US embassy cable - 02HARARE2838

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2012 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI 
SUBJECT: MDC-ANC CONTACTS ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: HARARE 2829 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington.  Reasons: 1.5 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.  (C)  According to a senior MDC parliamentarian, the ANC 
has agreed to a ZANU-PF plan for Zimbabwean Speaker of 
Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa to replace Robert Mugabe, while 
offering token reprentation to the opposition.  MDC leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai was briefed on this initiative, which 
likely prompted his December 18 statement condemning South 
Africa and Britain.  The retired Rhodesian Colonel named in 
the statement admitted being sent as an emissary to 
Tsvangirai by Mnangagwa and defense forces chief Vitalis 
 
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Zvinavashe, a particularly interesting development if Mugabe 
was unaware of this overture.  Meanwhile, Father Fidelis 
Mukonori's efforts to broker a Mugabe-Tsvangirai dialogue are 
at an embryonic stage, but both sides appear willing to 
engage in such an effort given the provision of unspecified 
guarantees from the other.  The MDC no longer believes South 
Africa will play a fair broker role on Zimbabwe and has told 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon in a letter that 
Pretoria has "repudiated its membership in the Troika" by its 
demonstrated partiality toward the "illegitimate Mugabe 
regime."      End Summary. 
 
ANC-ZANU-PF plan on the way forward 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  Reftel reported issuance of a statement by Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai accusing 
Britain, South Africa, and elements of ZANU-PF of conspiring 
to keep the ruling party in power after Robert Mugabe's 
departure from office.  We subsequently received a report of 
two recent meetings held in South Africa between MDC 
parliamentarian (and shadow justice minister) David Coltart 
and Patrick Moseki, described to us as a senior ANC official, 
which might shed additional light on the motivations for 
Tsvangirai's statement. 
 
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3.  (C)  According to Coltart's report, Coltart and Moseki 
first met in South Africa on December 8.  Moseki reportedly 
explained that Thabo Mbeki was facing growing criticism from 
within the ANC and its coalition partners for not doing 
enough to make the South African economy more equitable.  He 
implied that Mbeki was consumed predominantly with 
consolidating his political position, and that his views on 
Zimbabwe should be considered in that light.  Coltart replied 
with a description of the dramatic economic decline and the 
famine in Zimbabwe, and made it clear that the resulting 
tensions could soon erupt if the underlying political crisis 
were not soon resolved.  He reiterated the MDC's proposal on 
a way forward -- Mugabe's retirement followed by 
establishment of a transitional authority which would restore 
some degree of political and economic stability and pave the 
way for a new, internationally-supervised presidential 
election.  Coltart acknowledged that a transitional authority 
would have to grant some sort of amnesty to Mugabe and his 
senior officials, and that the international community would 
have to be prepared to offer safe passage.  Moseki replied 
that Zimbabwean Speaker of Parliament (and long Mugabe's heir 
apparent) Emmerson Mnangagwa was in South Africa attempting 
to sell the ANC a leadership succession plan which excluded 
the MDC.  Moseki said he would meet Mnangagwa the following 
day and report back to Coltart. 
 
4.  (C)  On December 9, Moseki and Coltart met again.  Moseki 
said he had been part of an ANC delegation which had met for 
most of that day with Mnangagwa.  The Zimbabwean Speaker had 
laid out ZANU-PF's plan of action, which Moseki implied the 
ANC had bought into : 
 
--Mugabe would serve out his term, which expires in 2008 but 
would soon appoint Mnangagwa Prime Minister and gradually 
turn over most executive functions to him; 
 
--Mnangagwa would offer a token number of Cabinet positions 
to the MDC (he suggested two seats but was urged by some of 
his ANC interlocutors to increase that number to five); 
 
--If the MDC opted not to go along with this plan, it would 
be crushed ruthlessly; 
 
--ZANU-PF would implement the plan regardless of what the 
international community thought of it or Mnangagwa. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  We know that Morgan Tsvangirai has been 
briefed on the above discussions, which could have prompted 
him to issue his December 19 statement accusing South Africa 
of collaborating with ZANU-PF to ensure the latter's 
continued hold on power.  The warm reception accorded 
Mnangagwa at the ANC congress could have been another factor 
in Tsvangirai's decision to issue such a strong condemnation 
of the South Africans.  The MDC leadership has come to the 
conclusion, over the past several months, that the South 
African government will not play a fair broker role on 
Zimbabwe.  Tsvangirai has written to Commonwealth 
Secretary-General Don McKinnon stating that the MDC would 
 
