US embassy cable - 02ANKARA9073

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 009073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT'S VETO CLOUDS ERDOGAN'S 
POLITICAL FUTURE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 8165 
     B. ANKARA 8252 
 
 
Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. Kass. 
Reasons: 1.5 (b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: President Sezer Dec. 19 vetoed a 
constitutional amendment package (including changes to 
Articles 67, 76, and 78 -- ref A) designed to reinstate AK 
Leader Erdogan's political rights and clear the way for his 
entry into Parliament and the Government. Contacts across the 
spectrum say that Sezer is playing politics, risking not only 
his reputation for even-handedness but complicating 
government operations at a time when clarity and decisive 
action are needed.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
What Happened: the Politics 
--------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Sezer claimed the constitution "could not be changed 
for one man."  For his part, Erdogan publicly challenged the 
President to submit the amendments -- and by implication, 
Sezer's political reputation -- to a popular referendum.  His 
lawyer charged that, while the constitutional amendment 
package "is not personal, Sezer's veto is." 
 
 
3. (C) The package had passed Parliamentary muster Dec. 13 
with 440 of 465 votes cast, including a minimum of some 80 
from the Establishmentarian, opposition Republican People's 
Party (CHP).  This sizable figure represents nearly 45 
percent of the entire CHP caucus.  Deniz Baykal, the CHP 
leader, reportedly had been anxious to bring the popular 
Erdogan into Parliament and Government, partly to make AK an 
easier target by saddling Erdogan -- rather than P.M. 
Abdullah Gul, AK's No. 2 man -- directly with any AK 
Government missteps. 
 
 
4. (C) Contacts across the political spectrum are questioning 
the President's motives, criticizing his action as a purely 
political vice legal decision -- by a man who promotes a 
reputation as a disinterested, "by the book" former 
Constitutional Court Chief. 
 
 
-- CHP has publicly indicated that it disagrees with Sezer's 
reasoning.  Nevertheless, senior CHP deputy Bulent Tanla told 
poloff Dec. 20 that the party will now "carefully review" 
Sezer's ruling.  "With all of the important issues on 
Turkey's agenda, it would be wrong to hurry through the 
process," he said. 
 
 
-- Senior AK officials are even more direct, asserting to us 
that by vetoing the package Sezer "is serving the political 
interests of Turkey's Deep State" (ref B).  The Parliamentary 
Bureau Chief of the semi-official Anatolian News Agency 
(A.A.) volunteered that behind Sezer stands a collection of 
State bureaucratic and other institutions intent on keeping 
the heat on Erdogan. 
 
 
-- The owner/CEO of a TV-newspaper conglomerate told 
D/Polcouns Dec. 20 that Sezer is working with elements of the 
military, the judiciary, and with CHP to promote discord in 
government operations -- suggesting that despite CHP's 
earlier support for the package, it wants to keep AK twisting 
in the wind.  He asserted that TGS Chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok 
personally wants to stay out of the fray and is even trying 
to limit military meddling in politics, but faces resistance 
from senior commanders who take a different tack.  (Note: 
Some general officers are pleasantly surprised by AK and do 
not, in fact, want it undercut -- yet.  End note.) 
 
 
------------- 
The Mechanics 
------------- 
 
 
5. (C)  The draft must now pass through Parliament as though 
it were a new proposal -- beginning with deliberations in the 
Constitutional Committee before moving a floor vote by the 
entire Assembly.  As it did the first time around, Parliament 
will then vote on he amendments twice -- with a 48-hour 
interval between votes.  As a result, the earliest Parliament 
can adopt the legislation for Sezer's review would be Dec. 
27, according to the mainstream press. 
 
 
6. (C) The AK-controlled Parliament is likely to try pushing 
through and resubmitting to Sezer an unchanged package.  If 
so, Sezer would have three options: 1) he can accept the 
package, having made public his concerns; 2) he can apply to 
the Constitutional Court for an annulment of the changes; or 
3) he may submit all or part of the package to referendum. 
For most pieces of legislation, the president has at most 15 
days to reach a decision.  For changes to the constitution, 
however, there is no formal time limit, but Sezer would be 
expected to produce a decision by mid-January (assuming 
late-December legislative passage).  Should Sezer decide to 
take the matter to the voters, the action shifts to the 
Supreme Election Board (YSK), which is charged with 
establishing the conditions and calendar under which the 
referendum would be held.  In this regard, the YSK apparently 
has considerable lattitude. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Comment: Playing Chicken 
------------------------ 
 
 
7. (C) Our AK sources and other contacts say Erdogan's level 
of irritation with Sezer is high and growing.  This, together 
with what we know about AK and Erdogan's personality, suggest 
that at a minimum, tension between the AK Party/Government 
and Sezer will smolder, and could flare up when Erdogan 
assumes formal power -- which contacts of all political 
stripes assume is a virtual certainty sooner or later. 
 
 
8. (C) In contrast to his most recent predecessors, Sezer has 
tried to nurture a reputation as an apolitical Head of State. 
 Nevertheless, over time he has let his political slip show 
in ever increasing increments; for example a senior 
Constitutional Court Justice charges that Sezer has in fact 
abandoned neutrality in favor of supporting a narrow 
Establishmentarian, status-quo-oriented political agenda. 
While a referendum would entail risks on all sides, Sezer -- 
and a Presidency whose powers depend more on public approval 
than on specific constitutional provisions -- would stand to 
lose the most by: 1) appearing to thwart the popular will; 
and 2) perpetuating the current, unwieldy situation regarding 
Erdogan, AK, and the Government -- created in the first 
instance by legal restrictions on the AK leader that appear 
increasingly without merit in the public eye. 
PEARSON