US embassy cable - 02ANKARA9058

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 009058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, TU, Iraq 
SUBJECT: WOLFOWITZ AND GROSSMAN PRESS TURKS FOR SUPPORT ON 
IRAQ 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, reasons 1.5, 
b/d. 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
1 . (S) On December 3, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz 
and Under Secretary of State Grossman met with new Turkish PM 
Gul, an interagency group chaired by MFA Under Secretary 
Ziyal, Turkish Deputy Chief of Defense General Buyukanit 
(DCHOD), leader of the opposition Baykal, and MND Gonul.  At 
each meeting DepSecDef emphasized the urgency for clarity on 
what role Turkey is prepared to play in possible military 
actions in Iraq.  Specifically, DepSecDef noted that without 
the imminent resumption of military-to-military talks, site 
surveys of Turkish facilities, and site preparations, the 
"Northern Option" would soon be out of the question. 
DepSecDef noted the USG needed an answer by December 6 and 
outlined the significant assistance package the USG was 
prepared to provide should Turkey decide to become a full 
partner.  GOT officials reiterated their redlines for an Iraq 
operation and highlighted the potential risks to Turkey and 
its economy.  Gul agreed to resume military-to-military 
planning and to allow the U.S. to conduct site surveys of 
Turkish military facilities.  However, he pleaded for 
additional time on the more fundamental decisions concerning 
Turkey's possible contributions, including site preparations, 
troop lists, role of coalition forces, and Turkish 
participation in the Northern Option.  The GOT took the 
opportunity to underscore the importance of Turkey's 
relationship with the EU and Cyprus. 
 
 
Turkish Prime Minister Gul 
-------------------------- 
 
 
2. (S) After congratulating Gul on his recent formation of a 
new government, DepSecDef stated he and U/S Grossman were 
sent by President Bush to Ankara to discuss Turkey's 
potential contribution to preparations for possible military 
action against Iraq.  Fully recognizing that PM Gul has been 
in office only a very short time, DepSecDef underscored the 
"real urgency" for a decision on the role Turkey would be 
willing to play. 
 
 
3. (S) Noting that Turkey and the United States have had 
good, detailed discussions on the matter since last July, 
DepSecDef reminded Gul that President Bush has made no 
decision on whether to go to war with Iraq.  The USG is 
making efforts to resolve this crisis peacefully, but the 
President is determined to have Iraq disarmed of its weapons 
of mass destruction, "voluntarily if possible, but, if 
necessary, by force."  The US, DepSecDef added, is asking 
Turkey to be involved in the planning and preparation for the 
use of force against Iraq.  The only chance for a peaceful 
outcome is to build a determined show of force.  Military 
force is the underpinning of our diplomacy. 
 
 
4. (S) Repeating what the USG has told Ankara it needs from 
Turkey, DepSecDef reviewed several key requests: 
 
 
- Resumption of military-to-military planning talks; 
- Permission to conduct site surveys and begin site 
preparation of specified Turkish military facilities; 
- Turkish participation in the development of the Northern 
Option; 
- Acceptance of proposed troop lists, including the role of 
possible coalition forces such as the United Kingdom; 
- Removal of constraints on Operation Northern Watch; 
- Approval of overflight rights; and, 
- Support, if necessary, against terrorists in Northern Iraq. 
 (DepSecDef noted the presence of several hundred suspected 
terrorists in Khurmal.) 
 
 
5. (S) DepSecDef reemphasized the need to get an answer from 
Turkey as the time is approaching when planning will have to 
switch from preparing for both a Northern Option and a 
Southern Option, to solely pursuing a Southern Option.  He 
added that if the US acts militarily against Saddam Hussein, 
it would do so with a significant number of other countries. 
DepSecDef reiterated that Turkey's red lines on military 
action against Iraq were also U.S. red lines: 
 
 
--The territorial integrity of Iraq would be preserved; 
--There would be no independent Kurdish state; 
--The rights and welfare of the Turkoman people would be 
protected; 
--Iraqi national control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be 
retained; and, 
--Iraqi national control of the nation's oil would be 
retained. 
 