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find it "extremely difficult" to continue to participate in a 
Commonwealth Troika process which involves South Africa.  In 
the letter, a copy of which has been faxed to AF/S, 
Tsvangirai writes:  "We are convinced that through its 
 
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duplicity, South Africa has repudiated its membership in the 
Troika.  Pretoria has totally distanced itself from any 
attempt to evaluate the Zimbabwe crisis impartially and 
objectively.  It can only meaningfully participate in the 
Troika deliberations not as an honest broker, but as an open 
and self-confessed representative of the illegitimate Mugabe 
regime." 
 
 
Father Fidelis keeps at it 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Meanwhile, Father Fidelis Mukonori is continuing his 
efforts to arrange a Mugabe-Tsvangirai dialogue.  In a 
meeting with Tsvangirai advisor Gandi Mudzingwa on December 
19, Father Fidelis said Mugabe had told him that the MDC 
leader had as much of a right as any Zimbabwean to govern 
Zimbabwe.  Mugabe, however, expressed concerns about the 
MDC's pending court challenge of the presidential election 
results and about some in the MDC who were more interested in 
seeking retribution than moving forward.  Mudzingwa told us 
it was apparent from his conversation with Father Fidelis 
that Mugabe wants certain guarantees, most likely immunity 
from prosecution for past misdeeds.  Asked whether Mugabe 
would trust Tsvangirai was capable of delivering such a 
guarantee, Mudzingwa told us that was an issue to be worked 
out in an inter-party dialogue.  In his conversation with 
Mudzingwa, Father Fidelis was apparently  dismissive of 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, calling him a "small boy."  Father 
Fidelis was due to follow up with Tsvangirai in a meeting 
scheduled for December 19.  (Comment: This initiative is 
clearly in its embryonic stages and it is unclear whether it 
will lead anywhere.  Mudzingwa was pleasantly surprised by 
Mugabe's reported comment regarding Tsvangirai, and said 
dropping the court case was not out of the question provided 
significant concessions were agreed first by the other side. 
Father Fidelis told us separately that no meeting would occur 
this year and until the election court case was resolved. 
End Comment.) 
 
British in cahoots with Mnangagwa? 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C)  Tsvangirai told the Ambassador on December 17 that he 
had learned of efforts by the British Government to convince 
the editor of the independent "Daily News" to soften its 
regular criticism of Emmerson Mnangagwa.  He said he also 
knew that retired Colonel Lionel Dyck -- who was head of the 
Rhodesian military's parachute regiment and now runs an 
international demining company -- was working with Mnangagwa 
and General Vitalis Zvinavashe, Chairman of the Defense 
Forces, to find a solution to Zimbabwe's political crisis. 
(Comment: Tsvangirai clearly assumed these two developments 
were related, and appears to have concluded that the British 
government believed Mnangagwa's replacement of Mugabe was the 
best way of restoring political stability to Zimbabwe and 
that they were working together to effect that outcome.  End 
Comment.) In response to a journalist's question, Dyck 
acknowledged meeting with Tsvangirai as an emissary of 
Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe.  "I would like to see peaceful 
change in Zimbabwe," he said, "and, as such, the vehicle of 
ZANU-PF should be used as part of a transition to peaceful 
change." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) As we concluded in reftel, Tsvangirai was concerned 
about being squeezed into accepting a political settlement in 
which he and the MDC were given only token representation in 
an Mnangagwa-led government.  He apparently concluded that 
exposing his suspicions publicly was the best way of warding 
off such a possibility.  It is not yet clear whether the MDC 
leader's vehement condemnations of particular governments and 
individuals burned bridges with some of those -- both 
internally and externally -- most willing to and capable of 
helping extricate Zimbabwe from its cycle of crises.  In 
addition, if Mugabe was not aware of their overture to 
Tsvangirai via Colonel Dyck, Messrs. Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe 
 
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will have some very deft explaining to do. 
 
 
SULLIVAN