US embassy cable - 02ABUJA3344

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NIGERIA: KADUNA GOVERNOR BLAMES RECENT VIOLENCE ON RADICAL MUSLIMS AND OUTSIDE AGITATORS

Identifier: 02ABUJA3344
Wikileaks: View 02ABUJA3344 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2002-12-19 15:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: KADUNA GOVERNOR BLAMES RECENT VIOLENCE ON 
 RADICAL MUSLIMS AND OUTSIDE AGITATORS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a December 11 meeting with 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Steven Schrage and Ambassador Jeter, 
Kaduna State Governor Ahmed Makarfi discussed the late 
November violence in Kaduna.  Makarfi blamed the riots on 
pro-sharia Islamic groups and agitators from outside 
Kaduna.  He acknowledged that religious tensions acted as 
kindling; however, he said the motivations of those who 
actually lit the fire were "purely political".  Later, in a 
private conversation with Ambassador Jeter, Makarfi laid 
much of the blame at the feet of Vice President Atiku and 
National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed.  Makarfi said 
that in their attempts to embarrass President Obasanjo and 
undermine his popularity the two political heavyweights had 
unleashed forces they could not control.  Finally, while 
the governor praised the military for its handling of the 
incident, he had no kind words for the Nigerian National 
Police (NNP) and other civilian security agencies.  Were it 
not for their inept handling of the situation, said 
Makarfi, the violence might well have been averted.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (C) During a December 11 meeting with INL DAS Schrage 
and Ambassador Jeter, Kaduna State governor Makarfi 
discussed the late November violence in Kaduna.  Ambassador 
emphasized that Kaduna, with its ethnically and religiously 
diverse population, had the potential to be an example for 
the rest of Nigeria if incidences of civil unrest could be 
minimized. Makarfi acknowledged that rising tension between 
Kaduna's Christian and Muslim populations was of grave 
concern, but he thought the root of the problem was 
politics, not religion. 
 
 
3.  (C) Makarfi said the unrest had nothing to do with the 
many peaceful Muslim processions taking place in Kaduna. 
The violence began when members of radical Islamic groups, 
collectively known as Izala, incited the crowds to act. 
Emphasizing that the riots were planned, Makarfi noted that 
there many of those arrested claimed they were paid to 
attack the "This Day" newspaper office or to burn the 
governor's shopping plaza.  He also claimed that the 
evening before the riots began, he had heard reports of 
people dropping tires in strategic locations around Kaduna 
so they would be available to be burned the next day. 
Makarfi was astounded that neither the Nigerian police nor 
the intelligence service was able to pick up these signs of 
impending trouble. 
 
 
4.  (C) Makarfi specifically noted the pernicious influence 
of the "Supreme Council for Sharia Law".  The governor 
accused this group of helping to incite the riots in order 
to hasten the introduction of sharia law into Kaduna State. 
Makarfi said this group would be the likely source of 
future problems for him and Kaduna because of the 
governor's disdain for sharia law.  Noting that the Muslim 
community is sharply divided between radicals and 
moderates, Makarfi said he would work to remove the 
influence of this group from Kaduna and vowed to support 
those that would join him in the fight.  He said this would 
be a showdown and he welcomed it. 
 
 
5.  (C) Later, in a private conversation with the 
Ambassador, Makarfi further emphasized the political nature 
of the violence by placing much of the blame on Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar and National Security Advisor 
Aliyu Mohammed.  Makarfi accused the VP and NSA of 
fomenting violence in Katsina, Nasarawa, and Benue in 
addition to Kaduna.  The governor allowed that the VP and 
NSA may have only wanted to cause minor unrest in order to 
embarrass and weaken President Obasanjo.  Unfortunately, 
said Makarfi, the duo let loose forces that they could not 
control.  When asked what the USG might be able to do help 
the situation, Makarfi suggested that the USG speak with 
the VP and NSA and demand that they desist. 
 
 
6.  (C) While Makarfi gave the military good marks for its 
handling of the crisis, his review of the NNP's performance 
was scathing.  Makarfi characterized them as being 
uncoordinated, untrained and undisciplined.  He said the 
police had failed miserably during the riots and that the 
Police Commissioner admitted as much to him personally. 
The governor noted that despite rumors that something was 
in the offing and his personal order to increase local 
security measures, the police did nothing to prepare 
themselves for the violence that would take place in 
Kaduna.  Makarfi said that when the situation finally 
deteriorated to the point at which the military requested 
permission to deploy, he had to overrule the Nigerian 
National Police which had said military intervention was 
unnecessary. 
 
 
7.  (C) Clearly exacerbated by the NNP's performance, 
Makarfi suggested scrapping the organization all together. 
He felt that most police functions could be better carried 
out by local police forces.  He advocated the creation of a 
"National Guard" made up of retired military personnel that 
would be available to act in cases of large-scale unrest. 
 
 
8.  (C) When the Ambassador and Makarfi's conversation 
turned toward the upcoming national elections, Makarfi said 
the international community should pressure Obasanjo not to 
run for a second term for the good of the country.  Makarfi 
thought the North could accept another southerner as long 
as he is not Obasanjo or another Yorba.  When the 
Ambassador told Makarfi that he had heard VP Atiku had 
decided to stay with the President, Makarfi changed his 
tack slightly, saying Obasanjo had a chance to win the 
North if he reconciled with Atiku. 
 
 
9. (C) Makarfi thought Ibrahim Babangida's support of the 
candidacy of former Vice President Alex Ekwueme was a ploy 
to win the presidency for IBB in 2007.  Makarfi reasoned 
that if Ekwueme were to win the South-zoned presidency, he 
would not run for a second term.  That would leave the door 
open for IBB to run when the office is zoned to the North 
in 2007. 
 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT: While Makarfi's allegations about the 
VP's and NSA's roles in fomenting sectarian violence are 
disturbing, it is important to keep in mind the source of 
the information.  Makarfi and Atiku have long been 
competitors.  Indeed, many saw Makarfi as Atiku's likely 
replacement if Obasanjo dropped the VP.  It is possible 
that political animosity may have influenced Makarfi's 
search for the cause of unrest in his state.  END COMMENT. 
JETER 

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