 
6. (S) Turkey, DepSecDef stated, has much to gain by 
participating in a military action against Iraq.  The 
conflict would be less risky, shorter in duration, and less 
economically damaging to Turkey's and the region's economies. 
 The potential for creation of a vacuum in northern Iraq 
would be less likely.  The conflict's aftermath would be 
easier to manage.  DepSecDef stated that the United States is 
very aware of Turkey's concerns about the economic risks such 
military action could generate.  For that reason, POTUS is 
ready to work with Congress to provide a substantial 
assistance package for Turkey.  If the US and Turkey go to 
war against Iraq, this package would include: 
 
 
- $2 billion/yr for two years of some mix of Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), the latter 
being synchronized with World Bank and IMF disbursements; 
- $1 billion in oil to be donated by other nations; and, 
- Up to $500 million in local procurement by U.S. defense 
forces. 
 
 
7. (S) If Turkey commits fully, but war proves unnecessary, 
the President is ready to ask Congress for $250 million in 
FY04 assistance and hopes to augment that amount with another 
$105 million.  That would be $175 million in FMF, $175 
million in ESF, and $5 million in International Military 
Education and Training funding (IMET). Complementing this 
would be closer cooperation on missile defense, greater 
access to excess defense articles, and improvements to 
facilities at Incirlik and Konya military bases. 
 
 
10. (S) DepSecDef warned that if Turkey declines this 
request, a war against Iraq could last longer, making it 
costlier and less certain about events in northern Iraq. 
DepSecDef emphasized the U.S. need for clarity from Turkey on 
its role in order to plan appropriately.  If not, planning 
must focus solely on the Southern Option without Turkey. 
DepSecDef asked for a decision by the end of the week, 
December 6. 
 
 
11. (S) PM Gul exclaimed "by the end of the week?!"  He 
followed up by stating Turkey and the US have been strategic 
partners for decades, and Turkey wants to continue and to 
deepen that relationship.  However, the government had just 
received its confidence vote, and it has only received two 
briefings on this matter. "We have followed this issue but, 
of course, it's different when you are in office," Gul added. 
 Moreover, many pressing issues are on the government's 
agenda, including the approaching EU Copenhagen Summit and 
Cyprus. 
 
 
12. (S) Gul acknowledged that Iraq is led by a bad regime 
that has caused great suffering.  He conceded that Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction are dangerous to Turkey and the 
entire region.  "We know that war is not good.  It is to be 
avoided, but we understand your points."  He added that 
Turkey has historical roots in Iraq and that Turkish security 
is directly affected by events in northern Iraq. 
 
 
13. (S) "To give a political decision, we need some time, 
frankly speaking," Gul stated.  Time is needed to shape 
public opinion.  Gul repeated twice again that Turkey can say 
yes to the requests, but the government needs more time to 
update itself on the situation, must go to parliament, and 
must shape public opinion.  He stated that Turkey's fragile 
economy is an issue with millions of unemployed.  Military 
action against Iraq could damage progress underway in 
economic reform.  He emphasized, "We will cooperate, we will 
cooperate, but we need time to study as the new Foreign 
Minister knows little and the new Defense Minister knows 
little." 
 
 
14. (S) Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal 
intervened making two key assertions:  First, the offer 
DepSecDef reviewed was not commensurate with the risks and 
costs Turkey is being asked to bear.  Second, Turkey is 
entering a decisive phase in its relationship with Europe due 
to the approaching EU summit and current state of Cyprus 
settlement negotiations.  "If we do not pass these two 
hurdles (attaining a date for EU accession negotiations and a 
resolution of Cyprus), the devastation will preclude our 
ability to participate in an attack on Iraq.  We cannot give 
you an answer before December 12, the date of the Copenhagen 
Summit."  Ziyal added he had not briefed the Prime Minister 
on the terrorist danger present in Khurmal, but if the issue 
is terrorism, Turkey will of course be with the US.  PM Gul 
interjected, "We will fight with you against all types of 
terrorism." 
 
