent with Sezer's and fellow Establishment elements' 
considerable distaste for Erdogan and AK.  Many of our 
contacts across the spectrum see these elements (e.g., among 
ranking military officers, most of the bureaucracy, the 
judiciary, the educational establishment, and segments of Big 
Business) aiming to keep Erdogan and AK twisting in the wind 
by preventing Erdogan's smooth return to the elected 
political stage and by promoting friction between a sidelined 
Erdogan and P.M. Gul.  Our contacts note that, beyond a 
referendum, the State has other instruments -- including the 
continuing closure case against AK and corruption trials 
involving alleged misdeeds by Erdogan as Mayor of Istanbul -- 
to keep him, his party and the AK government off balance. 
PEARSON