US embassy cable - 02KUWAIT5528

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GCC PREPARES FOR HOSTILITIES

Identifier: 02KUWAIT5528
Wikileaks: View 02KUWAIT5528 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2002-12-26 12:49:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL IZ KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T KUWAIT 005528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2012 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: GCC PREPARES FOR HOSTILITIES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Minstate for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed al-Sabah gave the Ambassador a readout on this 
week,s GCC Summit during a December 25th meeting.   While 
billed as an opportunity to discuss internal GCC issues, 
including the conclusion of a much-publicized customs 
agreement, Dr. Mohammed said discussion at the conference 
focused on Iraq, and that all participants were in agreement 
that the Iraqi regime was &very dangerous,8 would not last, 
and that military conflict in the near future was inevitable. 
 In addition to concluding a unanimous resolution condemning 
Saddam,s December 7 speech, the participants also agreed to 
hold two &secret8 meetings within the next two weeks:  one 
to discuss the coordination of security efforts among member 
states and another to discuss GCC involvement in a 
post-Saddam Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
GCC on Iraq 
 
2. (S) According to Dr. Mohammed, Saddam Hussein,s December 
speech had galvanized opposition to Saddam amongst the ranks 
of GCC member states, and there was a realization among the 
GCC that the speech should be denounced.  To this end, he 
said, the participants in the summit allowed the Kuwaiti 
delegation to draft a resolution denouncing Saddam,s speech, 
which was adopted without &a single dot changed.8  The 
resolution was toughly worded, and included language 
condemning the speech,s incitement against the Kuwaiti 
government and support for terrorist acts in the country. 
 
3. (S) Dr. Mohammed said all parties were in unanimous 
agreement on a number of points regarding the Iraqi 
situation: that Saddam,s regime poses a distinct danger to 
the region; that it is highly unlikely that there will not be 
military conflict and that in fact such conflict is imminent; 
and that one way or another Saddam,s regime &is gone. It 
cannot survive, and we must think of a post-Saddam Iraq.8 
 
What now? 
 
4. (S) Responding to the Ambassador,s question about whether 
or not there had been substantive discussion about a 
post-Saddam Iraq, Dr. Mohammed revealed that the GCC had 
agreed to hold two &secret, unpublicized8 meetings on the 
Iraq situation within the next two weeks. 
 
5. (S) Realizing that the &transition period8 between a 
Saddam-led Iraq and a future government there may be 
dangerous, Dr. Mohammed said the GCC had agreed to hold a 
meeting of the head of the various GCC state security 
agencies to exchange information and coordinate security 
efforts. 
 
6. (S) In addition, the GCC had adopted by-laws for a new 
Joint Defense Committee, whose members will include GCC 
Foreign and Defense Ministers.  It will meet in Saudi Arabia 
for the first time in the coming few weeks.  The meeting will 
focus on the future of Iraq, including discussion of likely 
candidate(s) for leadership in a post-Saddam Iraq. 
 
7. (S) Comment:  Dr. Mohammed could not have been clearer 
about GCC states' desire to be rid of Saddam once and for 
all.  This, coupled with their belief that a confrontation is 
unavoidable anyway, has spurred them into action to prepare 
for the inevitable.  While this should facilitate somewhat 
approval for U.S. requests for support as we build a 
coalition and prepare for a possible confrontation, it also 
means that we should be prepared to share our views with GCC 
states on a post-Saddam Iraq as soon as possible.  Otherwise, 
they may go off in another direction, which could complicate 
further cooperation. 
JONES 

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