 
15. (S) DepSecDef stated the most urgent priority now is the 
need to resume planning talks, to initiate site surveys, and 
then to do site preparations.  The next major decision point 
will be deploying troops to prepare for war.  The ultimate 
decision point would be the decision to go to war.  If 
diplomacy is going to be effective, we need to move forward, 
he added.  Ziyal noted that the resumption of 
military-to-military planning and site surveys could go 
forward without parliamentary approval, after which the Prime 
Minister agreed the military-to-military planning talks can 
go forward. 
 
 
16. (S) Ambassador Grossman stated that POTUS is putting much 
effort forward to support Turkey's desire to get a date for 
accession negotiations from the European Union -- "You can 
count on us to press this line all through December 12." 
Momentum is developing toward this goal due to progress in 
Turkey's democratic reforms and progress in the Cyprus 
negotiations.  Grossman urged the new Turkish government to 
make a concrete commitment to the UN Secretary General's 
Cyprus plan as a basis for agreement.  Doing so would 
positively affect Turkey's prospects to attain a date certain 
from the EU for accession negotiations. 
 
 
17. (S) PM Gul responded that his government is talking to 
Turkish Cypriot President Denktash.  He emphasized that 
Turkey will inevitably join the EU, "That is our mentality." 
When Turkey joins, he asserted, the EU will become more of a 
world player.  Turkey's membership would send a message to 
the Muslim world that being democratic is attractive. 
 
 
18. (S) DepSecDef added that it is "an incredible strategic 
opportunity for the EU and I hope it doesn't blow it."  But 
in practical terms, EU accession and Cyprus are tied. 
Progress on the latter would be a huge step forward toward 
the former.  It would enable the US to be even more helpful 
to Turkey.  Closing the meeting, DepSecDef responded to 
Ziyal's criticism of the assistance package, stating that 
"the numbers may not be big to you, but they are big to our 
government.  They represent a major Presidential commitment." 
 He urged the Turkish government not to go public with these 
figures. The public line should be simply that: The United 
States is ready to assist Turkey. 
 
 
Roundtable Discussion at MFA 
---------------------------- 
 
 
19. (S) Ziyal then hosted DepSecDef and Grossman at an 
hour-long interagency meeting at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  The meeting focused on the Turks' proposal for a 
bilateral standby fund intended to sustain market confidence 
in Turkey's economy in the event of war with Iraq.  DepSecDef 
agreed to explore the merits of the proposal.  Following 
Ziyal's recap of DepSecDef's earlier meeting with PM Gul, 
they discussed the Prime Minister's agreement to re-start 
mil-mil planning talks and to permit site surveys of Turkey's 
military facilities.  U/S Grossman had a long, follow-on 
discussion with the MFA representatives about Cyprus.  He 
argued that now is the best time to resolve Cyprus -- before 
the EU decides on Cyprus accession December 12-13 -- and that 
the GOT should simply sign the first two pages of the UN plan. 
 
 
20. (S) Bilateral Standby Fund:  Ziyal opened the meeting by 
asking Treasury U/S Oztrak to report on his assessment of the 
economic consequences Turkey would face in the event of war 
with Iraq.  Oztrak estimated the impact of an Iraq operation 
in terms of the financing gap for 2003:  $47 billion best 
case (short war) to $58 billion worst case (long war).  A 
war, he predicted, would cause oil and natural gas price 
rises, export decline, and loss of tourism and oil pipeline 
revenues.  Psychological effects would lead to decreased 
consumer spending, loss of tax revenues, and increased 
government spending for social security and refugees. 
Interest rates would rise 10% and the lira's exchange rate 
against the dollar would fall by 28%.  Post-conflict 
uncertainty would have a substantial impact on the economy. 
Oztrak also mentioned indirect costs to Turkey such as an 
economic slowdown in Europe which could dampen Turkey's 
export trade.  He then boiled the factors down to three: 
losses in revenue, increased expenditures, and limits on 
access to financial markets. 
 
 
21. (S) Both Oztrak and Ziyal argued for "early and 
substantial" US financial support in the form of a "standby" 
arrangement, mentioning a figure of $20 billion.  This, they 
said, would be the best way to positively influence the 
perception of the markets that the US would "not let Turkey 
go down the drain" and that the Turkish economy would "stay 
afloat."  Turkey would be allowed to draw on these standby 
funds only to the degree it needed them -- less in the best 
case and more in the worse cases.  Oztrak accepted Ambassador 
Pearson's point that the Turks' analysis had not factored in 
any of the possible medium- to longer-term benefits DepSecDef 
had outlined, such as an upturn in trade relations with Iraq 
and other neighbors as well as increased tourism in a more 
stable region.  Oztrak also confirmed to U/S Grossman that 
Turkey much preferred that the USG control the escrow account 
rather than negotiate a new IMF standby, which "would have 
too many conditionalities." 
 
 
22. (S) DepSecDef said the Turkish "standby" approach might 
be an alternative to the President's package he had outlined 
to the PM.  We could not do both. The problem was how to 
devise a mechanism to mitigate negative market effects and 
create a fund Turkey could draw on only as needed. 
DepSecDef agreed with Ziyal's suggestion to open a "third 
channel" (in addition to the existing political and military 
ones) of economic experts to discuss the feasibility of the 
Turkish approach.  Ziyal urged the US to begin its 
consultations with Capital Hill on an aid package for Turkey 
even as the economic experts talk, in order not to lose time. 
 
 
23. (S) Site Surveys and Military-to-Military Planning Talks: 
 Ziyal recapped the decisions reached in the PM's meeting: 
"yes" to site surveys, and re-starting the mil-mil 
discussions.  The PM understood the need to "impress" Saddam 
visibly through overt cooperation.  Although Turkey 
understood the urgency the US attached to a political 
decision on furthering such cooperation, including stationing 
US and possibly other coalition (possibly British) troops in 
Turkey, Ziyal said that would be impossible before the 
December 12 Copenhagen EU Summit.  The Parliament would have 
to debate and approve any influx of foreign troops into 
Turkey. 
 
 
24. (S) DepSecDef underscored the need to allow site 
preparation teams into Turkey.  They would send a strong 
signal to Saddam about the seriousness of the coalition's 
resolve.  The US was prepared to spend $200-300 million on 
needed construction.  LTG Casey said this could involve up to 
6,000 engineers and logisticians.  TGS Deputy J3 MG Kalyoncu 
said the GOT would have to study the "legal" aspects of 
bringing in such large numbers of "foreign groups." 
 
 
25. (S) The Growing Coalition:  In response to Ziyal's query 
about the composition of the coalition, DeSecDef responded 
that he knew of at least 23 NATO members and aspirants who 
would be with us either unconditionally (16) or under another 
UNSCR (7).  He thought France and Russia would also come 
around.  In the Gulf region, most countries were committed 
privately while saying otherwise publicly.  In response to 
Ziyal's question, he admitted Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's 
positions were less clear, but he thought they would end up 
supporting any operation. 
 
 
26. (S) DepSecDef warned again that further delay in Turkish 
decision-making could sideline the Northern Option.  Planning 
for the South was already far advanced.  While the site prep 
teams could not actually start before mid-January, we need to 
know now--before they start--that Turkey would indeed allow 
US and possibly other coalition troops to come to Turkey. 
The big decision on actual use of force could come later. 
 
 
27. (S) Finally, D/US for the Mideast Tuygan called attention 
to the upcoming (13-15 Dec.) Iraqi Opposition conference in 
London.  The Group of Six had become too powerful, to the 
exclusion of the Turkomen.  Turkey insisted that the Turkomen 
be included in the core group.  Ziyal later emphasized that 
this is a critical concern for Turkey. 
 
 
DCHOD Buyukanit 
--------------- 
 
 
28. (S) USG Request for Military Support:  DCHOD stated the 
TGS was very familiar with US military requirements as well 
as with the discussion DepSecDef had earlier that day with PM 
Gul.  The TGS will deliver a detailed brief on Iraq to the 
new government on 9 Dec. 02.  The purpose of the TGS briefing 
will be to help the government reach necessary political 
decisions. 
 
 
29. (S) DepSecDef proposed that potentially three sets of 
decisions are needed:  (1) The first decision set, needed 
now, is to resume mil-to-mil planning talks, and to 
immediately initiate site surveys that would be followed by 
site preparations beginning early to mid January 03.  (2) The 
second decision concerns acceptance of foreign troops on 
Turkish soil, recognizing that the earliest likely troop 
deployment would be 4-6 weeks from now. (3) The final 
decision would be to use force, should the President of the 
United States decide to do so (a decision he has not yet 
made).  DepSecDef expressed appreciation that the Turkish PM 
recognized the USG need for a timely response and personally 
gave earlier that day his approval for immediately resuming 
mil-to-mil planning and initiating site surveys. 
 
 
30. (S) DCHOD asked what role NATO could play in an Iraqi 
operation, emphasizing that it would be very helpful for 
Turkey to have some NATO cover.  DepSecDef replied that NATO 
mechanisms could in principle be used for infrastructure 
improvements as well as potential Article 5 scenarios if 
conflict made it necessary to defend Turkey.  Ambassador 
Pearson added that NATO's Prague Summit statement supporting 
UNSCR 1441 could be useful in providing a NATO "umbrella" for 
Turkish site surveys and site preparations.  TGS Dep J3 
emphasized that a parliamentary decision would be needed for 
any troop deployments, whether they were engineers conducting 
site preparations or combat troops. 
 
 
31. (S) Turkey is Prepared to Deploy to Northern Iraq:  DCHOD 
stated that the Turkish military has almost completed 
preparations to prevent immigration and to control IDPs 
inside Iraq, should military operations be required.  In the 
event that Turkish forces deploy to Northern Iraq, the DCHOD 
asked the USG to emphasize to Iraqi groups that Turkish 
forces were not there as an occupying force.  DepSecDef 
responded that the best way to convince the northern Iraqi 
groups was to integrate all forces into a coordinated 
coalition that could both manage the IDP challenges and exert 
pressure on Baghdad.  DepSecDef again reiterated the value of 
a two-front war to expedite successful operations; he also 
noted that the potential role for UK forces was not "in" 
northern Iraq, but deploying "through" northern Iraq. 
 
 
32. (S) NATO Command Structure Review:  DCHOD related that 
the TGS was "not happy" with a recently received draft NATO 
command structure document (MC324).  The draft did not 
include any criteria by which to justify or rationalize the 
NATO HQ structures and their proposed locations.  It gave an 
appearance of taking a "sudden decision" without proper 
criteria.  DepSecDef agreed that criteria needed to be 
included and that USG was equally frustrated with the timing 
of the document. 
 
 
Parliamentary Opposition CHP Leader Baykal 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
33. (C) In his meeting with CHP and opposition leader Baykal, 
DepSecDef highlighted US support for Turkey's EU candidacy 
and for a definite accession negotiations date for Turkey to 
be granted during the EU Copenhagen summit.  He reiterated 
the USG view that the UN proposal for a Cyprus settlement 
represents a way to a rapid solution and that turkey should 
accept as the basis for further negotiations.  On Iraq, 
DepSecDef underscored that: 
- The US is working with a coalition of nations; 
- The only way to hope for a peaceful resolution is to 
demonstrate a credible threat of force; 
- We recognize Turkey's economic vulnerabilities; 
- All nations will benefit if Iraq becomes a free, open and 
prosperous country; and, 
- If war proves necessary, a strong coalition, including 
Turkey, is critical to ensuring that the conflict is short 
and to reducing its costs and risks. 
27. (C) EU accession: Baykal regretted that an earlier 
Turkish government (read: his rival Ecevit) had failed to 
grasp the opportunity to join the EU at the same time as 
Greece.  As a result, Turkey now works at a disadvantage 
compared to Greece.  But CHP is committed to pursuing 
Turkey's EU candidacy and, in this regard, will support 
efforts to this end by the AK government.  A "date for a 
date" from Copenhagen is not enough.  We all need to know 
whether Turkey is a European or Middle Eastern country.  If 
Turkey is rebuffed by the EU and at the same time is forced 
to cooperate with the US in an Iraq operation, especially in 
northern Iraq, then the country could become destabilized. 
If Turkey feels it is accepted as European, it can raise the 
level of its cooperation with the US; in any event, relations 
with the US are the pillar of Turkey's foreign policy. 
 
 
28.  (C) Cyprus: while supporting a fair and peaceful 
solution, Baykal expressed reservations whether a solution is 
possible in a short time and asserted CHP's dissatisfaction 
with the UN paper.  First, a solution has to start from the 
post-'74 bizonality in which each community is homogeneous. 
Second, the paper would have Cyprus revert to a pre-'74 
arrangement.  One-third of the Greek Cypriots would move back 
to the north, which would thus have two ethnic groups, 
whereas the Greek Cypriot south would remain homogeneous, 
thereby creating a disequilibrium which would lead to loss of 
political equality over the next 20 years.  CHP economic guru 
Dervis added that mixing the populations too fast would risk 
an incident, e.g., a killing, which would toss 10 years of 
good will out the window instantly.  Third, Baykal continued, 
the proposed boundary lines are a problem. 
 
 
29. (C) Iraq: reiterating his preference for a peaceful 
diplomatic solution, Baykal called for the elimination of WMD 
from the region around Turkey and expressed his desire for a 
democratic, peaceful regime in Baghdad  He acknowledged how 
critically important the Iraq question is for the US. And he 
noted that sometimes it is impossible for a country like 
Turkey to decide its own preferences in the face of the 
strategic interests of a country like the US.  If 
intervention is inescapable, then: 
- It should be carried out under international legitimacy 
with a clear legal basis; 
- The burden on Turkey, both financial and refugee, must be 
eliminated to avoid the damage done to Turkey's economic, 
social and political fabric under the economic and refugee 
impact of the Gulf War; 
- It is essential to maintain the territorial integrity of 
Iraq (and in this regard Baykal wants a clear picture of how 
Turkey's concerns about Kurdish independence movements will 
be met); and 
- Any solution must take into account the interests of the 
Turkomen who face Saddam Hussein's efforts to eliminate their 
identity and homeland in and around Kirkuk. 
 
 
MOD Gonul 
--------- 
 
 
30. (S) DEPSECDEF,s meeting with the new AK Party Minister 
of Defense was largely unsubstantive.  Not only is Turkey's 
Defense Ministry restricted also exclusively to defense 
procurement issues, but Gonul admitted he had not yet been 
briefed on Iraq.  DEPSECDEF outlined the nature of our close 
and transparent consultations to date, stressing that joint 
military planning is our best chance for peace.  Saddam would 
only change his mind about obeying UNSCRs if he is convinced 
the only alternative is his removal by force.  He would be 
convinced by actions, not words. Gonul agreed on the need to 
be firm on UNSCR 1441.  He asserted that Saddam had thus far 
complied with 1441 and urged the US to await the inspection 
reports before deciding on a military option.  A Turkish 
decision to cooperate, especially if it offered troops, would 
be a huge decision.  DYP Chairman Ciller had lost many votes 
by implying she would commit Turkish troops if she became PM. 
 That said, Gonul said Turkey would cooperate with the US, as 
it always had, but he hoped it would not be in a crisis. 
 
 
31.(S) DEPSECDEF cautioned against "over-scaring" the Turkish 
people about a possible Iraq operation.  Economic problems 
largely spring from psychological reasons.  Any war could be 
over relatively quickly and result in some substantial 
benefits for Turkey.  The government should begin 
accentuating the positive. 
32. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSecDef Wolfowitz 
and U/S Grossman. 
PEARSON